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                                    Abstract 
 
Tourism experts appear to agree that at some point in time each individual tourism 
destination will eventually encounter disruption, in the form of a crisis or a disaster. The 
subsequent negative impacts will threaten the destination‟s stability and immediate 
future. Crisis management models and frameworks are provided to assist tourism 
managers to prepare and cope with this apparent inevitability; however, it seems that 
these models are somewhat flawed in that they display several weaknesses and 
limitations; that is, certain important issues appear to have been neglected during their 
construction. Such concerns relate to the unpredictability of tourism crises and disasters, 
the rigid, prescriptive nature of the models, the cultural context of crises, and certain 
realities affecting small tourism businesses. The possibilities which could arise from the 
application of chaos theory are also overlooked, in favour of a traditional, pedantic 
approach which perhaps stifles innovation.  
      The AH1N1 Influenza crisis, which afflicted Mexico in 2009, provides a useful case 
study with which to conduct a qualitative investigation openly challenging 
contemporary tourism crisis management theory. Furthermore, it offers an opportunity 
to apply an alternative tourism crisis management model based on chaos theory. A series 
of semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key players from the Mexican 
tourism industry along with an analysis of government and media documentation. The 
process served to substantiate the doubts cast regarding the restrictions associated with 
contemporary models, as the flaws referred to above were apparent throughout the 
crisis. On a more positive note, also noticeable were various elements of chaos theory, 
whose recognition can serve to generate alternative tourism crisis management 
strategies which are perhaps more suitable and effective to the situation at hand. It is 
suggested that this empirical study utilising chaos theory, the first of its kind concerning 
a tourism destination, be used as the springboard for further research into the 
possibilities offered by chaos theory to the management of tourism crises and disasters.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 A critique of contemporary tourism crisis and disaster 
management models and frameworks: an introduction  
                                                 
 
 Tourism contributes to the economic development of many countries. It is a valuable 
source of income, foreign exchange and employment and it is predicted to soon become 
the world‟s most „significant industry‟ (Glaesser, 2006:1). It is anticipated that growth 
will continue, the most important regions being Europe, the Americas, and East Asia 
and the Pacific, and tourist arrivals are expected to reach 1.6 billion by 2020 (UNWTO, 
2010).  
          Nevertheless, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the growth in its scale and 
economic importance, tourism could be described as a volatile and fragile industry „that 
can be greatly influenced by natural, economic, safety and health issues‟ (Monterrubio, 
2010: 2). Thus, a key element of success or failure is, according to Volo (2007), a 
tourism destination‟s ability to provide a safe, predictable and secure environment for its 
visitors. However, safety and security can be compromised in the form of crises and 
disasters which can arrive without warning and often cause immense tangible and 
intangible damage to tourism destinations (Xu and Grunewald, 2009).  At the same 
time, the inevitable media attention that accompanies such events serves to heighten the 
risk perception of potential tourists, who often decide not to visit the affected 
destination as a result of their feelings of insecurity (Santana, 2003), and consequently, 
such disruption can have serious effects on a nation‟s economy (Volo, 2007).  Along 
with these economic effects, environmental consequences and major socio-cultural 
impacts may also occur, particularly if the destination is reliant on tourism, as is the case 
in many developing countries (Ritchie, 2008). 
          The susceptibility of tourism destinations to crises and disasters is widely 
addressed within the literature (Cioccio and Michael, 2005; Evans and Elphick, 2005; 
de Sausmarez, 2007; Kuo et al., 2008). Mao et al. (2009) discuss the vulnerability of 
tourism to political situations, natural disasters and epidemics, highlighting the decline 
in arrivals following various disasters, including SARS and the Asian Tsunami; Ritchie 
notes the increase in biosecurity risks and health scares (2008), while Wang (2009) 
observes how various studies have indicated that tourism demand is directly related to 
the effects of natural and human disasters. 
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          This inherent vulnerability of tourism has been starkly evident in recent years. In 
particular, significant media attention has been paid to a number of crisis events, such as 
the terrorist attacks in New York, Bali, and London, the UK Foot and Mouth outbreak, 
the SARS outbreak, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, 
and although not all of these events can be linked directly with tourism, nevertheless 
they have all affected the tourism industry on a national and international scale.  
          Such disruptions are not, however, an entirely new phenomenon; „To the casual 
observer exposed to the plethora of media that currently inform our daily lives, it 
appears that we live in an increasingly disaster prone world‟ is how Faulkner (2001: 
135) began his hugely influential paper, „Towards a Framework for Tourism Disaster 
Management‟ more than a decade ago. Faulkner had noticed an increase in tourism 
crises and disasters even before the turn of the millennium and he was voicing concern 
that poor disaster management planning and preparation (along with a lack of 
systematic research in the field analysing the impacts of such events and industry 
responses) meant that destinations were unprepared to respond effectively when 
confronted with a crisis situation. Thus, drawing on elements of existing crisis 
management theory and tourism disaster management strategy, Faulkner developed and 
consequently presented a “generic framework for tourism disaster strategies.” (2001: 
143). 
          Perhaps as a result of Faulkner‟s (2001) promptings, and an apparent growth in 
tourism crises in recent years, there is now evidence of increasing research into tourism 
crisis and disaster management, with academics either adding to Faulkner‟s framework 
or providing ideas of their own (Evans and Elphick, 2005; Hystad and Keller, 2008;  
Ritchie 2004, 2009). Nonetheless, there remains concern within the field that, despite 
the recent growth in research and knowledge, many managers and tourism organisations 
continue to remain unprepared for a crisis situation (Ritchie, 2009). Indeed, Hystad and 
Keller (2008) suggest that their research, and that of others (for example, Beirman, 
2003; Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001; Glaesser, 2006) serves to reveal that the „majority of 
tourism businesses do not actively incorporate disaster management strategies into their 
businesses‟ (Hystad and Keller, 2008: 160).   
          Tourism businesses and managers are, therefore, berated for not adopting the 
„disaster management strategies‟ which the literature has to offer. This criticism may be 
well-founded, perhaps, with large sections of the tourism industry appearing rather 
lethargic and unwilling to adapt – although there is no specific research that suggests 
this to be the case. However, the „strategies‟ and models which academia is keen to 
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thrust onto the industry must be considered carefully, and questions need to be asked 
about their applicability and usefulness. For example, in reality do such models really 
enable a tourism destination, organisation or business to plan for often unforeseen 
eventualities and to deal effectively with such situations when they occur?  And if 
tourism businesses could actually be convinced to embrace these disaster management 
strategies, would they then serve to mitigate the tangible and intangible damage 
evidently inflicted by such events?  
          Indeed, it is suggested here that, for a number of reasons which will be explained 
in detail throughout the next chapter, the models and frameworks proposed by tourism 
academics fail to deliver a satisfactory solution to the problems presented by crises and 
disasters. For example, much emphasis is placed on the pursuit of detailed risk analyses, 
yet it appears that the unpredictability and scope of potential crises and disasters make 
prediction rather difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the models, perhaps in a quest to 
be universally compatible, appear to adopt a „one-size-fits-all‟ approach, failing to take 
into account the circumstances unique to each crisis or disaster, such as cultural 
differences or levels of government and individual resources. Also, by using a 
prescriptive, step-by-step format, the models fail to take into account the complex and 
frequently chaotic characteristics of crises and disasters which, by their very nature, 
often do not proceed as might be expected.  
          More specifically, although the school of thought labeled chaos theory is often 
referred to in the tourism crisis and disaster literature, the proposed models do not 
appear to fully embrace the concept in a recognisable way. Yet, chaos theory brings into 
question the predictive techniques referred to above and challenges the appropriateness 
of prescriptive guidelines in a situation where chaos reigns and where disasters 
regrettably do not follow a perfect cycle in which one stage conveniently follows 
another. More importantly, chaos theory also allows for moments of managerial 
intervention. For example, it presents the notion of self-organisation which goes some 
way into explaining the robustness and resilience of the tourism industry and the fact 
that, despite often limited preparedness, the majority of destinations seem to recover 
remarkably quickly after a disaster, with visitor numbers returning to normal and often 
wider improvements being evident. By being aware of the concept of chaos theory and 
its various elements, it is suggested that governments, destination authorities and 
managers could potentially introduce measures designed to advance and improve 
recovery and to foster the creativity which is often apparent in chaotic situations.  
          The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to create awareness and challenge the 
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unsatisfactory aspects of contemporary tourism disaster management theory and to 
propose an alternative solution in the form of a new tourism crisis management model 
which seeks to improve the effectiveness of a destination‟s response to a crisis or 
disaster. In particular, it explores tourism disaster or crisis management from a chaos 
theory perspective, advocating various responses which fit with such an approach. In 
doing so, the risk analysis and prescriptive strategies which appear to be the fashionable 
„modus operandi‟ in the literature are discounted;  particular emphasis is placed on the 
necessity of  a strong marketing and communication response devised to suit whichever 
element of chaos theory appears to be present at that moment and the importance of 
developing an organisational (or destination) culture which incorporates characteristics 
which facilitate the naturally continuing change process intrinsic within organisations 
and the tourism system as a whole.  
          This critique of contemporary tourism crisis management theory and the potential 
benefits of an alternative approach are explored within the context of an actual tourism 
crisis. More specifically, the impact of the 2009 AH1N1 influenza („swine flu‟) crisis on 
the Mexican tourism industry is examined, followed by an investigation concerning the 
weaknesses of contemporary crisis management models and the potential offered by 
viewing the crisis from an alternative perspective based on chaos theory. The alternative 
model is applied to and „tested‟ against the specific case of the 2009 AH1N1 influenza 
crisis.  
          Specifically, the three main research objectives of the study are: 
1. To confirm that the limitations associated with contemporary tourism crisis and 
disaster management models are present in the case of the AH1N1 influenza 
tourism crisis. 
2. To demonstrate that chaos theory elements can be identified in the AH1N1 
influenza crisis. 
3. To test the proposed model by investigating the response of the Mexican 
government, tourism authorities and various sectors within the Mexican tourism 
industry and to arrive to a satisfactory conclusion concerning its future viability. 
 
In doing so, this thesis aspires to add a new dimension to the literature which 
will hopefully stimulate further academic discussion. 
  
          The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the contemporary 
literature on tourism crisis and disaster management and develops the new model 
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referred to above. This discussion synthesises and critically appraises contemporary 
tourism crisis management theory, providing substance and a contextual setting to the 
research and the conclusions that are ultimately drawn from the research. The third 
chapter then describes the research methodology. An inductive, qualitative approach in 
the form of a case study is adopted in order to gain a broad perspective of the situation. 
Beeton (2005: 42) describes case study research as „a holistic empirical inquiry used to 
gain an in-depth understanding of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, 
using multiple sources of evidence.‟  In order to gather primary data, a series of semi-
structured and in-depth interviews are conducted amongst a variety of sources within 
the Mexican tourism industry, from key players at governmental level and within 
national and regional tourism organisations through to hoteliers, travel agents, business 
owners and tourism academics and experts.  At the same time, a review of related 
journals, articles and reports is undertaken in order to gain secondary data. 
           Chapter four commences with a brief history of the Mexican tourism industry, 
followed by an account of the impacts and responses to the AH1N1 influenza tourism 
crisis in Mexico. The fifth chapter analyses the crisis in detail in order to explore the 
extent to which the criticisms and limitations proffered in the first chapter are justified 
in this instance. Chapter six investigates the appearance of chaos theory elements during 
the crisis, thus leading to the penultimate chapter in which the alternative model is 
considered in relation to the influenza crisis and its usefulness discussed and assessed.  
The eighth and final chapter then draws conclusions to the research questions based on 
the evidence from the case study.  
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Chapter 2                               
 
Towards an alternative model of tourism crisis management 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, it is suggested that current tourism disaster management models suffer 
from a number of weaknesses which raise questions with respect to their effectiveness 
as tools for the management of tourism crises and disasters. An alternative model is 
presented which views the issue of tourism crisis management from the perspective of 
chaos theory. This approach has previously been applied only once within a tourism 
context, when Paraskevas (2006) conducted research into the effect of food poisoning 
on a prominent hotel chain. 
 
2.2   The tourism crisis and disaster literature: a review 
Although a review of the tourism crisis management literature suggests a marked 
increase in academic attention paid to the subject since the beginning of the new 
millennium, it also reveals that it is not an entirely new field of study. That is, even 
though the majority of earlier crisis management literature was concerned with 
corporate organisations, the study of crisis management specifically in relation to 
tourism was not entirely neglected prior to the turn of the century.  As early as 1980, 
Arbel and Bargur produced a planning model for crisis management within the tourism 
industry whilst commentators subsequently explored a variety of related issues. These 
included: studies of international terrorism (D‟Amore and Anuza, 1986);  tourism crisis 
management (Lehrman, 1986); a case study of a tourism crisis in Fiji (Scott, 1988); 
tourism and disaster planning (Murphy and Bayley, 1989); a crisis management 
planning manual in response to a study of three destinations (Cassedy, 1991); a 
guidebook for managing tourism crises (Sonmez et al., 1994); marketing in post-
disaster destinations (Pottorff and Neal, 1994); and, Miami„s handling of a crisis 
(Greco, 1994). More recently, Drabek (1995) investigated disaster responses in the 
tourism industry, Heath (1998) looked at strategic marketing surrounding the Kobe 
earthquake, Gonzalez-Herrero (1997, 1998, 1999) examined crisis marketing and 
communications, Pizam and Mansfield (1996) edited a book concerning crime and 
security issues in relation to tourism, Young and Montgomery (1998) considered crisis 
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management and destination marketing, and Prideaux (1999) investigated tourism 
management in relation to the Asian economic crisis. 
          However, the publication of Faulkner‟s (2001) seminal article „Towards a 
framework for tourism disaster management‟ stimulated interest in the subject and there 
has since been a marked increase in publications, as noted by Pforr (2006:1) whilst 
conducting a literature review on tourism crisis management in an attempt to „identify 
foci of the current academic discourse‟.  Such „foci‟ included:  
 
i. The impact of negative events on certain sectors of the hospitality and tourism 
industry, such as hotels (Chien and Law, 2003; Henderson, 2003a; Israeli and 
Reichal, 2003; Henderson and Ng, 2004;  Kim et al., 2005;  Srikatanyoo and 
Campiranon, 2005; Lo et al., 2006; Yu, 2006), restaurants (Green et al., 2004; 
Tse et al., 2006), travel agents (Lovelock, 2004), and the airline industry (Gillen 
and Wall, 2003;  Henderson, 2003b;  Aderighi and Cento, 2004).  
 
ii. Communication, information management and the role of the mass media 
(Mckercher and Hui, 1999; Floyed et al., 2004; Hall, 2004; Santana, 2004; 
Mason et al., 2005; Fall and Massey, 2006; Glaesser, 2006). 
 
iii. Terrorism and political instability (Pizam and Smith, 2000; Pizam, 2002; 
Stafford et al., 2002; Taylor and Enz, 2002; Blake and Sinclair, 2003; Fall, 2004; 
Gurtner, 2005; Hitchcock and Darma Putra, 2005; Ryu, 2005). 
 
iv. South East Asia, particularly Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, appears 
frequently in the literature, (King, 2000; Chien and Law, 2003; Dombey, 2003; 
Henderson, 2003a; Henderson, 2003b; Henderson and Ng, 2004;  Mckercher 
and Hui, 2004; Cooper, 2005, 2006;  Dwyer et al., 2005; Wen et al.,2005;  Lo et 
al., 2006; Tse et al., 2006;) along with Australia ( Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001; 
Armstrong, 2005). 
 
In addition to Pforr‟s (2006) observations, a number of recent publications have direct 
relevance to the issues discussed here. These are listed in Appendix 1. Generally, 
however, the literature comprises largely a dialogue which aspires to understand the 
nature of crises and disasters, why these events occur, the effects that such situations 
have upon the economy and society, and the methods that can be utilised to nullify the 
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negative impacts before, during and after the event.  
 
2.2.1   Crisis and disaster definitions  
 Commentators frequently commence their investigation with an attempt to define and 
develop typologies of crises and disasters (for example, see: Anderson, 2006; Evans and 
Elphick, 2005; Pforr and Hosie, 2007; Ritchie, 2008; Santana, 2003). Typically, this is 
justified on the basis that, by having a better understanding of the nature of crises, 
destination managers and other stakeholders would be better prepared to confront such 
an event, if and when it happens (Ritchie et al., 2003). This is evident in the 
considerable attention given towards crisis and disaster definitions and typologies in the 
literature (Miller and Ritchie, 2003; Evans and Elphick, 2005; Pforr and Hosie, 2007; de 
Sausmarez, 2007).   
          Nonetheless, providing a precise definition is not as straightforward as perhaps 
might be expected, despite it being seen as a vital aspect of crisis management (Laws 
and Prideaux, 2005).  According to Ritchie (2009: 4), a „consistent typology‟ would be 
very useful as it would „help facilitate a dialogue with other researchers in the crisis 
management field, vital to advancing knowledge and understanding‟. However, as 
Santana (2004: 307) notes, „the literature provides no generally accepted definition of 
crisis and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises have been sparse‟, limiting the 
development of this field. Laws and Prideaux (2005) suggest this could be due to the 
„ubiquitous use of this and related terms‟ (2005:2) whilst Pforr and Hosie (2007) 
suggest the lack of an agreed common typology reflects the „diversity‟ of definitions 
that are found in the literature.  
Thus, despite the ongoing discussion in the literature regarding the nature of 
crises and disasters, consensus over a suitable definition of a (tourism) crisis or disaster 
remains problematic, the diversity referred to by Pforr and Hosie (2007) serving to 
confuse rather than illuminate the debate (Laws and Prideaux, 2005: 2).  Perhaps as a 
consequence, many authors refer to Faulkner‟s (2001) crisis and disaster definitions and 
characteristics which appear to be the most commonly accepted definitions within the 
literature (Kuo et al., 2008; Page et al., 2006; Ritchie et al., 2003; Tew et al., 2008). 
Faulkner (2001: 136) draws on Selbst‟s (1978) crisis definition to differentiate 
between a crisis and a disaster: „Any action or failure to act that interferes with an 
organisation‟s ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of its objectives, its viability 
or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as perceived by the majority of its 
employees, clients or constituents.‟  Selbst is suggesting that a crisis is caused by a lack 
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of adequate attention and action within an organization. His definition excludes such 
situations as tornadoes, earthquakes, or floods, which are external, unpredictable and 
uncontrollable and, thus, cannot be attributed to incompetent internal planning. 
Similarly, Faulkner (2001: 136) proposes that a  „crisis‟ be used to describe a situation 
„where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted through such 
problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt to change‟, 
whilst the term disaster can be used „to refer to situations where an enterprise (or 
collection of enterprises in the case of a tourist destination) is confronted with sudden 
unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has no control.‟  This implies that 
crises are internal and within management control, whereas disasters are external and 
difficult to predict (Ritchie, 2008). It should be noted, however,  that despite this 
apparently straightforward distinction between a crisis and a disaster, definitional 
confusion remains and it is not always easy to clarify between the two, especially as 
disasters can evolve into a crisis (Henderson, 2003,b).  Faulkner (2001: 138) accepts the 
complexity of the situation, stressing that ultimately the difference lies in the „root cause 
of the problem‟.  
           Attempts by Fink (1986), Keown-McMullan (1997) and Weiner and Khan (1972) 
to characterise crisis or disaster situations are consequently synthesised by Faulkner 
(2001: 138) into the following features, seen as essential ingredients of a disaster and a 
crisis scenario. These characteristics are consistently cited in the literature (Anderson, 
2006; Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001; Prideaux, 2003; Prideaux et al., 2003):  
 
i. A triggering event, which is so significant that it challenges the existing 
structure, routine operations or survival of the organization; 
ii. High threat, short decision time and an element of surprise and urgency; 
iii. A perception of an inability to cope among those directly affected; 
iv. A turning point, when decisive change, which may have both positive and 
negative connotations, is imminent; 
v. Characterised by „fluid, unstable, dynamic‟ situations (Fink, 1986: 20)  
 
(Faulkner, 2001: 138) 
                             
2.3     Crisis and disaster management models 
In an attempt to manage these ingredients of crisis and disaster situations, a number of 
models have been developed which aim to provide governments, destination tourism 
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organisations and businesses with a means of planning and responding to such events. 
The first tourism-specific framework was, as noted above, developed by Faulkner in 
2001 (Ritchie, 2009).  
Criticising the lack of theoretical and conceptual frameworks within the tourism 
crisis management field, Faulkner proposed a generic tourism disaster management 
framework in an attempt to address such issues and to provide guidance to tourism 
organisations. He identified six phases in the disaster process or lifecycle: pre-event, 
prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long-term (recovery) and resolution. Each phase is 
given appropriate responses; precursors, mobilisation, action, recovery, reconstruction 
and reassessment and review.  For example, at the pre-event stage, in order to avoid or 
minimise the impact of a disaster, contingency plans are developed in response to a risk 
assessment, and scenario planning is undertaken to assess the potential impact of 
imaginary events. At the prodromal stage of the process, when it seems that a disaster is 
impending and cannot be avoided, Faulkner considers it necessary to mobilise through 
use of warning systems, which includes the use of the media, by the establishment of a 
command centre and by securing facilities. These steps will have been previously 
designed in the contingency plans, which categorize the strategic priorities for each 
stage.  For everything to succeed, Faulkner emphasises the need for a coordinated team 
approach, the need for on-going consultation, and a high level of commitment. 
          This model was applied to the Katherine flood in Australia by Faulkner and 
Vikulov (2001), thus providing a descriptive account of the framework‟s usefulness. It 
has been further applied to the Bali nightclub bombings (Henderson, 2002); to several 
crises affecting the Australian tourism industry in 2001 (Prideaux, 2003); to the UK 
Foot and Mouth outbreak (Miller and Ritchie, 2003); and to the effect of the SARS 
crisis on hotels in Singapore (Henderson and Ng, 2004). Further details are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
Other models have been developed, perhaps as a result of Faulkner‟s demands 
for more research or, perhaps, as a result of the apparently increasing number of 
disasters and crises that affect tourism destinations.  A list and critique of these models 
can be found below in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Positive and negative criticism of recent tourism crisis and disaster models 
 
Author and 
year 
Title  Explanation Criticism 
 
Faulkner, W:  
2001 
 
Tourism disaster 
management 
framework 
 
Identifies responses to each 
phase of the disaster process. 
 
Negative 
 Emphasis on contingency planning. 
Prescriptive, step-by-step guide. 
 One-size-fits all approach. 
Does not account for organisational resources, therefore unrealistic. 
 
Positive  
A thorough course of action for authorities and managers. 
 
Faulkner,W and 
Vikulov,S   : 
2001 
 
As above 
 
As above but with various 
additions. 
 
Same as above. 
 
Henderson, J.C  
: 2003 
 
Stages in airline 
crisis management 
 
Compresses Faulkner‟s first 
three phases of pre-event, 
prodromal and emergency into 
one component, called „event‟. 
 
Negative  
Although it does recognise the fact that crises often begin in the bifurcation stage, it does not 
mention how different stages can also occur simultaneously. 
 
Positive  
 Recognises the difficulties posed by rigid, prescriptive planning.  
 
 
Ritchie, B.W   : 
2004 
 
 
 
 
Strategic and 
holistic 
management 
framework 
 
 
Strategic responses to  three 
main stages - prevention and 
planning, strategic 
implementation and resolution, 
evaluation and  
 
Negative  
Emphasis on risk analysis. 
Prescriptive. 
Does not account for organisational resources. 
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Author and 
year 
 
Title 
 
Explanation 
 
Criticism 
  feedback. Positive 
The emphasis on „flexibility‟ and „modification‟ demonstrates that thought has been given to the 
range and scope of crises and disasters. 
 
De 
Sausmarez,N.   
: 2004 
 
Representation of 
the main steps in 
developing a 
national crisis 
management policy 
 
Proactive approach involving 
the formation of a crisis plan 
which involves assessing value 
of tourism sector, risk 
assessment, monitoring of 
indicators, examining potential 
for regional cooperation. 
 
Negative 
Unrealistic- As de Sausmarez points out in the conclusion, indicator monitoring can be highly 
complex, funding problems are likely to occur and bureaucracy can slow proactive measures. 
 
Positive 
The intended audience is made clear- governments and tourism sector professionals. 
No fixed sequence of steps is more in line with a chaos theory perspective approach. 
 
 
Page,S et al   : 
2006 
 
Visit Scotland 
potential crisis 
response model for 
an influenza 
pandemic 
 
Consists of the actions and 
approaches to the pre-crisis, 
crisis and recovery stages.  
 
Negative 
Much emphasis given to scenario planning.  
 
Positive 
Advice given for crisis and recovery stages is in line with the marketing and communication 
responses relevant with a chaos theory approach. 
 
 
Carlsen, J.C 
and  Hughes, M 
:  2007 
 
Recovery marketing 
strategies  
 
Compiled of guidelines from 
Beirman (2003) and issued from 
UNWTO (2005) and PATA (nd).  
 
Negative 
None.  
 
Positive 
Offers sound marketing and communication advice in line with a chaos theory approach. 
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Author and 
year 
 
Title 
  
Explanation 
 
Criticism 
 
Hystad, P.W 
and  Keller. P.C 
:  2008 
 
Stakeholder roles 
within a destination 
tourism disaster 
management cycle 
 
Suggested roles of emergency 
organisations, tourism 
organisations and tourism 
businesses throughout the 
stages of a disaster.  
 
Negative 
Assumes perfect cooperation between stakeholders which is unlikely. 
 
Positive 
Helps to nurture cooperation and the defining of responsibility. 
 
 
Tew et al :  
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model of crisis 
management 
planning and 
implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incorporates public brand 
management and internal 
management with pre-crisis 
planning and response. 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
Emphasis on pre-crisis planning.  
Assumes stakeholder cooperation. 
Unrealistic. 
Positive 
None. 
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2.4    Tourism crisis and disaster management models: a critique  
 As mentioned above, the aim of crisis and disaster management models is to provide 
guidance to managers and planners before, during and after an event. The reason for this 
is self-evident; as mentioned in the introduction, the economic and social effects of a 
crisis or disaster on a destination (or country) may be significant and so avoidance or, at 
least, rapid response and recovery from an untoward event is highly desirable. However, 
it is suggested that the models proposed by the tourism crisis management theory have 
inherent weaknesses and are not suitable for all crisis and disaster situations. 
 
 
2.4.1 Weaknesses of contemporary tourism crisis and disaster models and 
frameworks 
 
i. The unpredictability of tourism crises and disasters  
 Pre-disaster preparedness is seen by many academics as a vital ingredient of tourism 
crisis and disaster management (Faulkner, 2001: Prideaux, 2003: Ritchie, 2004). It is 
argued that being in a state of readiness can help reduce the impact of an event when it 
happens (Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995; Heath, 1998), in principle a wise strategy 
as, according to Fink (1986: 7), „anytime you (i.e. managers) are not in crisis, you are 
instead in a pre-crisis, or prodromal mode.‟ Similarly, Ritchie (2009: 69) suggests the 
need for a „paradigm shift away from a „this won‟t happen to me or us‟ attitude to an „it 
probably will happen so what should I do about it‟ stance, and he insists that those who 
take productive steps to prepare themselves for a crisis or disaster will ultimately be 
better prepared.  
          Not surprisingly, therefore, prevention and planning is a noticeable component of 
many contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management models.  It involves the 
„development of emergency plans, warning systems and other activities adopted in 
advance of a disaster to aid in its management‟ (Ritchie, 2009). The literature also 
recommends the formation of disaster management teams and agreement on activation 
protocols (Faulkner, 2001), stressing the importance of staff training and organisational 
culture (Pforr and Hosie, 2007) and highlighting the necessity of stakeholder awareness 
(Hystad and Keller, 2008). While these may all be considered fundamental elements of 
tourism disaster and crisis planning, another suggested feature of pre-crisis planning 
demands some scrutiny.  
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Specifically, many models propose that risk assessments should be undertaken 
and that, on the basis of scenario analysis, contingency plans should be developed  in 
accordance with those situations considered likely to occur. However, whilst this may 
be considered beneficial in those destinations which can be considered hazardous or at 
risk of predictable events (for example, Santana (2003) illustrates how ignoring a 
known hazard in Brazil led to a destination crisis, and Pike (2007) reports on a 'self-
inflicted' crisis caused by stakeholder inaction to changes affecting a New Zealand 
resort), the usefulness of this technique in relation to predicting future 'hypothetical' 
crises or disasters may be questioned. In particular, the sheer unpredictability of tourism 
crises and disasters serves to undermine the potential effectiveness of contingency 
planning.  
Such unpredictability is evidenced in the literature. For example, Miller and 
Ritchie (2003) note the difficulties caused by unpredictable events in their investigation 
of the effects of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) crisis on the UK tourism 
industry, observing that „the extent of negative or positive impact is largely beyond the 
control of the tourism industry. Both FMD and the terrorism on 11 September 2001 
could not have been influenced by the tourism industry, only responded to, while both 
events were entirely unpredictable.‟ (Miller and Ritchie, 2003: 169). In other words, 
they argue that the FMD crisis and, indeed, the events of „9/11‟, were unconventional, 
unavoidable and beyond the realms of realistic prediction. Even in hindsight, research 
conducted by Ritchie et al. (2003) suggests that many tourism agencies, despite having 
suffered as a result of the Foot and Mouth outbreak, would not consider future pre-crisis 
planning specifically because of the unpredictability of such events and the fact that it 
appears to be a futile exercise (Blackman and Ritchie, 2007). 
On a much grander scale, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami defied any notion of 
pre-event planning. This is noted by Sharpley (2005: 345): „it is unlikely that any set of 
guidelines or, indeed, any established crisis management procedure could have 
adequately prepared a destination or region for the catastrophic events…‟   Other recent 
disasters and crises bear the same hallmarks. The onset of the AH1N1 influenza in 
Mexico, the subject of this thesis, was unexpected and unpredictable; likewise, the 
Icelandic volcanic ash cloud in April 2010, though impacting primarily on air travel 
within Europe, resulted in unprecedented inconvenience for travelers and huge 
repercussions for hoteliers and the airline industry on a global scale.   
The identification of potential / predictable crises and disasters is, therefore 
problematic. Scenario planning may be expensive, time consuming and, it is suggested, 
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a rather unrealistic or even pointless exercise given the evident unpredictability of 
tourism crises and disasters. Contingency planning can also lead to complacency (Evans 
and Elphick, 2005). For example, governments, destination organisations and 
businesses may relax in the belief that they are prepared for every conceivable situation, 
only to be taken by surprise when a crisis or disaster that was not identified in scenario 
analysis occurs, resulting in „paralysis‟ and inaction (Evans and Elphick 2005: 143).  
           It is also unrealistic to expect organisations running on a tight budget to commit 
scarce financial resources to a highly detailed proactive approach. De Sausmarez (2003: 
229), for example, notes the reluctance of the private sector to spend money to prepare 
for „a hypothetical crisis that may never materialise‟.  Indeed, she goes on to argue that 
„because tourism is so vulnerable to such an enormous number of possible crises in so 
many different scenarios, the identification of an approaching crisis by monitoring 
appropriate indicators in sufficient time to take remedial action becomes so complex as 
to be unrealistic.‟    
Thus, although it is generally accepted that established protocols need to be in 
place to deal with such events, and stakeholders need to be aware of the threat and their 
subsequent responsibilities in the face of a crisis, a major criticism of contemporary 
tourism disaster management models is their focus on scenario planning which, as 
evidence suggests, is largely futile given the unpredictable nature of disasters and crises.  
 
ii. The limitations of prescriptive / rigid models  
Tourism crisis and disaster management models tend to presume that a crisis passes 
through a number of consecutive stages, or phases, in essence following a „lifecycle‟. 
Thus, guidelines are presented which advise managers on what to do at each stage. In 
reality, however, crises and disasters often occur without warning and a destination can 
immediately enter the „emergency‟ phase, by-passing the „pre-event‟ and „prodromal‟ 
phase and requiring a rapid reaction. Indeed, the alarm caused by the dramatic 
suddenness of such events may lead to confusion and inappropriate decision making, as 
noted by Sellnow et al. (2002) in their study of crisis communication during a flood in 
America in 1997.   
The swift onset of disaster is also noted by Henderson (2003b: 281) in her study 
of an airplane crash in Singapore; she remarks how „crises do not always follow the 
clearly delineated pattern of theoretical models because of their unpredictability and the 
speed at which they unfold‟.  Consequently, she presents a model in which the first three 
steps of Faulkner‟s framework are compressed into one single phase, labelled „event‟. 
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Moreover, not only can crises and disasters arrive suddenly and without warning; they 
are also complex and chaotic in nature, with the situation continually evolving and 
changing. This was noted by Farazmand (2009: 402) who, in a study of government 
reaction to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, explains how „crises scramble plans of action and 
surprise everyone in and out of the field, as the dynamics of crisis constantly change 
and unfold on daily and hourly basis, with unpredictable outcomes‟.  
The difficulty posed by „changing dynamics‟  is also evident in Miller and 
Ritchie‟s (2003) application of Faulkner‟s framework to the UK FMD crisis, (see 
appendix 2) in which the prodromal, emergency and recovery phases appeared to be 
happening simultaneously in different regions, thus hampering any attempt by managers 
to use the framework as a guide to strategy.  The literature advises a revision of 
marketing strategy in the prodromal phase whilst, in the emergency stage, it is 
suggested that marketing activities should be suspended or at least reduced. 
Furthermore, the recovery stage is seen as a time for promotional campaigns and 
alliances. With all these stages apparently coinciding in the FMD crisis, managers were 
put in a position in which they did not know which guideline to follow next. Miller and 
Ritchie (2003: 168) concluded that Faulkner‟s model has „limited value in enabling 
event managers to steer a pre-determined course through such an unlikely, yet 
catastrophic event‟.  
          More generally, Scott et al. (2007: 4) observe that many previous crisis 
management models fail as they tend to offer „a series of remedial steps‟ without 
appreciating the true complexity of the situation and the dynamic and complex network 
of relationships involved in the tourism system. These „remedial steps‟, which may look 
impressive in a crisis management manual, can be severely limiting in the case of a 
„real‟ disaster, as was noted by Paraskevas (2006). 
 
iii.   Restrictions posed by a rigid plan 
 Paraskevas (2006), in a case study of a hotel chain affected by a food poisoning crisis, 
found that the detailed crisis management plan that was in place was largely ineffective. 
The following quote from an executive committee member vividly illustrates the 
situation: 
 
„The results were disappointing. This CMP (crisis management plan) was 
supposed to protect the chain and it failed. The level of detail in the planning 
was misleading. What looks good in paper does not really work in practice. 
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What we thought that would be a co-ordinated response turned out to be a 
complete failure (Executive Committee Member)‟ (Paraskevas, 2006: 898). 
 
          The research conducted by Paraskevas (2006) highlights the limitations posed 
when managers and employees attempt to react to a crisis by means of rigid, detailed, 
step-by-step planning, as is the case of many tourism management models. Even 
Ritchie‟s model (2004), which emphasises the importance of flexibility, still offers a 
linear, prescriptive approach.  
           Descriptive accounts of crises and disasters (such as the above by Paraskevas 
(2006) and the application of models to a real life situation (for example, Faulkner and 
Vikulov, 2001; Miller and Ritchie, 2003) provide a useful contribution to the field in 
that they can be used to test a conceptual model that has not been previously „tested‟. 
This research project will do this, by „testing‟ a new, conceptual model to a real life 
situation. Advantages and limitations can be highlighted through this method, and it has 
served to illustrate some benefits and shortcomings of Faulkner‟s model. One such 
shortcoming is the „one-size-fits-all‟ approach, another apparent weakness of 
contemporary tourism crisis management models. 
 
iv. A  ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach   
Ritchie (2009) notes how the „broadness‟ of the majority of tourism crisis models 
diminishes their capacity to directly relate to individual segments of the industry and the 
varying types of crises or disasters while, as referred to above, Sharpley (2005) noted 
the improbability that any tourism disaster management plan would have been sufficient 
to deal with the impacts of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Evidently, the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami differed immensely in terms of scale and impact to „smaller‟, more localised 
events, such as the Katherine Flood in Australia. Yet, while Faulkner‟s framework was 
applied successfully to the Katherine Flood (Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001), its suitability 
as an effective tool in the case of a „different kind‟ of disaster or crisis, such as that 
brought about by the Indian Ocean Tsunami, may be questioned. Indeed, as has been 
previously noted, complications arose when Miller and Ritchie (2003) attempted to 
apply Faulkner‟s model to the FMD crisis in the UK on a national level and on an 
organizational level. They draw attention to the difficulties: „Thus, while Faulkner‟s 
(2001) model does serve to identify stages to the disaster, they are not as clearly 
discernable as for the Katherine floods. This may be due to the evolving nature of the 
disaster or the role of the media but may also be a result of its application to an 
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organization rather than a discrete destination‟ (Miller and Ritchie, 2003: 168).  
Evidently, crises and disasters differ in their origins, effects, outcomes and the 
measures necessary for recovery. They also differ in the amount of time needed for 
recovery.  Zeng et al. (2005) note how crises, such as human epidemics, animal 
epidemics, destructive weather conditions and other natural disasters, civil 
strife/violence, war or terrorism all have different effects and recovery times and 
necessitate different recovery strategies, thus limiting the usefulness of one individual 
crisis model for all. Similarly, Carlsen and Hughes (2007: 147) note the inadequacy of a 
„one size fits all‟ approach: „Crises and disasters are variable in duration and scale. The 
flow-on and contagion effects depend very much upon the nature of the disaster (natural 
or man-made) and the corresponding change in public perception in response to media 
coverage and crisis communication.‟ Furthermore, Carlsen and Liburd (2007: 268) draw 
attention to the fact that „crises by their nature are geographically, demographically and 
temporally discrete, so that the boundaries of study are not fixed but vary dramatically.‟ 
They discuss the differing research tools that would be necessary to study the effects of 
the terrorist attacks on New York and, in contrast, civil unrest in Fiji.  The terrorist 
attacks led to a global tourism crisis while the Fiji coups were limited to the specific 
country, thus necessitating a quite different response.  
In addition to the concerns which arise as a result of the sheer size and scope of 
an event (such as 9/11, SARS or the Indian Ocean tsunami) and an event‟s complex 
lifecycle (FMD), there are two further factors which serve to condemn a „one size fits 
all‟ approach:  the cultural context of the event and the realities of small businesses.  
 
v. Cultural context  
Gonzalez-Herrero and Platt (1998) explored differences in tourism crisis preparation 
between the United States and Spain. In response to one question, 78% of US 
respondents affirmed that they had a crisis plan in place, compared to just 29% of the 
Spanish respondents. This could be interpreted as evidence of the priorities given by 
differing cultures to the issue of tourism crisis management. Pforr (2006: 2) notes the 
preference in South East Asian countries for reactive, as opposed to proactive, planning: 
„This government driven approach is very context specific with its focus on a particular 
destination and an emphasis on information and communication management to foster 
effective coordination and collaboration amongst the relevant stakeholders.‟   
The contrasting approaches to disaster management, depending on the 
geographical and cultural setting, highlights the impracticality of a model, such as 
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Faulkner‟s, being applicable in a region which has many cultural differences to the 
model‟s country of origin. It is not within the scope of this research to examine cultural 
differences on the scale that Hofstede addressed the issue (1983); Hofstede noted how 
distinct cultures displayed contrasting attitudes and behaviour regarding work and life in 
general. Nonetheless, it is a point worth noting that a tourism crisis management plan 
developed in Australia may not be as well received in China or Peru, for example.  As 
Mistilis (2005: 11) points out, „tourism is a multi-cultural industry, and when a crisis 
occurs, the context differs by culture, organizational style and political structure.‟ It has 
even been noted by de Sausmarez (2004) that many Asian cultures are reluctant to admit 
to a crisis because of concerns over „losing face‟ and that this reluctance can affect 
communication and information supply.  
Cultural considerations must also be borne in mind when planning market 
recovery, as research has shown that risk perceptions differ across cultures (Sonmez, 
1998), with some cultures suffering from the so-called hysteresis effect (Mao et al. , 
2009). Mao et al. (2009), in their research of post-SARS recovery in Taiwan, compared 
inbound arrivals from Japan, Hong Kong and the US. It was noted how arrivals from 
Hong Kong and the US returned to pre-SARS levels immediately after the crisis but, in 
the case of Japan, it took a year for levels to return to previous levels. This can be 
attributed to the Japanese preference for „safe and passive activities‟ (Mao et al., 2009: 
2). Another factor, noted by Carlsen and Liburd (2007), is the fact that many less 
developed countries simply do not have the financial and technological resources to 
conduct the market recovery strategies advocated in the literature whilst, as the 
following section considers, the same can be said regarding small businesses more 
generally.  
 
 
vi. Realities of small businesses  
Larger companies may enjoy the economic resources and staff expertise to initiate pre-
crisis planning; however, this is often beyond the scope of smaller businesses which 
make up a sizeable percentage of the tourism industry. Cioccio and Michael (2007: 9), 
for example, assessed disaster preparedness within small businesses in Victoria, 
Australia. They found that such businesses have „neither the time nor the resources to 
formalise their contingency planning‟ and „have no capacity to initiate actions beyond 
their day-to-day operations.‟  Similar problems are noted by Hystad and Keller (2008) 
and de Sausmarez (2003). In their follow-up study to the Kelowna bush fires in Canada, 
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Hystad and Keller (2008) noted that many small businesses assumed that responsibility 
lay elsewhere and, thus, their level of planning was usually non-existent. De Sausmarez 
(2003) in her study of the Malaysian response to the Asian financial crisis noted the 
difficulty of preparing crisis management plans for the tourism sector due to its 
diversity.  
          If a large segment of the tourism industry does not have the resources or, perhaps, 
the inclination to apply tourism disaster management models, then models and 
frameworks such as Faulkner‟s appear to be falling on deaf ears in many cases. 
Consequently, and as suggested by Ritchie (2009: 127), research into the influence of 
preparedness variables such as „experience, values and beliefs, messages, personal 
attributes and sociocultural norms‟ would be appropriate, so that specific plans could be 
developed for industry sectors.  
 
vii. Failure to view the situation from a chaos theory perspective  
The school of thought entitled chaos theory (see appendix 3) was originally explored 
within the boundaries of physical science; however, it has since provoked interest in 
various fields, such as ecology, international relations and economics (Levy, 1994). 
Levy (1994: 169) believes that it is chaos theory‟s potential ability to find „order and 
structure behind complex events‟ that has stirred enthusiasm among social science 
researchers. It has not gone unnoticed in the field of tourism, with contributions coming 
from Faulkner and Russell (1997), Mckercher (1999), Faulkner (2000), Farrell and 
Twining-Ward (2003), Paraskevas (2006) and Zahra and Ryan (2007.) 
           Tourism research has traditionally used a „Newtonian‟ research philosophy which 
views the tourism system as being stable, linear and predictable. As explained by 
Faulkner (2000: 7): „As a derivative of classical physics, the Newtonian/Cartesian 
paradigm propagated a reductionist worldview whereby objects and events are 
understood in terms of their constituent parts and these are assumed to fit together like 
cogs in a clockwork machine. Every event is therefore determined by initial conditions, 
that are, at least in principle, predictable with some degree of precision owing to the 
predominance of linear or quasi-linear relationships.‟ 
          If one considers Faulkner‟s tourism crisis and disaster ingredients (see section 
2.2.1), which include factors such as a triggering event, high threat, surprise, urgency, 
an inability to cope, a turning point, fluidity and instability, then it becomes somewhat 
apparent that any attempt to manage crisis and disaster situations using the above 
traditional methods is going to be problematic as the ingredients which characterise 
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tourism crises and disasters do not appear to relate to such a paradigm. 
          In contrast, chaos theory views systems, such as the tourism system, as being not 
at all „stable, linear and predictable‟ (Faulkner, 2000:7) but indeed the complete 
opposite; they  are seen as being unstable, non-linear and totally unpredictable, akin to 
Faulkner‟s crisis and disaster  ingredients.  As Faulkner and Russell (1997: 557) 
describe: „Essentially chaos describes a situation where a system is dislodged from its 
steady state condition by a triggering event which is as random and unpredictable as the 
outcome. It involves the regrouping of the elements of the system, from which a new 
order eventually emerges.‟ 
          It is, therefore, suggested that chaos theory offers a more appropriate theoretical 
framework from which to study the management of crises and disasters than traditional 
frameworks. In particular, various key elements exist within chaos theory which, if 
recognised as they appear in a tourism crisis or disaster, can provide suitable moments 
for managerial intervention. These elements and their relevance to tourism crisis and 
disaster situations are explained in detail below (section 2.5.1 to section 2.5.3).   
           McKercher (1999: 425) appears to share this view. Concerned that much tourism 
theory „remains entrenched in an intellectual time warp that is up to 30 years old‟, he 
offers a chaos model of tourism to explain the complex inter-relationships which exist in 
the tourism system. His model highlights the effects that „non-tourism related 
externalities‟ , such as natural disasters or pandemics, can have on the tourism system 
and demonstrates his belief that a tourism system is similar to a „self-organizing‟, living 
community that is basically complex and chaotic and cannot be explained by linear 
models:  „…tourism represents an open system, where the vitality of a destination area 
can be influenced as much by external events as by internal events‟ (McKercher, 1999: 
428).   
It is suggested that this „intellectual time warp‟ has infiltrated the tourism 
disaster management models offered in the literature. Faulkner, along with Russell 
(1997, 2004), suggested that “if one is to understand the dynamics of tourism systems 
more effectively…an alternative perspective based on chaos theory is more appropriate” 
(2004: 575) and consequently provided a “synthesis” (2004: 577) of Butler‟s (1980) 
tourism lifecycle model and what are described as the “principles” (2004: 577) of chaos 
theory. Faulkner also makes reference to chaos theory while presenting the tourism 
disaster management framework; however, significantly, the tourism disaster 
management framework, with its linear, prescriptive approach, does not appear to 
directly apply such a perspective. Subsequently, other frameworks provide the same, 
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linear, cause and effect approach. Ritchie (2004), despite stressing that chaos theory 
could provide managerial insight, follows a pattern very similar to Faulkner. Perhaps by 
proposing a strategic approach to tourism disaster management they consider this done, 
but it is suggested here that both Faulkner‟s and Ritchie‟s models fail to embrace 
comprehensively the potential that chaos theory could offer tourism crisis management 
which, as discussed below, permits an alternative perspective on tourism crisis 
management.  
  
              
 2.5   Managing tourism crises and disasters: a chaos theory perspective    
As considered above, crises and disasters are unpredictable in that they can arrive 
without warning and take unlikely twists and turns, thus severely limiting the usefulness 
of contingency planning and tourism crisis management guidelines. By nature chaotic 
and complex, crises and disasters are „fluid, unstable‟ and „dynamic‟ (Fink, 1986) and so 
the question must be asked as to whether tourism crisis management is actually a 
„heroic‟, albeit futile, attempt to manage the unmanageable. 
Here, it is suggested that, despite the initial helplessness which the term „chaos‟ 
may imply, an understanding of the various elements of chaos theory can provide 
techniques and opportunities to assist in the management of a tourism crisis. Indeed, it 
is proposed that the adoption of chaos theory can improve the planning and response 
framework for tourism crises and disasters. This approach potentially eradicates the 
weaknesses, discussed in the previous sections, common to contemporary tourism crisis 
management models and offers an alternative solution to the challenges caused by crises 
and disasters. Specifically, scenario analysis and contingency planning are replaced by a 
response which recommends that preparation is instilled into an organisation by way of 
nurturing an internal culture which can effortlessly facilitate change and instability. In 
the face of a disaster, the emphasis is on responding to crisis and chaos elements when 
they present themselves with a combination of marketing and communication strategies.  
Chaos theory can be of use for managers of small and medium sized enterprises 
and also as a means of managing the destination as a whole, as is the case for 
destination tourism agencies or governmental departments.  A small tourism business, a 
large tourism organisation and a tourism destination in general can all be viewed as 
'open systems'. Therefore, a model which embraces chaos theory is of use to individual 
business owners such as hoteliers and restaurateurs, and also managers with wider 
ranging responsibilities. Before presenting a tourism crisis and disaster management 
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model constructed from a chaos theory perspective, however, it is first necessary to 
explain the elements of chaos theory and how these elements can be utilised to 
counteract the challenges presented by crises and disasters. 
 
 
2.5.1    ‘Edge of chaos’  
Tourism managers need to be aware that tourism operates in an intricate, non-linear 
manner with a high number of „complex, interrelationships‟ (McKercher, 1999: 426) 
existing within the tourism system. As mentioned above, McKercher (1999) presents the 
„chaos model of tourism‟, which serves to illustrate the interconnectivity of the various 
„players‟ within the tourism system. The actions of one element can have repercussions, 
both positive and negative, on the other elements. The manager must be acutely aware 
of the element labeled „non-tourism related externalities‟, which includes „macro-
environmental forces (Ibid: 430) such as disasters.  
Managers should also be aware that instability and change are inherent 
characteristics of this system and, even if a destination has proceeded in stability for a 
long period of time, there exists the ever-present threat of disruption. The system is 
always on the „edge of chaos‟, in a state of „tenuous equilibrium‟, in which a „trigger 
event‟ can directly or indirectly induce a disaster or crisis. Known as the „butterfly 
effect‟, chaos theorists suggest that even something so apparently trivial as the flapping 
of a butterfly‟s wings has the potential to initiate certain conditions which produce a 
path of circumstances which eventually lead to a disaster. In a tourism context, this 
concept helps to explain how a set of natural reactions which culminated in a volcanic 
ash cloud appearing over the UK and Europe in April 2010 led to unprecedented travel 
chaos and damage to the airline industry worldwide.  
Inherent in an „edge of chaos‟ situation is the sheer unpredictability of what will 
happen next. With so many influences upon the system, managers have no way of 
knowing if they are on the precipice of a natural disaster, an epidemic, a terrorist attack 
or an economic crisis. With so many diverse influences on the tourism system, it is also 
apparent that a crisis or disaster can have an impact on a destination thousands of miles 
away.  As has been noted previously, the literature suggests that such threats can be 
countered by conducting large-scale scenario analysis and the drawing of detailed 
contingency plans to deal with every conceivable situation. However, a brief analysis of 
recent events as mentioned earlier (Indian Ocean Tsunami, Foot and Mouth, Volcanic 
ash cloud) has served to illustrate the limitations of such techniques.  
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While chaos theory suggests that specific crisis and disaster prediction is 
impossible (Matthews et al., 1999), it simultaneously predicts that some kind of chaotic 
event is practically inevitable, thus leading to the presumption that some kind of 
planning is wholly necessary. This suggests that managers should seek to create the 
conditions which will enable an efficient and effective response if and when a crisis 
occurs. Therefore, the first step that managers should take in this „edge of chaos 
equilibrium‟ is to ensure that their own specific organisations strive to become „robust‟ 
and „resilient‟ (Paraskevas, 2006: 903), qualities which will be of paramount importance 
in the face of the „inevitable' crisis. Paraskevas (2006) suggests that each organisation 
should nurture a culture which allows flexibility and promotes information flow. There 
should be a feedback system which permits self correction and self- organisation, and 
the reallocation of resources if and when necessary. As Levy (1994: 176) notes: „long-
term forecasting is almost impossible for chaotic systems, and dramatic change can 
occur unexpectedly; as a result, flexibility and adaptiveness are essential for 
organizations to survive.‟  
By recognising that they exist on the „edge of chaos‟, it is suggested that 
organisations can avoid certain crises by a willingness to change with the times and self-
organise, thus avoiding becoming stagnant.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss knowledge management and organisational learning in detail; however, it is 
suggested that the implementation of an effective knowledge management strategy 
could assist in preparing all organisations, from small businesses to government level 
departments, for inevitable change. By fostering a culture of innovation, self-
development, participation and inter-organisational learning, an organisation will 
develop a competitive advantage, improved quality and productivity, be more attuned to 
customers' needs and most importantly in the context of crises and disasters, have the 
capability to cope with change (Coopey, 1996).     
Robert and Lajtha (2002), cited in Pareskas (2006: 894), argue that „...the key to 
effective crisis management lies with structured and continuous learning processes that 
equip managers to deal with the sudden and the unexpected rather than with detailed 
CMP's [crisis management plans].‟ An organisational learning strategy is given 
prominence in the literature, although usually as part of the post-crisis reflective process 
(Blackman and Ritchie, 2007; Evans and Elphick, 2005; Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001; 
Ritchie, 2009). In a similar vein, Farrell and Twining-Ward (2003: 284) propose that 
„adaptive management‟ is „an effective way of managing the comprehensive tourism 
system‟. They define adaptive management as „the process of building resilience and 
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coping with uncertainty through a continual process of experimenting, monitoring and 
social learning‟ (Ibid: 284/5). This would emphasise a move from a linear focus to a 
non-deterministic approach. It acknowledges surprises and uncertainties (Gunderson, 
1999) and proposes regular monitoring and learning which leads to knowledge 
accumulation and enables stakeholders to more easily adapt to changing situations 
(Mclain and Lee, 1996). 
It is argued that such an approach is much more useful in preparing an 
organisation for a disaster or crisis than the development of context specific detailed 
guidelines. Whilst, on the one hand, each organisation must have basic protocol in place 
to deal with a sudden disaster, on the other hand an organisational climate which 
expects change and has the infrastructure in place to effectively promote and deal with 
change will be in a better position to exhibit the characteristics of „robustness‟ and 
„resilience‟, so necessary in a crisis situation.  
On a broader scale, each organisation should be aware of its responsibility 
within the tourism system. As noted by Cioccio and Michael (2005: 9), small businesses 
tend to see themselves as „clients‟; for them, the onus lies with the government and 
regional tourist organisations to promote recovery. Hystad and Keller (2008), also 
noting this, present a model which outlines the roles of stakeholders throughout the 
stages of a disaster.  In the edge of chaos state, the onus is on the emergency 
organisations to develop protocol, for tourism organisations to develop a media and 
marketing strategy and for the internal tourism community to lay down individual 
protocol and develop staff awareness. Stakeholder roles then change as the event 
progresses.  
A strong, effective marketing strategy is of great value in the „edge of chaos‟ 
phase. The building of a strong brand image for the destination can ensure its survival 
through troubled times, as a good reputation can create a „lock-in-effect‟, an element of 
chaos theory, in which new and potential customers continue to be attracted to the 
location despite possible negative publicity. Of equal importance, it is suggested that 
tourism organisations should also strive to promote good media relations, to form 
„positive credit‟ which can assist in reducing the averse negative affects often attributed 
to sensationalist media coverage of a disaster (Avraham and Ketter, 2008).  
The powerful effect that the media can contribute to a tourism crisis situation is 
referred to throughout the literature, with Keown-McMullan (1997) going as far as 
suggesting that the media have the power to turn an incident into a crisis. Public 
perception of an incident can be greatly influenced by the media and sensationalist 
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reporting (de Sausmarez, 2004). Often, communication between the destination 
authorities and the media is poor and, as a result, false, inaccurate reporting occurs 
which heightens potential tourists‟ negative perception of a destination (Santana, 2003). 
For example, Mason et al. (2005: 19), concerned with the connection between SARS, 
tourism and the media, note that „during the outbreak it was often difficult to separate 
fact from media hyperbole‟, while Peters and Pakeemaat (2005: 16), in their research 
into responses to an avalanche in the Austrian Alps, also note how „media 
communication was poorly managed and a misrepresentation of the catastrophe 
followed.‟ The world‟s media, in their search for the next „big‟ story, are inevitably 
attracted to disaster zones or „scare‟ stories, such as health related events. The media can 
then turn a situation into a crisis.  
By pursuing good media relations and by acquiring a strong market position, and 
also by harnessing an organisational culture which is open, flexible, with a common 
vision, and unafraid of change, it is suggested that the businesses of  McKercher‟s 
destination tourism community and the communication vectors („all levels of the formal 
travel trade, other tourism retailers, the efforts of public sector marketing and promotion 
agencies and direct communication between businesses and the travelling public‟ 
(McKercher, 1999: 431)), will be best prepared when a crisis or disaster occurs. 
 
2.5.2 Bifurcation and cosmology   
A disaster can be viewed as being a 'bifurcation point'. Bifurcation, according to 
Sellnow et al. (2002: 271) „represents the flashpoints of change where a system‟s 
direction, character, and/or structure are fundamentally disrupted…Crisis events and 
behaviors…are often described in chaos theory as these points of system bifurcation.‟  
This element of chaos theory can also be equated with Faulkner‟s emergency phase of a 
disaster lifecycle. At this phase, when the system is thrown into chaos and 
disequilibrium, the cosmology element of chaos theory is usually evident. It describes a 
feeling of helplessness and confusion, due to the „high threat, short decision time, 
surprise, urgency‟ and includes the „perception of an inability to cope‟, referred to 
previously while discussing the characteristics of crises and disasters. Weick (1993: 
634) describes cosmology thus: „A cosmology episode occurs when people suddenly 
and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system. What makes 
such an incident so shattering is that both the sense of what is occurring and the means 
to rebuild that sense collapse together.‟  
The apparent futility of scenario planning and simulation exercises can again be 
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noted at this stage. The words of a CEO of a hotel chain affected by a crisis illustrate 
this point:  
 
„We had conducted a simulation exercise only five months ago. The scenario was 
similar but not in such scale. Nevertheless, we all felt confident that although it 
was a highly unexpected situation, the plan was designed with such a crisis in 
mind and we would be able to deal with it effectively. We did not expect that 
some people would not be able to cope and that some others would react in such 
a negative manner (CEO)‟  (Paraskevas, 2006: 898).  
 
In other words, an unsuspecting manager may suddenly be thrust into a situation in 
which fear and confusion is abundant and both he/she and staff members will find 
themselves unable to cope.  A previously unthinkable scenario has developed and the 
contingency plans at hand fail to correspond with what is happening. However, it is 
suggested that a manager (and organisation) versed in chaos theory would likely be able 
to recognise the bifurcation stage for what it is and be able to react accordingly. It is 
therefore necessary for the manager to mitigate the effects of cosmology episodes and 
impaired decision making by means of clear communication. Evans and Elphick (2005: 
144), following Smith‟s (1990) model of crisis management, suggest that this is not the 
time for „rushed decisions‟ and that it is better to focus on „decisional, informational and 
communicational flows‟ and the key activity of crisis containment and communication 
flow. Sellnow et al. (2002: 274) support the view that truthfulness and accuracy is 
warranted as „tenacious justifications‟ can be difficult to account for at a later stage. For 
this, Ritchie et al. (2003), in their study of the FMD crisis, develop a „Five-Point Crisis 
Communication Plan‟, advocating two way communication with the media in an effort 
to reduce the reporting of incorrect information and to deliver a consistent message to 
enhance credibility for the organisation.  
Page et al. (2006) recommend that marketing activity is reduced or even 
suspended at this moment to allow for this period to pass, as a continuation of normal 
marketing activities could be deemed insensitive and inappropriate; the situation has 
changed and demands a new approach. 
 
2.5.3 Self-organisation and strange attractors 
It is said that a learning organisation exhibits the characteristic of self-organisation 
(Senge et al., 1994). The concept of self-organisation is also recognised within chaos 
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theory and is described as one of its most „provocative‟ and „controversial‟ elements 
(Levy, 1994: 171). It „is a natural process whereby order re-emerges out of a random 
and chaotic state‟ (Stewart, 1989). Sellnow et al. (2002: 272) further explain; „through 
self-organization, new forms, structures, procedures, hierarchies, and understanding 
emerge, giving a new form to the system, often at a higher level of order and 
complexity‟. As clarified by Zahra (2007: 860), „although each element in the system 
may seem to act in an independent manner, collectively the entire system functions in an 
orderly manner as it is governed by a number of underlying principles, leading to 
spontaneous order‟. McKercher (1999: 427), writing in a tourism context, importantly 
conveys how despite the unpredictable nature of crises and disasters, tourism systems 
manage to „re-emerge in an even more competitive manner‟.  
This re-emergence demonstrates the resilience of tourism and how most 
destinations appear to recover extremely quickly after an event.  Zeng et al. (2005: 307), 
in an investigation of the tourism effects of SARS in China, remark how „tourism 
appears to exhibit little resistance but considerable resilience‟, while Scott and Laws 
(2005:157), advocating future study on the concept of resilience, report that „mass 
tourism is alive and well, surviving many disasters and crises.‟ McKercher and Hui 
(2003), writing after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, note how, 
despite fears of a profound recession in the tourism industry, the effects have not been 
as deep as initially envisaged.  Wang (2008: 75), although offering warnings over the 
consequences of not being prepared, also comments upon the resilience of the industry, 
observing that „the industry has always managed to resume or exceed its former 
production values within a period of just one or two years‟. Equally, Hystad and Keller 
(2008: 158) conducting research into the Kelowna forest fires of 2003, note how 
„Tourism Kelowna managed to respond adequately to the 2003 disaster even though 
they did not have a plan. Overall comments were very positive towards Tourism 
Kelowna‟s efforts and its recovery marketing was judged effective by the majority of 
businesses.‟  
 
 
Table 2.2  below shows a number of recent tourism crises, the amount of pre-crisis 
planning that was in place before the event, and the negative impacts caused by the 
event.  
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Table 2.2:   Tourism crises and disasters: impacts and recovery time  
 
 
Disaster/ 
crisis 
Date Author(s) Pre-crisis planning Impacts Recovery time 
Katherine 
Flood, 
Australia 
26 Jan, 1998 Faulkner and 
Vikulov, 
2001 
No apparent plan 3 dead.  
Evacuation.  
Flood damage. 
Sensationalist media 
coverage. 
Fast- 15% increase in guest 
nights compared to previous 
year. 
 
Avalanche  
Tyrol, Austria 
 
Feb, 1999 
 
Peters and 
Pikeemaat, 
2005 
 
Aware of danger but 
plans only developed 
in prodromal stage 
 
31 dead. 
Property damage 5.27 
million Euros. 
8000 evacuated. 
 
Fast - rise in visitor numbers. 
Level in one year and big 
increase in two years. 
Feb, 1998- 62.570 
Feb, 1999- 47.384 
Feb, 2000- 62.576 
Feb, 2001- 80.495 
 
Foot and Mouth  
UK 
 
Feb, 2001 
 
Miller and Ritchie, 
2003; 
Ritchie et al , 2003; 
Frisby, 2003 
 
No apparent plan 
 
Four million animals 
culled. 
9% fall in overseas 
visitors. 
Sensationalist coverage. 
 
Fast - 15 January 2002 - 
Government announces that 
disease has been defeated. 
Fully recovered by June, 2003 
Terrorist attacks on 
New York 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Sept, 2001 Goodich, 2002; 
Blake and Sinclair, 
2003 
Not evident 5000-6000 killed and 
many more injured. 
Impacts worldwide travel 
and tourism industry. 
Closure of stock market. 
Fast- Recovery taking place 
by June, 2002, but still below 
annual average. 
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Disaster/ crisis 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Pre-crisis planning 
 
 
Impacts 
 
 
Recovery time 
 
 
SARS 
China 
Hong Kong 
Vietnam 
Singapore 
Canada, etc 
(29 countries affected) 
 
 
2003 
 
 
Henderson and Ng, 
2004; 
Zeng et al., 2005; 
Mason et al., 2005; 
Kuo et al .,2007; 
Tew et al .2008; 
Mao et al., 2009 
 
 
 
China - not evident. 
Singapore - hotel had 
crisis planning but 
unsuitable 
 
 
7774 deaths.  
Sensationalist coverage. 
China - foreign arrivals 
down 70%. 
Singapore - visitor arrivals 
down 70% in May. 
Singapore hotel sector - 
average occupancy rate 
drops to 21% compared 
to the normal 74.5%. 
 
 
 
China - Growth returns to 
9.1% in third quarter of 2003. 
Visitor arrivals return to 
normal by end of 2003. 
 
Singapore - room occupancies 
back to normal by end of 
2003. 
 
Bushfire in Northeast 
Victoria, 
Australia 
 
Summer 2003 
 
Cioccio and 
Michael, 2005 
 
Not evident, 
particularly in small 
businesses 
 
1.1 million hectares 
destroyed. 
$20m loss of business in 
first month. 
Sensationalist coverage. 
 
Fast - Marketing activities 
began three months later 
 
Indian Ocean Tsunami  
 
Indian Ocean coastal 
regions 
 
26 Dec, 2004 
 
Sharpley, 2005; 
Carlsen and 
Hughes, 2007 
 
 
Maldives - no apparent 
plan in place 
 
Estimated deaths  
300,000 (Feb, 2005). 
Damage estimated at $10 
billion. 
Maldives - 19 of 87 
resorts closed. 
 
Maldives  
Fast- 
Resumption of industry 
investment had recovered 
within 12 months. 
Occupancy rates for Dec, 
2005- Feb, 2006 had returned 
to pre-tsunami levels 
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 If one examines the amount of pre-crisis planning before these events, there is 
one factor which is common to all; little or no planning was evident. Table 2.2 also 
shows the recovery times of each event. If one examines the length of time taken for the 
destination to recover, there is another common factor; it was rapid on all occasions.   
It therefore appears rather obvious that even without planning, for some reason 
recovery is usually rapid and complete; it appears that the tourism industry is highly 
resilient to crises and disaster. Table 2.2 also demonstrates the range, scope and inherent 
complexity of disasters, which highlights the difficulties which ensue in attempting to 
predict and prepare for an event, as was mentioned previously. 
Managers need to be aware during the bifurcation stage and immediately 
afterwards that a return to normal is neither viable nor necessarily desirable. Bifurcation 
allows for the process of self-organisation and creativity which can bring improvements 
to individual businesses and the destination as a whole, from as it was in its pre-disaster 
condition. This was noted by Berman and Roel (1993) in their study concerning the 
aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake in which opportunities for development 
were in evidence.  
 In order to assist the process of self-organisation, managers aware of the chaos 
theory element of „strange attractor‟ are able to adopt a range of techniques which will 
help bring some form of order to the situation. As noted earlier, a key concept of chaos 
theory is the idea that order will emerge from a chaotic state. An 'island of stability' is 
needed in the prevailing chaos (Thietart and Forgues, 1995). This concept is noted by 
Sellnow et al. (2002) in the case of the Red River Valley flood in the United States. In 
this case, the National Guard and the Federal Emergency Management agency brought 
an air of stability to a chaotic situation.  
By providing communication platforms and encouraging co-operative 
relationships, managers themselves can become the „strange attractors‟ which assist in 
bringing order from chaos and „create the conditions for a new order to come‟ (Thietart 
and Forgues, 1995: 28). The key is to facilitate methods in which the system can work 
in unison towards its common goal of recovery.  Sellnow et al. (2002) liken „strange 
attractors‟ to the values, needs and assumptions that guide a social system towards 
relative stability following bifurcation. Zahra and Ryan (2007: 855) explain it as being a 
„common vision, sense of meaning, strategy or value system that drives people to 
achieve a common goal‟. On an organisational scale, an organisation should exhibit the 
characteristics mentioned previously which facilitate the change process, while on a 
destination or regional level, various marketing and communication strategies should be 
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deployed as the situation moves from bifurcation into self-organisation, or recovery.  
Media communication (Faulkner, 2001; Peters and Pikeemaat, 2005) is given 
prominence in the literature, with open and clear communication being viewed as 
imperative in this phase, as it was during bifurcation. Beirman (2003: 4) emphasnises 
the need for „urgent adaptation of marketing and operational policies to restore the 
confidence of employees, associated enterprises and consumers in the viability of the 
destination‟. Such recovery marketing strategies can include reduced price vacations, 
value-added special offers, familiarisation trips for journalists and tour operators, and 
increased promotion to the domestic market (Beirman, 2003; Carlsen and Hughes, 
2007).  Frisby (2002) notes the marketing tactics of the British Tourist Authority during 
the intermediate stage of the Foot and Mouth crisis which included, amongst other 
things, a consumer e-mail campaign, television, print and radio advertising, special 
offers, trade promotions, media visits, press briefings, new website and special issues of 
Inbound magazine.  
Marketers should be aware of the chaos theory element of „lock-in-effect‟, 
mentioned earlier. The „lock-in effect‟ is evident when behaviour keeps reoccurring, 
even though the original reason for such behaviour may be obsolete. It explains 
repetitive behaviour in a tourism context, such as a family that visits the same resort 
each year. The destination has a strong „pull‟ for whatever reason, and managers should 
be aware of this when developing marketing plans during recovery. Nonetheless, care 
must be taken that, in the rush to get things ‟back to normal‟, everything is ready for the 
return of visitors to the destination. For example, Cammisa (1993) notes how tourism 
authorities in Florida rushed to promote the hotel sector following Hurricane Andrew, 
but failed to mention that the rest of the infrastructure was devastated. Failure to deliver 
adequate services to tourists will result in further negative publicity; perhaps, a 
marketing campaign targeting a domestic clientele is more appropriate at this stage. 
The self-organisation stage can be an appropriate time to call for governmental 
assistance which, according to Israeli and Reichel (2003), is one of the four categories 
of crisis management practice. Ritchie (2009) points out that the tourism industry 
should quickly lobby government and the private sector for resources after a disaster has 
struck and perhaps there may be a case for international aid. Government measures 
include „incentives to stimulate foreign investment, tax relief and extended credit to 
tourism businesses, increased funding to national tourism organisations, and the 
stimulation of domestic tourism in the absence of international visitors‟ (de Sausmarez, 
2004: 168). An evaluation of the importance of the tourism industry needs to be 
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clarified to the government (de Sausmarez, 2004).For example, Sharpley and Craven 
(2001) report that a lack of understanding and data led to government favouritism 
towards the agricultural sector during the UK FMD crisis. Blake and Sinclair (2003) 
suggest that further research is necessary in this area.  
As the recovery proceeds, the importance of marketing and advertising 
continues. Ritchie (2009: 193) states: „The main aim of the recovery marketing 
campaign is to reverse the negative destination image and increase tourist flows and 
demand‟ and suggests using such techniques as persuasive advertising, partnership 
marketing, trade shows and special events. Collaboration between public and private 
sector organisations and even regional alliances can help with expensive recovery 
marketing campaigns (Ritchie, 2009). Beirman (2003: 14 ) further reiterates this point 
as he explains how organisations such as „airlines, hoteliers, resorts, museums and 
wholesale tour operators‟ who  „all depend on the successful selling and marketing of 
destinations which form all or part of their programs‟ initiate joint marketing campaigns 
in the recovery stage as it is palpably in all their interests to do so. 
Media coverage remains important. If an amicable relationship has been 
nurtured with the media it is likely that the recovery procedures presently taking effect 
will be reported, thus helping to nullify persistent negative perception. Frisby (2002) 
describes how the British Tourist Authority allowed travel industry leaders from across 
the world to view the impact of FMD in order to foster positive relations and generate 
positive reporting. 
 
2.6     Summary and presentation of model  
 An analysis of contemporary tourism disaster management models and frameworks 
brings to light the weaknesses considered in this chapter. While the models appear to be 
useful in some situations, it is evident that they are not universally applicable and that 
they are not relevant to every type of disaster. Therein lays the dilemma. Each crisis or 
disaster is unique, bringing its own distinctive problems and challenges which demand 
different responses and methods of management. Thus, crises and disasters cannot be 
specifically planned for and then managed using prescriptive guidelines because, 
typically, they occur unexpectedly and do not follow logical paths which would 
conveniently suit their management. They twist and turn and may provoke other crises 
which require different strategies. Tourism crises and disasters are complex events 
which affect a complex system and, accordingly, their management is rather complex.  
To conclude this chapter, a tourism crisis and disaster management model is 
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presented which advocates a chaos theory perspective when dealing with tourism crises 
and disasters (see Table 2.3 below). Rather than suggesting scenario analysis, 
contingency planning, and the prescriptive, step by step guidelines common to existing 
tourism crisis management models, it proposes a marketing and communication strategy 
based on the particular chaos theory element deemed present at the time, in line with the 
recommendations issued in the previous sections regarding chaos theory elements. For 
example, in the bifurcation phase, a suspension or reduction of marketing activities is 
recommended along with open and honest communication with stakeholders and the 
media, while the self-organisation phase calls for product diversification, cost 
reductions, a focus on the domestic market, alliances and joint marketing campaigns, 
government and international assistance and a continuation of the same open 
communication strategy with the media. 
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Table 2.3:   An alternative tourism crisis/disaster management model incorporating the elements of chaos theory: The Chaos 
Theory Tourism Crisis/Disaster Management Model   
 
Create organisational environment that 
facilitates learning and ’embraces’ 
change.  
 
Create environment that promotes innovation 
and flexibility.  
Promote adaptive management. 
Chaos theory element Marketing Communication 
 
Edge of chaos 
 
 
Be aware of the possibility of disaster and have a 
basic plan in place.   
Product diversification. 
Creation of strong brand image. 
 
Be aware of the possibility. Basic protocol (crisis 
management team) needs to be in place.  
Develop good relationship with media.  
Butterfly effect (sensitivity to initial 
conditions)  
Revise marketing strategy.  Implement communications strategy.  
Communication with staff and customers. 
 
Bifurcation Suspend or reduce marketing activities. Clear, flexible, open, truthful communication with 
stakeholders and the media. 
 
Cosmology Suspend or reduce marketing activities. Clear, flexible, open, truthful communication with 
stakeholders and the media. 
 
Self-organisation 
Strange attractor 
Adaptation of marketing - product 
diversification (if not done previously), cost 
reductions, focus on domestic clientele. 
Alliances and joint marketing campaigns. 
 
Continuation of open communication with the media.  
Investigate government assistance and international aid. 
Lock-in effect  
 
Special offers for loyal customers. 
 
 
 
 Reflection allows for lessons to be learned from 
the crisis.  
Reflection allows for lessons to be learned from the 
crisis. 
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This chapter can perhaps be briefly summarised by the words of Thietart and Forgues 
(1995: 28): „ ….managers are confronted with a major challenge that the 
incompleteness of traditional models cannot help to meet...Prescription and prediction 
imply perfect knowledge of the interrelationships between variables and their dynamics 
over time that we do not have.‟    
Thietart and Forgues (1995: 28) go on to propose further research into the 
„qualitative properties of chaos theory‟, suggesting that „among these features several 
seem worth exploring. For instance, such features as prediction impossibility 
(sensitivity to initial conditions)...attraction towards configurations (strange attractors), 
and stepwise change processes (bifurcation)‟.      
This thesis will continue to explore „prediction impossibility‟, „strange 
attractors‟, „bifurcation‟ and more besides, in an attempt to address the weaknesses that 
have been associated with current tourism crisis and disaster management models. The 
following chapter will outline the chosen research methodology whilst chapter three 
will continue to address the themes discussed in this chapter against the backdrop of the 
Mexican AH1N1 Influenza crisis.  
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Chapter 3         
 
Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Before one can decide upon a certain research methodology, it is necessary to carefully 
assess the objectives and aspirations of the research project. As Dann et al. (1988) 
eloquently observe, one is embarking upon a metaphorical journey, a quest for a specific 
„goal‟, and the methods used to achieve that goal are of utmost importance for the 
satisfaction of the researcher and for future peer approval. Different objectives require 
different approaches and methods, although ultimately, perhaps, the methodology 
chooses the researcher rather than vice-versa as a result of the researcher‟s personal 
beliefs. This concept is explained by Phillimore and Goodson (2004: 34):  „put simply, 
knowledge production relies heavily upon the ontology of the researcher – their 
definition of reality. Their epistemology – what they count as knowledge – depends on 
what they want knowledge about, while the kind of knowledge that they seek 
determines their methodology.‟  
By initially focusing on Phillimore and Goodson‟s „simple‟ explanation of 
knowledge production, it is possible to discuss the methodological approach adopted in 
this thesis. 
 
3.2   What is being investigated?  What do we want knowledge about?  
 
3.2.1   The two issues 
The previously identified weaknesses and limitations of contemporary tourism crisis 
and disaster management models and the incorporation of chaos theory into a disaster 
management model form the „essence‟ of the inquiry. An „intellectual puzzle‟ (Mason, 
2002: 13) has, therefore, presented itself in the form of two issues. The first involves the 
criticism of current tourism crisis management models. It is suggested that such models 
fail to account for the unpredictable nature of disasters, and that they are too 
prescriptive and rigid, with a „broadness of approach‟ which does not cater for the 
characteristics of individual crises, cultural differences and financial and knowledge 
restrictions of smaller businesses.   
The second issue in need of examination is the applicability and viability of the 
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proposed chaos theory model (table 2.3). The specific questions to be asked are: does 
this model effectively address the weaknesses of the other models, and does it represent 
a realistic alternative to them?   
 
3.3   How can the two issues be investigated?   
 Finn et al. (2000: 8) note how there is „a strong association in the minds of students 
undertaking research that quantitative research is associated with the hypothetico-
deductive method of theory testing, and qualitative data with seeking patterns in the 
data to inductively generate theory‟.  However, departing from the epistemological 
battle between the positivist and interpretivist traditions, Dann et al. (1988: 5) suggest 
that it is a matter of deciding, from a personal viewpoint, how to address the identified 
hypotheses (or in this case, perhaps, the word „issues‟ is more apt) and how to approach 
this in a manner which ideally combines „theoretical awareness‟ and „methodological 
sophistication.‟  
Mason (2000) is of the opinion that five questions must be considered by the 
researcher before setting forth upon the research journey. These questions relate to the 
researcher‟s personal ontological and epistemological perspectives, the research area 
and the research questions and the aim of the research (see Table 3.1 below). Given the 
stated ontological and epistemological perspectives, the research questions or 
hypotheses, and the purpose of the thesis, it is suggested that a qualitative approach 
offers an appropriate method to seek the knowledge required to answer the questions 
being posed.   
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Table 3.1:  Mason‟s five questions: How the researcher‟s ontological perspective and epistemological position relates to this research 
 
Ontological 
perspective 
 
Epistemological 
position  
 
Broad research area 
 
Intellectual puzzle and 
research questions 
 
Aims and purpose 
 
Constructivism/ 
interpretivism 
-recognition of 
multiple perspectives 
(Jennings, 2005). 
 
“…assumes multiple, 
apprehendable, and 
sometimes conflicting 
social realities that are 
the products of human 
intellects, but that 
may change as their 
constructors become 
more informed and 
sophisticated.”  (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994: 
111)  
 
 
The subjective 
viewpoints of people 
and their experiences is 
the basis for 
understanding.  
 
Interaction between 
researcher and 
respondents leads to 
creation of knowledge 
(Guba and Lincoln, 
1994) 
 
 
 
Tourism crisis/disaster 
management 
 
 
The effectiveness of 
current tourism 
crisis/disaster 
management models  
 
1. Do the weaknesses 
which apparently exist 
within the models affect 
their application to 
crisis/disaster 
situations?   
 
2. Does a model which 
views tourism 
crisis/disaster 
management issues 
from a chaos theory 
perspective present a 
more attractive, viable 
alternative? 
 
To challenge contemporary 
tourism crisis management 
theory.  
 
To provide an alternative by 
viewing the situation from a 
chaos theory perspective.  
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Given that the researcher expresses to hold ontological and epistemological perspectives 
which relate to the constructivist and interpretivist paradigms and the belief that the 
subjective viewpoints of people and their experience serve as the basis for 
understanding a social inquiry, and given the scope of the research questions and the 
purpose of the thesis, it is suggested that a qualitative approach offers the most 
appropriate method to seek the knowledge required to answer the questions being 
posed.   
 
3.4   What are the reasons for a qualitative approach? 
 
1. As just mentioned, the researcher‟s ontological and epistemological viewpoints 
call for such an approach. Schwandt (1994: 125) points out how „human beings 
do not find or discover knowledge so much as construct or make it‟. Quoting 
Guba and Lincoln (1989), Schwandt (1994: 129) further explains: 
„Constructions are attempts to make sense of or to interpret experience, and most 
are self-sustaining and renewing.‟  The belief that knowledge is gained by 
gathering information relating to participants‟ experience and the subsequent 
interpretation of this data which may serve to test hypotheses and/or generate 
new theory necessitates a qualitative method of inquiry.  
 
2. It could be argued that this research is examining a complex „reality‟. Riley and 
Love (2000: 166) suggest that quantitative methods „cannot fully address 
questions of meaning and understanding‟.  As Stake (1995: 17) remarks, „issues 
are not simple and clean, but intricately wired to political, social, historical, and 
especially personal contexts‟.  Guba and Lincoln (1994) go on to argue that the 
positivist paradigm seeks to be nomothetic and applicable to all circumstances. 
Positivist approaches struggle to address context specific, complex situations 
and the variety of knowledge which can be gained from the analysis of data; this 
is quite unlike qualitative methods of inquiry which, according to Hollinshead 
(2004: 72), aim to be „idiosyncratic, vexatious and time-consuming‟ in their 
quest for knowledge. The understanding of phenomena, according to Stake 
(1995:.42), requires a holistic perspective which views the situation from „a 
wide sweep of contexts: temporal and spatial, historical, political, economic, 
cultural, social and personal.‟  
         As the aim of this thesis is to test contemporary tourism crisis management 
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theory and to provide an alternative means of dealing with the issue, a topic 
which is of an abstract and complex nature, it is suggested that a qualitative 
research approach is most appropriate; it enables the researcher to experience the 
situation „through the eyes‟ of those directly concerned in order to gain a more 
thorough „meaning‟ and „understanding‟ of the issues concerned and to focus on 
newly emerging themes. This evidence can then be analysed in relation to the 
criticisms pointed out in the previous chapter, allowing links to be made between 
theory and data and conclusions to be drawn.  
 
3. Positivistic methods of research have, until recently, dominated the field. 
Faulkner ( 2000: 3), referring to Dann and Philips (2000), describes this state of 
affairs: „the tourism research field has inherited the conceptual and 
methodological foundations that have dominated social science disciplines in 
recent decades and, in particular, it has exhibited an affinity for the positivistic 
inclinations of the business and management oriented disciplines‟.  Chaos 
theory, recognising instability, non-linearity and complexity, directly challenges 
quantitative methods and demands a qualitative approach.  
 
 
3.5     Which methods are used and why? 
 The research is conducted in the form of a case study. This method has been chosen for 
several reasons.  
 
i. A ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked 
Yin (2003) suggests a specific research strategy is particularly advantageous in certain 
situations. When the research is questioning the „how‟ or „why‟ of contemporary events 
(see Table 2.1) over which the researcher does not have control, Yin advocates the use 
of the case study. In the case of this research, the questions to be addressed are, firstly: 
„do the weaknesses which apparently exist within the models affect their application to 
crisis/disaster situations?‟ and, secondly, „does a model which views tourism 
crisis/disaster issues from a chaos theory perspective present a more attractive, viable 
alternative?' In the first question, we are interested in knowing how and why the 
weaknesses limit the effectiveness of the models and, in the second, we wish to 
investigate how and why a chaos theory model may offer a better alternative in relation 
to a situation over which the researcher has no control.  
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ii. Instrumental case study:  the case study is used to provide insight into a 
phenomenon.  
 Stake (1994: 237) notes how a case study can be used to play a „supportive role‟ in 
order to facilitate „our understanding of something else‟ - “The choice of case is made 
because it is expected to advance our understanding of that other interest” or, as Beeton 
(2005: 38) explains, it „illuminates‟ an issue by examining a „specific instance.‟ The 
principal area of interest is that of contemporary tourism crisis management theory and 
the possibilities rendered by utilising a chaos theory approach. Mexico and its AH1N1 
crisis is an example of a tourism crisis which will play the „role‟ of hypothesis tester.  
 
iii. Combination of methods.  
Knights and McCabe (1997) suggest that the case study provides a vehicle through 
which several qualitative methods can be combined, thus contributing to the validity 
and reliability of the research. Interviews provide „subjective‟ data; however, 
documentary data is used in conjunction, thus providing a more „balanced‟ account of 
the situation.  
 
iv. Validity of case study research 
Beeton (2005: 37) lists a number of reasons why the case study is a „valid 
methodological tool in tourism research.‟  
 
(a) -Can explain why an innovation worked or failed to work. This thesis is 
investigating the effectiveness of contemporary tourism crisis models and the alternative 
chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster management model.  
 
 
(b)- Has the advantage of hindsight, yet can be relevant in the present and to the future. 
The investigation into the effects of the AH1N1 influenza crisis on the Mexican tourism 
industry is, of course, taking place after the event; however, it is hoped that the insights 
and knowledge gained can positively contribute to contemporary tourism crisis 
management theory and future theory.  
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(c) Can illustrate the complexities of a situation by recognising more than one 
contributing factor. Tourism crises and disasters are complex situations and the 
challenge is to recognise the factors that contribute to this complexity and conceive 
solutions.  
 
 
(d) Shows the influence of personalities and politics on an issue. The importance of 
tourism for the Mexican economy will no doubt become apparent during the course of 
the investigation.  The huge influence of the government and the media is also expected 
to be a prominent issue.  
 
 
(e) The reader may be able to apply it to his/her situation. While the case study 
specifically concerns the Mexican AH1N1 crisis, the critique of current tourism crisis 
management theory applies to all tourism crisis/disaster situations.  
 
 
(f) Can evaluate alternatives not chosen. While the thesis is investigating two specific 
issues, the qualitative research approach encourages the development of new theory.  
 
 
(g) Can utilize information from a wide variety of sources. The thesis aims to investigate 
the issues from the perspective of a variety of sources, from key players in the Mexican 
tourism industry to business owners and government documents.  
 
 
Of course, there are a number of criticisms related to case study research. These are 
summarised in Table 3.2 below, which also seeks to justify the use of case study 
research in the face of such criticism.  As mentioned above, a case study provides the 
opportunity to adopt various other research methods. In this research, semi-structured 
interviews are used in conjunction with an examination of government, industry and 
media reports to gather information to supplement the case study. 
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Table 3.2: The case study: limitations and justifications 
   
Limitations of case study research  Justification 
Generalisation - Dann et al. (1988: 15) 
criticise a case study approach undertaken by 
De Sola Pool (1958), which fails to take into 
account the „typicality‟ of the respondents, 
hence affecting the „generalizability of the 
information gleaned from them.‟ 
The analysis of a single case presents problems 
of „generalizability‟. The AH1N1 crisis in 
Mexico is a different situation to the Katherine 
Flood, for example; however, it is suggested 
that a degree of „theoretical generalizability‟ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007: 63) is possible. As Yin 
(2003: 10) points out, „in this sense, the case 
study, like the experiment, does not represent a 
„sample‟ and, in doing a case study, your goal 
will be to expand and generalize theories 
(analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization).‟ 
  
Bias - Hoaglin et al. (1982) suggest that case 
studies can mirror the bias of the researcher.  
Yin (2003) counters this criticism by stating that 
bias is just as likely in other research strategies, 
such as surveys or historical research.  
It is proposed that triangulation can overcome 
researcher bias (Creswell, 1994).  
 
Can be very long, and attempting to reduce the 
size in order to fit within the thesis regulations 
can lead to a failure to include all relevant 
information. 
Yin (2003: 143) suggests that thought should be 
given to this and the intended audience as a 
„starting point‟, before one begins the 
composition of the case study.  
Can be difficult to complete. Yin (2003: 162-163) points out three 
characteristics of „completeness‟. 
(1) „...the boundaries of the case…are given 
explicit attention‟.  
(2) „The complete case study should 
demonstrate convincingly that the investigator 
expended exhaustive effort in collecting the 
relevant evidence‟ 
(3) „When a time or resource constraint is 
known at the outset of a study, the responsible 
investigator should design a case study that can 
be completed within such constraints…‟ 
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3.6  Semi-structured interviewing  
 This research method has been chosen for several reasons.  
 
i. Qualitative approach  
Semi-structured interviews are allied to a qualitative approach to research. Jennings 
(2005: 104) summarises: „The use of …semi-structured interviews is associated with the 
phenomenological, constructivist or interpretivist paradigm, which holds an ontology 
(worldview) that recognizes multiple perspectives in regard to the research process, an 
epistemological stance that is subjective in nature and a methodology which is 
predicated on qualitative principles‟.  
 
ii. Chaos theory approach  
 Jennings (2005:103) notes how chaos theorists often make use of semi-structured 
interviews. As revealed previously, chaos theory naturally calls for a qualitative 
approach and Jennings asserts that „in depth and semi-structured interviews are the key 
components of a qualitative research project‟.  
 
iii. Answering the research questions…and more 
Semi-structured interviews provide a means of answering the research questions and 
developing theory. Whilst providing a means of asking „theory-driven, hypothesis-
directed questions‟ (Flick, 1998: 84), they also provide the flexibility to allow the 
respondent to express their unique version of events and to make further suggestions 
and recommendations which can contribute towards generation of theory. While 
structured interviewing is geared towards the capture of „precise‟ data, unstructured or 
semi-structured interviewing does not impose limits (Fontana and Frey, 1994), and this 
can result in findings which richly add to the data and the quality of the research.  
 
iv. Varied and complex information  
As the interview subjects range from small business owners and tourists to tourism 
academics and government level planners, the questions asked and the information 
obtained is expected to differ considerably. Quantitative structured interviews and 
surveys would not allow for such scope and so semi-structured interviewing is deemed 
necessary. 
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v. Case study information   
 Yin (2003: 90) remarks how the interview is one of the most important sources of 
information for the case study, and usually these are of „an open-ended nature‟.  
 
Semi -structured interviewing does have its limitations. These are summarised in Table 
3.3 below.  
 
Table 3.3: Semi- structured interviews: limitations and justifications 
Limitations of semi-structured interviewing Justification 
Finn et al. (2000: 75) „Bias may increase as 
interviewer selects questions to probe and may 
inhibit comparability of responses”. 
Yin (2003) counters this criticism by stating that 
bias is just as likely in other research strategies, 
such as surveys or historical research.  
It is suggested that triangulation can overcome 
researcher bias (Creswell, 1994).  
 
Can be difficult to establish trust and rapport. This depends on the personal attributes of both 
the interviewer and interviewee.  
 
Fleeting contact - The interviewer and 
interviewee only spend a relatively short 
amount of time together. Lack of familiarity 
can result in guarded, hesitant answers which 
provide little information. 
   
 Depends on the „skill‟ of the interviewer.  
Not every interviewee is capable of answering 
the questions in the way that the interviewer 
would hope (Fuchs, 1984).   
Role plays and rehearsals are recommended as 
part of interview training (Flick, 1998). 
Misinterpretation of views- „understanding the 
language and culture of the respondents‟ 
Fontana and Frey (1994:366) 
Depends on the „skills‟ of the researcher.  
Selection of „right‟ questions. Depends on the „skills‟ of the researcher. 
 
 
3.7   Documents 
 Various documents are used as sources of secondary data and a qualitative content 
analysis approach is utilised.  These documents are primarily in the form of official 
reports, organisational documents and newspaper reports. Reasons for this include:  
 
i.  As a means of ‘balancing’ the data and as a practical means of securing more 
information alongside the information gained in the interviews.  
 As Hakim (1982) suggests, it can help to remove the spotlight from the individual 
evidence and provide a more varied, broad approach to data gathering and analysis. 
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Hodder (1994: 393) further elaborates: „Such texts are of importance for qualitative 
research because, in general terms, access can be easy and low cost, because the 
information provided may differ from and may not be available in spoken form, and 
because texts endure and thus give historical insight.‟ Documentary evidence will be 
compared to the interview evidence and the common themes and concepts which 
become evident will be examined in detail. Also, any contrasting evidence and the 
possible reasons for this will be taken into consideration.  
 
ii.   Documents play an important role in case study data collection. 
Yin (2003:87) insists that „because of their overall value, documents play an explicit 
role in any data collection in doing case studies‟. He lists their strengths:  (i) stable (they 
can be evaluated as often as necessary); (ii) unobtrusive (were created independently of 
the case study); and, (iii) exact (contain names and details of events). Stake (1995: 68) 
is also adamant that a documentary review is an integral part of case study research and 
advises that such data may unearth „unexpected clues.‟  
 
As with semi -structured interviewing, the use of documents as a form of secondary data 
does have its limitations. These are shown in Table 3.4 below.  
 
Table 3.4: Documents: limitations and justifications 
Limitations of secondary data  Justification  
A researcher may presume that a document 
contains the „unmitigated truth‟; however, they 
often reflect the unknown bias of the author 
(Yin, 2003: 87). 
The researcher must bear this in mind and be 
aware that „the documentary evidence reflects a 
communication among other parties attempting 
to achieve some other objectives‟ (Yin, 2000: 
87).  
 
Statistics can be „massaged‟ as a means of 
influencing data (Finn et al., 2000:58). 
 
As above, the researcher must be aware of this. 
The original data may have been of poor 
quality.  
The researcher should take care to ensure that 
the secondary data comes from a reliable 
source. 
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The choice of methods and potential sources are summarised in Table 3.5 below, 
adapted from Mason (2002).  
 
Table 3.5: How the chosen methodology justifies the research questions  
Research questions  Data sources and 
methods  
Justification  
1. Do the weaknesses which 
apparently exist within 
contemporary tourism crisis 
management models affect 
their application to 
crisis/disaster situations?  
Players within the tourism 
industry:  case study, 
interviews. 
 
 
 Government, industry and 
media reports.   
A case study will be used to 
provide a „real-life‟ situation 
in which insight into the 
research question can be 
gained.  It allows for the use 
of interviews and analysis of 
relevant reports.  
 
Interviews will provide varied 
accounts of the crisis. The 
experiences of those affected 
will reveal an „insider‟ account 
of the crisis; the effects, 
strategies employed, successes 
and failings, hindsight, etc. 
 
Reports will provide extra 
information with which to 
evaluate the research question.  
2. Does a model which views 
tourism crisis/disaster issues 
from a chaos theory 
perspective present a more 
attractive, viable alternative? 
Players within the tourism 
industry: interviews.  
The accounts and experiences 
will provide an insight into 
how applying the chaos theory 
model may provide a viable 
alternative.  
 
Source: adapted from Mason (2002) 
  
The methodological approach is designed to answer the research questions and to 
satisfy and justify the aim of the thesis. It is suggested that a qualitative approach in the 
form of a case study which gathers data by the method of interview and document 
analysis offers the most promising approach, as has been explained above. Other 
approaches have been considered; focus groups would be very difficult to arrange and 
probably impractical in a country such as Mexico in which it is suggested that many 
people will doubtless say what is „politically correct‟, whether it is the truth or not, 
especially with an audience. A one- to- one interview offers the possibility of creating 
an air of trust between interviewer and interviewee in which a more honest and truthful 
account could be solicited; structured interviews are seen to be too restrictive for this 
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subject matter as it is hoped that as well as addressing the two research questions, the 
interviews will be a means to generate new theory, in almost a grounded approach 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The interviews will seek the interviewees‟ points of view, 
their concerns and their ideas and wandering „slightly off tangent‟ will be encouraged in 
order to facilitate this grounded approach. Quantitative research methods such as 
sampling, use of surveys and descriptive statistics will not be used; while they are 
considered perfectly viable research techniques in their own right, the knowledge 
required for this thesis is not regarded as being conducive with this approach.  
 
3.8   Summary 
This thesis seeks to elicit the impact that the AH1N1 crisis had on the Mexican tourism 
industry, the subsequent reaction of industry stakeholders, and how they view the 
situation in hindsight.  It wishes to investigate the concepts of unpredictability, „edge of 
chaos‟, butterfly effect, bifurcation, cosmology, self-organisation and the limitations 
posed by prescriptive, rigid, „one-size-fits-all‟ tourism crisis management models in the 
context of a real life tourism crisis.  It is therefore proposed that the only means of 
enveloping such an array of ideas is by adopting a qualitative approach which is geared 
towards answering the research questions and the possibly „grounding‟ out of new 
theory in the process.  
 
3.9 The methods used in Mexico                                                                                                  
Along with the above explanation which attempts to specifically identify the research 
questions and justify the chosen methodology and research methods, it is also necessary 
to describe the actual research process as it happened in Mexico. 
(i)        Selections of respondents  
Approximately sixty potential respondents were identified within the 
Mexican tourism industry, ranging from key players in the Ministry of 
Tourism (SECTUR) and the Tourism Board (CPTM) to Mexican tourism 
academics and business owners. The majority were identified by an internet 
search. For example, the SECTUR website has a directory which lists the 
telephone number and email addresses of its staff. Other individuals were 
identified by searching for tourism businesses and organisations in Mexico 
City and Cancun and again looking for staff telephone numbers and email 
addresses. These people were then contacted by telephone and by email and 
asked if they would participate in an interview concerning the AH1N1 
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influenza crisis and the response of the tourism authorities. The academics 
were contacted by the email address provided on their publications, while 
Bruce Broughton, the Canadian tourist, was a guest at the same hotel in 
which the researcher was residing in January, 2011. 
The majority of potential interviewees politely refused, but crucially 
thirteen people did agree and interviews were subsequently arranged. 
(ii)  Where the interviews took place 
 The interviews with José Raúl Sánchez and Adriana Uribe Pérez from 
SECTUR and José Alberto García from the CPTM took place at the 
separate headquarters of SECTUR and the CPTM in Mexico City. 
Likewise, the interview with Adolfo Crespo of Mexicana Airlines was 
conducted in his office at the Mexicana Tower in Mexico City and the 
interview with Braulio Cárdenas also took place in his office at the Mexico 
City headquarters of the National Chamber for the Restaurant and Food 
Industry. 
The interview with tourism academic Juan Carlos Monterrubio was 
conducted at the Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Mexico in Texcoco 
in the State of Mexico, while the interview with the other tourism 
academic, Carlos Amaya Molinar, took place in a restaurant in Mexico 
City. 
 María Teresa Solís Trejo, Alejandro Rojas, and Fernando Betzano were 
also interviewed in various cafes and restaurants in Mexico City. 
The interview with Walter Dagri took place at the Real Resort hotel in 
Playa del Carmen and the interview with Kenneth Johnson was conducted 
at the location of his business, Ecocolors, in Cancun. Bruce Broughton was 
also interviewed in Cancun at the Celuisma Dos Playas hotel.  
(iii)  The interview questions 
In each interview the questions were carefully structured so as to gain 
specific information from each interviewee relating to the main research 
themes and issues- the limitations and weaknesses of contemporary tourism 
crisis and disaster management models, the identification of chaos theory 
elements, and if managerial intervention in the form of marketing and 
communication measures, according to which chaos theory was present, 
would enable a more adequate response. For example, the interviews with 
the SECTUR representatives, the CPTM representative and the Secretary of 
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Tourism for Mexico City provided an opportunity to gather first-hand 
information regarding the existence/non-existence of a health related 
tourism crisis/disaster management plan, the impacts of the crisis, the main 
challenges facing the authorities, the subsequent response of the authorities, 
and lessons learned from the crisis. The interviews with the business owner, 
the hotel manager, Mexicana Airlines, the National Chamber for the 
Restaurant and Food Industry, the National Confederation of Mexican 
travel agents and Vantage Strategy Consulting allowed the crisis to be seen 
from a different perspective and provided information concerning the 
existence/non-existence of business and sector specific crisis management 
plans, impacts of the crisis on the industry , the challenges facing individual 
businesses and sectors of the tourism industry and their view of the 
government response and overall situation. The interviews with the tourism 
academics provided an opportunity to explore more difficult concepts in 
greater detail, as professional opinion could be sought regarding the 
limitations associated with tourism crisis and disaster management models 
and the application of chaos theory to tourism crises and disasters.  
Each interviewee was encouraged to talk freely and openly and „wandering 
slightly off-topic‟ was welcomed as it encouraged the development of new 
ideas and themes previously neglected.  
(iv) Content analysis 
The interviews were conducted in English, apart from the interviews with 
Braulio Cárdenas and José Alberto García which were done in Spanish; 
each interview was recorded on a digital audio recorder, and later 
transcribed. The interviews in Spanish were transcribed and then translated. 
The interview transcripts were then carefully analysed.  The focus of the 
analysis concerned the issues outlined in table 3.6 below. 
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Table 3.6:  Examining the data: Relevant themes and issues 
 
Weaknesses of 
crisis/disaster models 
Chaos theory 
elements 
Marketing and 
communication 
responses 
Unpredictability Edge of chaos Crisis and disaster 
plans 
Limitations of 
prescriptive/ rigid 
models 
Butterfly effect Product diversification 
One size fits all 
approach 
Bifurcation and 
cosmology 
Brand image 
Cultural context Self-organisation and 
strange attractors 
Media relationship 
Realities of small 
businesses 
Lock-in effect Marketing activities 
throughout the crisis 
  Communication 
activities throughout 
the crisis 
  Reflection 
 
 
 The questions were principally aimed at eliciting responses concerning 
these themes and so when an issue was commented upon, such as the 
unpredictability of the AH1N1 influenza crisis, for example, or the 
recovery marketing strategies put into effect during the self-organisation 
phase, then the said issue was noted in the margin of the transcript, and then 
categorized separately, to be added to if and when brought up in future 
interviews.  As mentioned above, it was also expected that the interviews 
would produce random ideas and themes leading to the generation of 
original theory and so any interesting „new‟ information was duly noted and 
categorised separately. This will become apparent later as issues such as the 
deep-seated political mistrust abundant in Mexican society and concerns 
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regarding the „mysterious‟ crisis came to light during the interviews. 
(v) The documents 
The documents were chosen carefully as a means of adding to and 
balancing the data which was obtained from the interviews. An internet 
search provided access to various documents which were mainly useful in 
compiling a chronological sequence of events, evaluating the past and 
current state of Mexican tourism, and measuring the impacts of the crisis on 
the tourism industry and the response of the authorities. The documents 
included: 
(a) Information bulletins provided on the SECTUR website which 
described the impacts of the crisis on various destinations and the 
measures being taken by the authorities. 
(b) A document prepared by the Economic Commission of Latin America 
(CEPAL) entitled  Evaluación preliminar del impacto en México de la 
Influenza AH1N1  (Preliminary investigation of the impact of AH1N1 
influenza on Mexico). This document, available online, gives specific 
information regarding the impacts of the Influenza crisis, including the 
decline in international visitor arrivals and hotel occupancy and the 
promotional campaigns put into effect by the authorities. 
(c) A document prepared by the Centre of Social Studies and Public 
Opinion (CESOP) called 2009, un año de crisis para el turismo (2009- 
a year of crisis for tourism). This document, also available online, 
investigates the impacts of the worldwide economic recession and the 
Influenza crisis on Mexican tourism. 
(d) UNWTO world tourism barometers, available online, give regular 
information and data from individual destination countries and also 
provide evaluations from a panel of tourism experts. The UNWTO 
„Tourism 2020 Vision‟ provides a long-term forecast of tourism 
development up to the year 2020. 
(e) WEF travel and tourism competitiveness reports measure the factors 
which potentially make individual countries an attractive business 
development proposition, rather than the factors which make it an 
appealing destination for tourists.  
As well as the internet search: 
(f)   Copies of the quality Mexican newspaper „El Universal‟ supplied 
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information concerning the chronological impacts of the Influenza 
crisis and were used to construct table 4.2. 
(g) An internal SECTUR press cuttings document provided by José Raúl 
Sánchez gave selected quotations from various newspapers and 
magazines which provided useful factual information and personal 
comments and were ultimately used to compile table 4.4.  
(h) A PowerPoint document given by Fernando Betzano was an important 
addition to the data. The document contained the CPTM tourism crisis 
management plan (table 4.3) which details the planned response of the 
tourism authorities.  
(vi) Document analysis  
The SECTUR bulletins were printed, translated and then analysed using the 
same manual content analysis approach as was used for the interview data; 
the same technique also applied to the newspaper reports. The factual 
information from the bulletins and the reports were compared to the factual 
information given in the interviews but no discrepancies were found to be 
present. The internal SECTUR press cuttings document and the PowerPoint 
document which provided the CPTM tourism crisis management plan were 
analysed and translated as above and, as just mentioned, used to prepare 
tables 4.3 and 4.4.  
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Chapter 4        
 
 Case study: The AH1N1 influenza crisis 
 
“Aha….this was a surprise.”  (José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, SECTUR, 
11
th
 October, 2010) 
 
4.1   Introduction 
  
Commencing with a short history of Mexican tourism development, this chapter 
presents an account of the AH1N1 crisis in Mexico and the responses to it. It provides 
the background and context for the following chapters which will explore in detail the 
issues highlighted in the second chapter concerning the limitations of contemporary 
tourism crisis management models, and the possibilities offered by viewing the situation 
from a chaos theory perspective. 
 
4.2       Early Mexican tourism: 1939- 1969 
„The border means more than a customs house, a passport officer, a man with a 
gun. Over there everything is going to be different; life is never going to be quite 
the same again after your passport has been stamped and you find yourself 
speechless among the money-changers. The man seeking scenery imagines 
strange woods and unheard-of mountains; the romantic believes that the women 
over the border will be more beautiful and complaisant than those at home; the 
unhappy man imagines at least a different hell…‟ (Greene, 1939: 23) 
 
The writer Graham Greene, lost in thought on the US-Mexico border some 70 years 
before the AH1N1 influenza crisis was to unfold, encapsulates the romantic ideology 
associated with the Mexico of old. Revolutions, danger and political unrest added to the 
charm of this unfamiliar land (Cothran and Cothran, 1998), with its vast jungles, 
deserts, ancient pyramids and sparkling Spanish colonial cities. It seems the only 
individuals who dared to venture into Mexico were intrepid explorers, catholic priests 
and „gringo‟ wrongdoers seeking refuge from the law.  
However, tentative changes began to occur in the post war years which would 
ultimately transform Greene‟s Mexico. Acapulco, Mexico City and the border regions 
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began to attract tourists, predominantly from the US, and the Mexican government 
began to note tourism‟s potential as an attractive means of finance.    
 
4.3     Mexican tourism 1969- 2009 
 Partly animated by the success of the 1961 National Border Program, the Mexican 
government, through the Ministry of Tourism (SECTUR) and the national tourism 
development trust fund (INFRATUR, whose title changed to FONATUR in 1974), took 
the lead in tourism planning, promotion and development. Changes began in earnest 
from the late 1960‟s with the government-led creation of five new tourist destinations – 
Cancun, Ixtapa, Los Cabos, Loreto and Huatulco.   Improvements were also made to the 
resorts of Acapulco, Puerta Vallarta and Cozumel (Brenner and Aguilar, 2002). The goal 
was „to achieve a controlled increase in tourism by improvement and expansion of 
existing resorts, and the creation of new tourist zones focused on newly created 
cities‟(Collins, 1979: 353). 
Cancun in particular met with spectacular success. In 1989 it attracted more than 
74,000 foreign tourists, overtaking Mexico City to become the most popular destination 
for foreign tourists in Mexico (Clancy, 2001), and it has been described by Cothran and 
Cothran (1998: 479) as the „most popular resort in the Western Hemisphere‟. 
As Clancy (2001: 137) observes, „by the early 1980‟s, the „traditional‟ Mexican 
tourist centers were drawing less than a third of international arrivals. For many 
foreigners, the Mexico they came to know was based on a tourist experience at Cancun 
or one of the other beach resorts.‟  Indeed, Clancy regards Mexico as one of the most 
popular destinations in the world and stipulates that tourism plays an integral role in the 
Mexican economy: „Arrivals in Mexico tripled between 1970 and 1991, while foreign 
exchange earnings from tourism soared to more than nine fold, from 415 million to 3.8 
billion dollars…rapid growth continued during the 1990s…in 1998 Mexico drew almost 
20 million foreign visitors…‟ (2001: 137) 
Brenner and Aguilar (2002: 510) remark how „successive governments since 
1977 have elaborated national tourism development plans and federal tourism laws, 
which state objectives, strategies, stimuli and territorial priorities for the development of 
the sector.‟  The National Tourism Development Plan of 1978 strove to maintain a 
balance between international and domestic tourism and to promote social tourism 
(Brenner and Aguilar, 2002), while the Tourism Plan of 2007-2012 focuses on 
competitiveness, sustainability and diversification (SECTUR, 2007). 
It is evident, therefore, that the Mexican government has played a leading role 
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over the last forty years in the development of international and domestic tourism. 
Clancy (2001: 130) describes how „state-led efforts continue to expand, promote and 
diversify Mexican destinations‟ although, in contrast to Clancy„s positive stance and 
general praise for the Mexican government‟s efforts, it should be noted that there are 
conflicting accounts which portray Mexican tourism in a less positive light. For 
example, Brenner (2005) complains of the negative social impacts of the international 
resorts and the failure of the government to address these issues whilst, in a similar vein, 
Brenner and Aguilar (2002) report on the lack of integrated regional development.  
Ritchie et al. (2010: 8) believe that the more recent performance of Mexico‟s 
tourism industry between 2005 and 2008 has been at best „mediocre‟ and, although 
usually placed as one of the top ten countries for number of visitors, it falls behind in 
tourist income (see Table 4.1 below).  According to Ritchie et al. (2010: 11), the 
industry has „stagnated‟ and blame is directed towards politicians and a lack of 
professionalism from key players within the industry.  
           Therefore, it appears questionable whether Mexican tourism can indeed 
be regarded as a success.  Certainly visitor arrival figures appear impressive, but 
favourable exchange rates for visitors arriving with dollars or pounds make it difficult 
for the Mexican tourism industry, dealing in pesos, to earn tourism revenues comparable 
with those destinations which deal in stronger currencies. For example, if one refers 
again to table 4.1 below, Mexico can be seen to occupy tenth place in terms of visitor 
arrivals, with visitor arrivals reaching 21.5 million in 2009.  In the same year, Austria 
welcomed a total of 21.3 million visitors; however, despite fewer arrivals, Austria 
gained US$ 19.4 billion in tourist receipts against Mexico‟s US$ 11.2 billion. A more 
stark contrast is evident if one compares Mexico with Australia. Australia saw tourist 
receipts of US$ 25.6 billion in 2009, compared to Mexico‟s US$11.2 billion, and yet 
only 5.5 million visitors entered the country. 
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 Table 4.1:  Top 10 international tourist destinations of 2009: arrivals and receipts 
       
Country  International tourist arrivals 
(million)  2009 
International tourism receipts 
(US$ billion)  2009 
 
France 
 
 
74.2 
 
49.4 
 
United States 
 
 
54.9 
 
93.9 
 
Spain  
 
 
57.2 
 
53.2 
 
China 
 
 
50.9 
 
39.7 
 
Italy 
 
43.2 
 
40.2 
 
United Kingdom 
 
28.0 
 
30.0 
 
Turkey 
 
25.5 
 
21.3 
 
Germany 
 
24.2 
 
34.7 
 
Malaysia 
 
23.6 
 
15.8 
 
Mexico 
 
21.5 
 
11.2 
 
Source:  UNWTO (2010) 
 
Interview respondent Carlos Amaya Molinar (Mexican tourism academic) firmly 
believes that Mexican tourism is failing and has not reached its potential for various 
reasons.  
 
“I don't think Mexico is a success in the world tourism arena; on the contrary, I feel that 
our tourism industry doesn't take advantage of the huge resources and opportunities at 
hand. I can tell you that our country has great advantages in the field of tourism in 
resources like land, weather, culture, gastronomy, beaches, location, price, population, 
history, nature and hotel industry; it has strong, unique historic and cultural 
characteristics, and yet the official tourism policy goes only for sun and sea attractions, 
trying to develop mega-resorts in an effort to recreate the success history of Quintana 
Roo and Los Cabos. 
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The problem is not located in the tourism industry; the problems in Mexico are 
structural and have been growing for the last 80 years. It all goes back to the Mexican 
revolution from 1910 to 1925, and the kind of governments that emerged from that 
struggle that have been based in generalised corruption, improvisation and lack of 
ethics. There has since been the shameless enrichment of politicians, union leaders and 
government officials, a monopolistic structure of the economy, massive migration, 
ignorance and bad education, destruction of the environment, rampant crime and 
despair.”    
Source:   Carlos Amaya Molinar, Universidad de Colíma, 6
th
  August, 2010 
 
          Some of these comments are echoed in the World Economic Forum's Travel and 
Tourism competitiveness index for 2009. Mexico was ranked in 51
st
 place overall, and 
while it was rated highly for its natural and cultural resources and the  prioritisation of 
the tourism sector, it fared less well in terms of tourism infrastructure, ground transport 
infrastructure, price competiveness and, in particular, health and hygiene and safety and 
security (WEF, 2009).  
Therefore, various conclusions can be drawn regarding the past and present 
stature of Mexican tourism, however they are somewhat contradictory and inconclusive, 
as Mexican tourism seems to be both propitious and inadequate at the same time.  There 
have been major successes (Cancun and Los Cabos) but expensive failures (Loreto); the 
successes have brought with them negative social impacts and a failure to comply with 
promised regional development. Consistently in the top ten of international visitor 
arrivals, Mexico‟s importance on the world tourism stage cannot be denied, but it does 
not seem to be reaping the financial rewards that such status surely demands, which 
appears to be mainly due to a weak financial currency; and while the country boasts 
many natural resources for tourism diversification, there are suggestions that they are 
being „ignored‟ in favour of creating the next „Cancun‟.  
 
4.4      Mexican tourism administrative organisation 
There are three main bodies responsible for the administration of Mexican tourism. The 
leading organisation is the Ministry of Tourism (SECTUR), which designs, co-ordinates 
and implements tourism policy. The Tourism Board (CPTM) is the tourist promotion 
agency, with offices throughout North America, Europe and Asia. Its activities include 
public relations, marketing and sales promotion. The National Fund for Tourism 
Development (FONATUR) promotes tourism development (Cancun, Los Cabos, etc.) 
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and participates in the building of infrastructure in such developments. All three 
organisations work with the individual state tourism departments in the development 
and promotion of tourism. 
 
4.5     2009:  AH1N1 Influenza crisis 
 An account of the AH1N1 influenza crisis will now be given, drawing on information 
gathered from personal accounts, government and tourism board documents, and also 
academic and media publications.  
While many tourism destinations were suffering as a result of the worldwide 
economic recession, Mexico appeared to be performing quite well, at least in terms of 
visitor arrivals. 2008 had seen a 5.9% rise in international visitors from the previous 
year (UNWTO, 2009) and 2009 had begun in a similar fashion: „The year started 
promisingly for Mexican tourism in spite of the effects of the economic downturn on 
both leisure and business travel (in an economy heavily dependent on exports to, and 
tourism from, the USA); and of reported escalating cartel drug-related violence‟ 
(UNWTO, 2009: 32). The rise in visitor arrivals has been attributed to the exchange 
rates between the dollar, the euro and the peso, which subsequently made Mexico a 
more financially attractive proposition for US and European travelers (CEPAL, 2010). 
As mentioned above though, this was not reflected in terms of tourism receipts.  
However, on April 13
th
 2009, the Mexican Health Ministry issued an 
unprecedented and alarming announcement, stating that there had recently been an 
outbreak of severe respiratory infections in the country which had proved fatal in a 
number of cases. Almost immediately, the situation began to dominate the world‟s 
media. Lepp and Gibson (2003) state that previous studies have indicated that health 
concerns are one of the main perceived risk factors influencing international tourism 
(see also Carter, 1998; Cossens and Gin; 1994, Lawton and Page, 1997) and this became 
apparent as international visitor numbers to Mexico decreased rapidly with the news of 
the influenza outbreak, as is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.   
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Figure 4.1: International tourist arrivals to Mexico, January-December, 2008 and 2009   
(millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CESOP, 2010 
 
Even though the virus quickly spread to other parts of the world, it was chiefly 
associated with Mexico where, strangely, it appeared to be much more potent than in 
other places. Consequently, the effect on Mexican tourism was immediate and profound.  
Several countries advised against travel to Mexico and many sent airplanes to repatriate 
tourists.   
         In the words of interview respondent Adriana Uribe Pérez (SECTUR): 
“The initial impacts on the industry were of shock, as mainly the international side of 
the tourism industry went into paralysis…everything went down; the passengers, the 
hotels, the rooms; everything in tourism went down. People didn‟t want to leave their 
homes actually, and people from abroad didn‟t want to travel to Mexico. So basically 
everything was dead in these months of April and May.”   
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Source: Adriana Uribe Pérez, Sub- Director of Statistical Operations, SECTUR (9
th
 
July, 2010) 
 
Table 4.2 below details the initial stages of the situation from reports published 
in El Universal, a popular quality Mexican newspaper. It serves to demonstrate the rapid 
escalation of what can surely be termed a crisis for the Mexican tourism industry, as 
cruise ship cancellations and hotel cancellations increased rapidly in the space of just a 
few days.  
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Table 4.2: Chronological impacts of the AH1N1 influenza outbreak on tourism   Source – El Universal (various issues) 
 
27
th
  April  
 
EU health commissioner warns against all but vital travel to Mexico  
 
28
th
  April  
 
Reports of first cancellations in Yucutan Peninsula, a cruise ship of 2,500 passengers. 
Flight cancellations from a German travel agency. 
 
 
29
th
  April  
 
 
Cancellation of at least 25 cruise ships. 
Hotel occupancy in Mexico City the lowest in 16 years. 
 
 
30
th
  April  
 
Cuba and Argentina stop direct flights to Mexico. 
France seeks formal European ban on flights. 
 
 
1
st
  May  
 
Cancun - cancellations from US, Canada, Spain, Germany and UK. 
Flight cancellations, hotel reservation cancellations, cruise ship cancellations in Mazatlan, 
La Paz, Los Cabos, Puerta Vallarta, Acapulco and Cancun.  
 
 
2
nd
  May  
 
Mexico has virtually no international tourism.  
Canada, Argentina and Cuba cancel all flights to Mexico. 
Suspension of flights is multiplying and those that exist have few passengers. Hotels report 
between 10 and 30% occupation in contrast to the usual 80% for this time of year.  
 
5
th
  May  
 
Camino Real hotel in Polanco, Mexico City, reports that only 40 of its 700 rooms are 
occupied. It is estimated that the crisis is costing Mexico City alone US$100 million a day. 
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The worst affected area was Cancun. In the first two weeks of May, hotel occupancy fell 
to 21.4% and 22.9% respectively, in comparison to the normal levels of 67.1% and 
72.6% for the time of year (CEPAL, 2010). As a result, hotels were forced make cuts, 
which led to temporary closures, which in turn culminated in numerous job losses.   
          Interview respondent, Walter Dagri, sales manager from Real Resorts Hotels in 
nearby Playa Del Carmen, recalls the moment: 
 
“When the first case of AH1N1 was detected in Mexico, people stopped travelling to 
this country. We were having, in Cancun and Playa Del Carmen, one of the best years 
ever. January and February had been fantastic, despite the world financial crisis. 
Suddenly, when H1N1 began to be known as „Mexican Influenza‟ everything changed. 
We passed from 90% occupancy to 10-15%. Many hotels, bars and restaurants had to 
close. Many flights were cancelled. It was the worst scenario since 9/11.” 
Source: Walter Dagri, Sales Manager, Real Resorts Hotels, 11
th
 January, 2011  
 
4.5.1    Immediate response of government  
 Monterrubio (2010: 10), in his media analysis of the government reaction to the crisis, 
reports that „in addition to the travel restrictions adopted by international governments 
and tourism companies, the Mexican government made important decisions on issues 
relating to and affecting the tourism industry…on 28 April over 35,000 restaurants were 
first closed temporarily in Mexico City, which is one of the most important tourism 
destinations in the country. The following day 175 archaeological zones and museums 
around the country were also closed by the national government to avoid virus 
transmission. Places such as restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and other recreational spaces 
where high risk of infection was likely were instructed to close.‟  The shutdown, an 
attempt to prevent the spread of the virus, was officially put into effect on May 1
st
 and it 
lasted for five days.  
 
4.5.2      Response of SECTUR, the CPTM and FONATUR 
 On the same day as the „shutdown‟ began, a statement was issued from SECTUR. They 
were to form an evaluation committee, in conjunction with the CPTM and FONATUR, 
in order to monitor the effects of the crisis on Mexico‟s principal tourism destinations 
and tourism sectors, with the idea being that a reactive strategy could then be developed 
which would be based on accurate information. In the meantime all international 
marketing activity was suspended (SECTUR, 2009).  
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          Meetings and discussions took place between the evaluation committee and state 
tourism authorities and, on May 8
th
, a three phased tourism crisis management plan (see 
Table 4.3 below) was released by the CPTM.  The CPTM crisis management plan 
focused on the immediate need for flexible and truthful communication between official 
channels and all stakeholders from the emergency stage onwards. Normal international 
marketing activities were to be suspended and attention focused on the domestic market, 
along with the formation or strengthening of strategic alliances with existing or 
potential partners and allies. A huge international marketing campaign was planned for 
when the crisis „officially‟ ended,  which would focus primarily on current, loyal 
customers, chiefly from North America, but also on potential niche markets such as 
China, India, Russia and Brazil. 
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Table 4.3:   CPTM tourism crisis management plan (translated from the original Spanish version) 
                 
Phase 1 -  Immediate - Managing the crisis - no 
control  
1. Give accurate information in co-ordination with the Federal government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Health and ProMexico. 
2. Information to be given through official channels. 
3. Postpone international marketing. 
4. Give daily reports and information. 
 
Target the domestic market  
1. New national marketing campaign- ‘vas por Mexico’ 
2. Co-ordinate communication with the tourism industry. 
3. Tailor made destination campaigns.  
 
Phase 2 - June/July - Strengthen alliances - control, 
but not total  
 
Alliances (North America) 
1. Strengthen strategic alliances. Co-ordinate the product being offered and co-ordinate communication with 
the market. 
2. Witness testimony campaign. Use opinion leaders, consumers. Utilise social media - you tube, face book, 
twitter. 
3. Public relations campaign. Use traditional methods and virtual methods. Work in co-ordination with the 
Federal government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health and ProMexico.  
 
 
Phase 3 - July and onwards - High impact 
international campaign - To be done when the 
Ministry of Health, the World Health Organisation 
and the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
announce that Mexico is a safe destination  
 
Institutional campaign for the North American, National, European and Latin America markets. 
Tourism board- methods 
1. National TV, cable TV, radio, businesses 
2. Emphasis on internet. 
Allies- trading partners, tour operators, hotels, virtual travel agents, airlines 
1. Intensify public relations and familiarisation trips 
2. Satellite media tours 
3. Live press events in US and Canada. 
4. Universities (returning students to the US) 
Development of business plan to motivate consumers to return to Mexico.  
Source: CPTM (2009): PowerPoint document provided by F. Betzano, November, 5
th
, 2010
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4.5.3     ‘Vive México’: The domestic campaign 
 On May 25
th
, Mexican President Felipe Calderon publicly announced the „Vive 
México‟ campaign, the title slightly changed from the originally planned „vas por 
México‟ (Go Mexico!) (as can be seen on Table 4.3). In accordance with Phase One of 
the CPTM crisis management plan (Table 4.3), the aim of „Vive México‟ was to 
promote domestic tourism.  The campaign would seek to provoke a resurgence of 
national pride and to encourage Mexicans to travel within their own country.  Various 
Mexican and international celebrities were invited to act as ambassadors for the country, 
and key stakeholders in the Mexican tourism industry, such as airlines, hotels, travel 
associations and tour operators were encouraged to work together under the same „Vive 
México‟ slogan, offering attractive deals to stimulate interior tourism flow (SECTUR, 
2009). 
 Interview respondent, Adolfo Crespo, from Mexicana Airlines, describes the 
launch of the campaign: 
  
“We launched „Vive México‟ with the Mexican tourism board. We had three airplanes 
which were painted with the Vive México logo and we had a really big press conference. 
We invited press from all over the world to the launching of this campaign”  
Source:  Adolfo Crespo, Vice President Customer Service and Corporate 
Communications, Mexicana Airlines, 14
th
 July, 2010  
 
4.5. 4   June 1
st
: a press sample 
 Table 4.4 shows various quotations extracted from newspaper and magazine reports 
which were selected for a SECTUR internal document, dated June 1
st
, 2009 (SECTUR, 
2009).  In an attempt to give a truthful, accurate account of the crisis, it is suggested that 
a 'snap-shot in time‟, which focuses on one particular day in the midst of the crisis, 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate three important issues.  
 
1. The impact of the crisis on Mexican tourism. 
2.  The efforts being made by the authorities to combat these negative impacts. 
3.  An opportunity to gauge public reaction to the crisis.   
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Table 4.4:    A press sample (translated from original Spanish) 
 
 
Newspaper and Author  
 
Quote (Translated from Spanish) 
 
La Jornada -  Julio Reyna Quíroz 
 
The webpage ofertasvivemexico.com appeared on Monday afternoon, after President Felipe Calderon 
launched the promotion campaign ‘Vive Mexico’ with the aid of sporting and cultural celebrities.  
The campaign aims to promote Mexico as a safe tourism destination following the Influenza virus and 
the webpage offers promotions from airlines, hotels and tourism businesses for the coming summer 
season. 
  
 
El Universal - Erick Viveros 
 
The state governments of the State of Mexico, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and 
Veracruz pleaded with the government to hand over sufficient financial resources to permit the 
immediate re-activation of the tourism sector…. 
 
 
El Universal -  Leonardo Curzio 
 
The theme chosen by our government is stupid. I couldn’t imagine a phrase more redundant to 
promote tourism… it gives the impression of an idyllic and picturesque Mexico that does not exist 
anymore… 
 
 
Impacto -  Francisco Cárdenas Cruz  
 
If the airlines don’t reduce their prices which at the moment mean that it is cheaper to visit various 
cities in the US and Canada, than Cancun, Los Cabos or Puerta Vallarta, and if the national and 
international hotels don’t do likewise, then the ‘Vive Mexico’ campaign and the 200 thousand million 
pesos that comes with it, will sooner or later become a lost cause.  
 
 
El Universal   - Adriana Luna  
 
 
 
Marco Antonio Solis, the Buki, is wearing a t-shirt with the message “ No Danger, come to Mexico’  after 
accepting an invitation from the singer, Alejandro Fernandez, to appear in one of  two concerts to help 
promote national tourism, on the 20th June in Puerta Vallarta and on the 27th in Guadalajara.  
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Newspaper and Author Quote (Translated from the Spanish) 
 
Cronica   -   Josue Huerta  
 
The Mexico City Tourism Secretary. Alejandro Rojas Diaz Duran, presented the credit card, ‘Go to 
Mexico City’ , which can be obtained by workers from any state, including Mexico City, to use while 
paying for hotels, restaurants or in supermarkets. With this card, the person has insurance for 
emergencies and Influenza AH1N1.  
 
El Economista  - Roberto Martínez Peña  
 
The Mayan Riviera continues to be the region most affected, with a fall of 49.07%. The destinations 
which can be seen in a better light are Hermosillo, with a rise in hotel occupancy of 12.2%, Salamanca 
with 5.13%, Los Mochis with 4.35% and Puerto Escondido with 2.24%. Huatulco deserves a mention, 
whose occupation rose from 30% to 70% during the last week in May.  
 
 
El Universal -  Adriana Varillas 
 
Tourism is central to the Mexican economy, and represents around 8% of the gross domestic product. 
From this amount, Cancun contributes around 21%, and 60% of the gross domestic product of 
Quintana Roo.  
The tourism supply chain includes hotels, restaurants, bars, discos, transport (ground, air and sea), 
artisans and other services.  
Tourism contributes to the country’s balance of payments with more than 13 thousand million dollars 
each year; therefore it is the third most important resource after petroleum and government savings.  
 
 
Source:  SECTUR press cuttings document provided by J.R Sánchez (11
th
 October, 2010) 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
The document is useful in that it offers a mixture of factual information and personal 
comments. Each report provides the research with important contextual information.  
 
1. The first report mentions the launch of the 'Vive México' campaign, and its aim 
of restoring Mexico's position as a 'safe' destination with the help of celebrities 
and numerous promotions from industry stakeholders. 
2. The second report confirms that various state governments are lobbying and 
asking for government help to restore tourism in their respective districts. 
3. The third report is a personal comment which is of use in identifying the 
'attitude' of, in this case just one person, but potentially the attitude of various 
sections of the public towards the 'Vive México' campaign.  
4. Again, the fourth report is a personal comment, but one which may represent a 
wider body of opinion. It criticises the high cost of travel within Mexico for the 
majority of its population, who are the intended audience of the 'Vive México' 
promotional campaign. 
5. The fifth report provides more 'factual' information which illustrates how 
'celebrities' are being used to promote tourism as part of the 'Vive México' 
campaign. 
6. The sixth report explains one of the tactics used by the Mexico City tourism 
board to promote domestic tourism to the capital. 
7. The penultimate report illustrates the severity of the crisis in the state of 
Quintana Roo (Cancun's state) but shows improvement in various other 
destinations.  
8.  The final report contains more factual information regarding the importance of 
Mexican tourism to the country, but particularly in Quintana Roo.  
 
 
4.5.5     Welcome Back: The North America campaign 
 June 17
th
 saw the commencement of the international promotional campaign in key 
source markets throughout the US and Canada (in effect, Phase 3 of the CPTM tourism 
crisis management plan (see table 4.3)). The campaign was to consist of three phases 
('Believe it'- 'Welcome Back'- 'Mexico- it‟s time to go') which were to run consecutively 
and would endorse the message that the influenza has been contained and it is once 
again safe to travel to Mexico. As the US and Canada are Mexico´s principal source 
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markets for international tourism, the campaign would primarily focus on these two 
countries, to be followed by Europe, Asia and Latin America (SECTUR, 2009).  
 
4.6   Summary 
 The above account of the AH1N1 influenza crisis serves to clarify the main incidents 
which occurred during the crisis, to identify the response of the government and the 
principal tourism organizations, and to briefly assess public reaction.  
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Chapter 5    
 
Case study:  The limitations associated with contemporary tourism crisis 
and disaster management models and the Mexican AH1N1 Influenza crisis 
 
        It is argued that contemporary tourism crisis management models and frameworks 
display several weaknesses which restrict their effectiveness to assist managers and 
decision makers in crisis situations, leading to the research question: 
 
Q1.  Do the weaknesses which apparently exist within the models affect their 
application to crisis/disaster situations? 
 
An assessment will now be undertaken in order to judge whether this case study serves 
to justify such criticism.  
 
5.1  Weaknesses of contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management models  
 
5.1.1 The unpredictability of tourism crises and disasters  
As noted in chapter two, certain forms of proactive crisis planning, such as the 
formation of disaster management teams and general stakeholder preparedness, could be 
considered advantageous in terms of tourism crisis management. However, it was 
suggested that the use of scenario planning and subsequent contingency planning must 
bear scrutiny, as crises and disasters often appear in rather unprecedented forms and 
guises which repeatedly defy prediction, with 9/11, the FMD outbreak, and the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami provided as examples (see section 2.4.1i.)   
           Despite recent health crises (SARS, Avian Flu) and the ensuing rise in tourism 
academic dialogue concerning health issues (Capua and Alexander, 2002; Page et al., 
2005; Tew et al., 2008), it appears that the AH1N1 crisis was not predicted in Mexico. 
The Mexican tourism authorities insist that they did take careful note of the SARS and 
Asian flu incidents, but it was considered highly unlikely that Mexico would face such a 
situation and so planning for a health crisis, such as an influenza epidemic, was never 
seriously considered.  
           Contingency plans certainly exist for natural disasters, given Mexico‟s 
susceptibility to hurricanes and earthquakes (see SECTUR, 2011), and it was 
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established that SECTUR does indeed meet with individual state tourism organisations 
each year to discuss crisis management issues. It was also acknowledged that the CPTM 
has an array of contingency communication plans and procedures in co-ordination with 
its public relations agencies in Mexico, North America and Europe. Nevertheless, the 
research demonstrated that the principal, government led Mexican tourism organisations 
did not have a specific health crisis management strategy to deal with the AH1N1 
influenza crisis when it emerged in April, 2009, and neither did the majority of private 
tourism organisations. It was simply not expected, or predicted, as is revealed in the 
responses of various interview respondents when questioned over this issue.  
 
“We have plans for natural disasters because we have experienced natural disasters,    
hurricanes particularly...but as far as health issues are concerned there was no 
plan...unfortunately it was the first experience we had had. It was the first situation we 
had had like that…serious…it couldn‟t have been predicted.” 
Source: José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, SECTUR, 11
th
 October, 2010 
 
   “I know that the AH1N1 took the tourism authorities off guard, as everybody else in 
Mexico, and I also know that they didn‟t have a plan at the national or local level to 
cope with such a crisis.” 
Source: Carlos Amaya Molinar, Universidad de Colíma, 6
th
 August, 2010 
   
 
“We did not have any plan. The crisis was unexpected and we were not ready for it.”  
 Source: Walter Dagri – Sales Manager, Real Resorts Hotels, 11th January, 2011 
 
         Ahead of discussing the other limitations associated with contemporary tourism 
crisis management models which were addressed in chapter two, it would perhaps be a 
useful exercise to briefly examine the possible reasons why the Mexican tourism 
authorities did not appear to have a specific health crisis management plan in place for 
the AH1N1 influenza crisis.  
From a general point of view, part of the reason could simply be that individual 
countries and cultures seemingly have different priorities when it comes to tourism 
crisis management preparation. As mentioned in the second chapter (section 2.4.1v), 
Gonzalez-Herrero & Platt (1998) discovered that US tourism authorities demonstrated a 
significantly more proactive approach to tourism crisis management than did Spain. 
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Mexico, a former Spanish colony, is of course a Latin country and a commonly accepted 
trait of the Latin culture is a preference for a relaxed, „laid-back‟ type of attitude, rather 
than one which makes advance planning a priority. Mexico, rightly or wrongly, is 
notorious for its „mañana syndrome‟, in which one lives solely for today, while putting 
off more arduous tasks and chores until tomorrow. Although Gonzalez-Herrero and Platt 
(1998) do not make conclusions to this effect, the mix of national cultural differences 
and business have been previously investigated, the most renowned being that of 
Hofstede (1983), and there does appear to be marked differences in the attitudes of 
various nation‟s inhabitants towards work and business, and it is suggested that surely 
this must also play a part in the attitude displayed by individual destinations towards 
tourism crisis management planning.  
On another note, as was pointed out in the introduction, it appears that academic 
knowledge is not frequently used for decision making in tourism organizations, and so it 
follows that tourism crisis management models and frameworks are unlikely to have 
been considered. During an interview, Mexican tourism academic, Juan Carlos 
Monterrubio, spoke of this issue: 
 
“Regarding the Faulkner framework, you must understand that academic work is one 
thing, and the day to day tourism operation is a very different one. I mean, we 
academics work in a highly analytical, theoretical, reflexive world, while the tourism 
operators and destination marketing organisations work on a day to day operative 
basis, concerned about marketing, profits, competition and survival.”   
Speaking specifically of Mexico, he added: 
 
“You must not forget that Mexico is a third world country. I wonder whether decision 
makers really know what a crisis is and whether a crisis should be managed at all, like 
other countries.” 
Source: Juan Carlos Monterrubio, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 28
th
 
June, 2010 
 
           It does appear that the issue of apparently large spread ignorance towards 
academic knowledge within tourism management in general is another matter which 
demands specific research of its own. If crisis models are not reaching their intended 
audience then obviously this is a serious concern which needs to be addressed. 
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Finally, corruption within Mexico may also have a part to play in the apparent absence 
of pre-crisis planning within tourism organisations. As Clancy (2001: 145) has 
previously observed, „rumors and stories of corruption and other inefficiencies 
surrounding tourism development are common.‟  It appears that financial resources are 
often spent on „unnecessary‟ development, leaving scant resources available for crisis 
and disaster preparation. 
 
5.1.2   The Limitations of prescriptive models / restrictions posed by a rigid plan  
 
i. Tourism crisis ‘lifecycle’ 
     Contemporary tourism crisis management models were accused of making the 
presumption that a crisis passes through several consecutive phases, one after the other; 
in essence, a „lifecycle‟ (section 2.4.1ii.) It was argued that often this is not the case; 
crises or disasters frequently by-pass what are classified as the pre-event and prodromal 
phases, and emerge without warning as a full-blown emergency. Crises can also 
provoke other further crises, meaning that potentially, there can be more than one crisis 
happening at one given time. It is, therefore, suggested that it is not uncommon for the 
prescribed and rigid management guidelines detailed in tourism crisis management 
models to be thrown into disarray. As a result, confusion abounds which can ultimately 
lead to poor management decision making.  
In this case-study, it is apparent that the AH1N1 influenza crisis arrived as a 'full 
blown emergency', with tourism cancellations reaching a peak only days after the 
official announcement was made by the health ministry (see Table 4.2). As has been 
established, the crisis was neither predicted nor planned for, and so any guidelines 
proffered for the pre-event and prodromal stages are immediately dismissed. It is 
suggested that a tourism manager looking to Faulkner‟s framework for advice would 
perhaps be at a loss as to where to begin (see Table 5.1 below).  
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Table 5.1:    Faulkner‟s guidelines compared to the reality of the AH1N1 crisis. 
         
 
Tourism crisis management models  (Faulkner’s framework, 
2001) 
 
 
The Mexican AH1N1 influenza crisis 
 
Guidelines for phases 
 
 
The reality  
 
1. Pre-event phase - Action can be taken to prevent or at least 
mitigate prospective crises. Suggest risk assessment in the 
form of scenario planning and the development of 
contingency plans.  
 
 
Like many other recent tourism crises, the AH1N1 crisis could be 
classed as „unpredictable‟.  Despite academic warnings (Page et 
al, 2005), it was not predicted or expected within Mexico.  
 
2. Prodromal phase- Action can be taken to alleviate the impact 
of an impending crisis.  
 
 
No possibility of mobilising beforehand as the crisis arrived 
unexpectedly.  
 
3. Emergency phase- The effects of the crisis are experienced. 
 
 
The crisis arrived at this stage causing immense pressure for the 
Mexican tourism authorities. Faulkner‟s framework does not 
explain what to do when an „unpredictable‟ crisis or disaster 
strikes suddenly and no specific plan exists for the situation, as is 
often the case. 
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ii. Crisis played out at different locations  
Not only can a tourism crisis or disaster occur without warning, the situation can also 
change unexpectedly and evolve at differing rates and outcomes at distinct, separate 
destinations within the same country.  Once again, step-by-step management guidelines 
can become increasingly difficult to follow, due to the complexity of the situation and 
the fact that the crisis is being played out at different locations, different levels of 
severity and at different speeds.  
 It should be noted that Mexico offers many distinct locations for the domestic 
and international traveler. While famous for Acapulco, Mexico City and its Fonatur 
created enclaves, such as Cancun and Los Cabos, there are many other significant 
visitor destinations within the country.  Colonial towns such as Zacatecas, Guanajuato 
and San Miguel de Allénde offer places of historical and cultural interest; the jungles of 
Chiapas and the mountains and deserts of the north present challenges to adventurous 
types; and „shady‟ border towns, such as Tijuana offer cheap, illicit entertainment to 
those seeking sex, alcohol and drugs.  
With so many destinations existing within the same country, it became apparent 
that individual destinations would be affected in different ways and at different levels by 
the crisis, thereby necessitating quite different responses and tactics.  As interview 
respondent, Adriana Uribe Pérez, from SECTUR explained: 
 
“Cultural destinations such as Zacatecas and San Miguel have a lower number of 
visitors from outside and so were least affected. Destinations that receive local tourism 
were not so badly affected. The worst was Cancun because it is the number one 
destination for receiving international tourists.” 
Source: Adriana Uribe Pérez, Sub -Director of Statistical Operations, SECTUR, 9
th
 
July, 2010    
 
           As confirmed by Uribe Pérez, Cancun was the worst affected resort.  Cancun is 
far more dependent on the international tourist than is, for example, Acapulco, which 
has ultimately become a predominantly domestic destination, with Mexico City as the 
main source market. Obviously both destinations required different crisis strategies; 
therefore, a step by step, prescriptive approach is far too simplistic to address a crisis of 
this scope (see Table 5.2 below). 
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Table 5.2: Cancun and Acapulco: Similar effect, but different response.  
    
 
CANCUN 
 
ACAPULCO 
 
Fonatur‟s diamond. This resort on Mexico‟s Caribbean coast has 
met with huge success since its inception in the 1970‟s. Main 
market- US and Canada.  
 
The traditional Mexican beach resort has lost some of its original 
glamour, but still attracts many people, predominantly from Mexico- 
Main market- Mexico City.  
 
 
Effect of AH1N1 crisis- Cancellations, huge drop in hotel 
occupancy, job losses.  
 
 
Effect of AH1N1 crisis- Similar to Cancun however more short-lived.  
 
Strategy for recovery - „Welcome Back‟ recovery campaign, 
focused on the international market. 
 
 
Strategy for recovery - „Vive México‟ campaign, focused on the 
domestic market. 
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          As is shown in Table 5.2, the initial impacts of the influenza crisis on Cancun and 
Acapulco were very similar, although longer lasting in the case of Cancun; however, the 
recovery strategies were of necessity completely different due to the fact that Cancun 
caters for an international market while Acapulco caters for a mainly domestic market. 
           It is therefore apparent that the AH1N1 influenza crisis did not follow the crisis 
„life-cycle‟ suggested  in contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management models 
and frameworks, and action could only be taken in the emergency phase, which severely 
negates the usefulness of the models with their predominant emphasis on a pro-active 
approach. The fact that the crisis affected various places at different levels further 
complicated the issue.  
 
5.1.3 A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach  
 Ritchie (2009) refers to the „broadness‟ of contemporary tourism crisis management 
plans; that is, they only appear to offer what could be described as a „one-size-fits-all‟ 
approach, with the same guidelines prescribed for every conceivable crisis situation. 
The models do not seem to consider that different crises warrant different responses, as 
obviously crises differ in size, scope, complexity and setting. The chaos theory tourism 
crisis/ disaster management model allows for this by recommending a pre-crisis 
organizational structure which prepares an organization for all forms of change, thus 
any kind of crisis or disaster.   
 
i. Different crises require different responses   
 As Zeng et al. (2005: 318) point out; different crises create different impacts and thus 
necessitate alternative recovery strategies: „…where the crisis includes a perception of 
risk, especially health, more comprehensive strategies appear necessary. This includes 
management of the media, especially images displayed during the crises. Then, post-
crisis aggressive marketing is needed that does not remind target markets of the crisis, 
but presents an image of „business as usual‟.  
Consequently, the AH1N1 influenza crisis, being a health crisis, demanded a 
more thorough, „comprehensive‟ response strategy than, for example, the Hurricane 
Wilma crisis of 2005. Interview respondent, José Raúl Sánchez (SECTUR) explains the 
concept: 
 
 “Hurricane Wilma was a specific event, as was the earthquake of 1985. For both those 
occasions we had a contingency plan because we knew beforehand that they were very 
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likely to happen. The Influenza crisis was different and required a very different strategy 
than those „natural‟ events. The influenza crisis was more of a social crisis, and creates 
a very difficult set of circumstances because you don‟t know how people are going to 
react or what will happen.”    
Source: José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, 11
th
 October, 2010 
 
Media sensationalism during the AH1N1 influenza crisis certainly contributed towards 
the overall negativity of the situation, hence demanding aggressive domestic and 
international marketing campaigns (as suggested by Zeng et al., (2005) above) to 
remind the public that Mexico was „open for business„ once again. Innovative 
marketing strategies were devised by both the public and private sector on a scale that 
had not been evident or indeed necessary for the Hurricane Wilma crisis.  
Interview respondent, Walter Dagri, sales manager of Real Resorts Hotels, 
describes their unique marketing strategy: 
 
“We started a campaign called “Flu Free Guarantee”. The idea came from our General 
Director, Mr. Fernando García. We published it on our web page. We promoted it during 
trade shows and tourism fairs in all 2009. What did it consist of? Well, we guaranteed 
that our Resorts were flu free. And we offered a free week at our Resorts for 3 
consecutive years if a lab stated that a guest contracted the flu 14 days after his 
departure from one of our Hotels.” 
Source: Walter Dagri, Sales Manager, Real Resorts Hotels, 11
th
 January, 2011  
 
          The point worth noting here is that an intensive national promotional campaign, 
on the scale of  'Vive México', was not required after Hurricane Wilma in 2005; neither 
was it necessary for hotels in Cancun and surrounding areas to offer special „guarantees‟ 
to their customers, as mentioned by Walter above.  The psychological effect on tourism 
perception was totally different on both occasions and each situation required a quite 
different response.  
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Table 5.3 below illustrates the strategic change in approach necessary when a 
destination is afflicted with an epidemic health crisis, rather than a hurricane. The 
differences concerning preparation and location should be noted. Weather forecasting 
provides a window of opportunity, albeit slight, with which to prepare for a hurricane 
which obviously cannot be done for a health crisis, while the affected location is much 
smaller for a hurricane than it is for a transmittable health crisis or epidemic. The two 
events, therefore, call for quite different responses. Rather than having to provide safe 
accommodation or evacuation procedures for inhabitants and tourists in a hurricane 
situation, an epidemic style health crisis will create huge demand for medical assistance 
and supplies, on a grander scale than a hurricane. Communication issues also call for 
different measures, as does the recovery operation afterwards. 
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Table 5.3:  How two crises require different responses  
 
Hurricane 
 
Health crisis 
 
Crisis management plan  ( Faulkner, 2001)  
 
 
Crisis management plan  
 
Preparation: There is a prodromal stage as hurricanes can be forecast in 
advance, giving at least some time for warnings and evacuation preparation. 
In the case of Mexico, hurricanes are a common occurrence and so tourism 
crisis management plans do exist for this situation. 
 
 
Preparation: Immediate emergency due to unpredictable nature and so no time 
for warnings or evacuation until the crisis appears. Unless the destination has 
prepared specific plans for a health crisis, the crisis will not even be 
considered until now, as was the case with the AH1N1 influenza crisis in 
Mexico.  
 
Location: A hurricane will affect one area, so attention can be focused on this 
one area.  
 
Location: A transmittable health crisis can spread to large distances rapidly, 
with contrasting impacts and severity.  
 
Elements of response:  
1. Faulkner recommends emergency accommodation and food supplies.  
 
 
Elements of response:  
1. Emergency accommodation and food supplies not necessary in health crisis.  
However, very likely that hospital accommodation, doctors and medical 
supplies will be sought on a large scale. 
 
2. Monitoring and communication on a local level. 
 
2. Monitoring and communication on a national and international level.  
 
3. Clean-up and restoration / repair of damaged infrastructure-  Huge 
operation to repair damaged  beaches, hotels, roads, etc., 
 
3. There is no damaged infrastructure to repair. The main emphasis is on a 
marketing effort designed to change damaged tourist perception and restore 
business and customer confidence.  
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ii. Uneven distribution of resources within the Mexican tourism system  
  The „one-size-fits-all‟ approach also failed to recognise the complexity and scope of 
the Mexican tourism industry. The research demonstrated that very different levels of 
organisation and competency exist within separate tourism destinations in Mexico.  
Interview respondent, María Teresa Solís Trejo, Director of Vantage Strategy 
Consulting (Mexico) and former employee of SECTUR and the CPTM, commented 
upon this issue:  
 
“The levels of organisation or readiness in these kinds of offices widely differ among 
Mexican tourism organisations, according to the importance that the tourism industry 
has in the regional economy. You will find highly organised destinations like Cancun, 
the Mayan Riviera, Puerta Vallarta, Los Cabos, Guadalajara or Monterrey against 
destinations with secondary importance, like Manzanillo, Mazatlan, Ixtapa, Huatulco, 
etc., with diminished organisation capabilities.”     
Source: María Teresa Solís Trejo, Director of Vantage Strategy Consulting (Mexico), 
26
th
 November, 2010 
 
       It thus appears that Cancun is much better equipped to deal with a tourism crisis 
than, for example, Manzanillo, and it also appears that levels of management training 
and preparedness differ widely within the country. Many destinations appear to be 
seriously lacking in financial resources and staff capability. As Solís Trejo continued: 
 
 “Generally speaking, most of the tourism authorities in Mexico are improvised, without 
the knowledge, experience or preparation required to perform in an appropriate way as 
destination marketing organisation managers.” 
Source: María Teresa Solís Trejo, Director of Vantage Strategy Consulting (Mexico), 
26
th
 November, 2010 
 
 
The research suggested that a principle reason for such significant differences in 
destination organisational capability could lie in the amount of foreign investment 
within the resorts and the amount of tax which emanates from a resort. For example, 
Cancun has received huge investment from multinational companies such as Hilton, 
Marriot and Barcelo, which cannot afford to lose their investments, while significant tax 
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revenues emanate from the resort, thus ensuring its ongoing maintenance and support in 
times of crises. A destination such as Manzanillo, conversely, does not enjoy this level 
of investment or governmental interest, thus making it more vulnerable to the impacts 
of crises and disasters. 
  
5.1.4    Cultural context  
 When a tourism crisis occurs, the context depends on the cultural and societal make up 
of the affected destination. It was suggested in Chapter two (section 2.4.1v) that tourism 
crisis management models fail in that they do not appear to recognise the fact that, put 
simply, places are different and people are different and, therefore, the response will 
always differ. As Mexican academic, Juan Carlos Monterrubio stressed during an 
interview:  
 
 “You can develop, say, a great model that may work in first world countries, but how 
can you be sure that they will work in developing countries where situations are 
different, people are different, and governments are different. Do they consider that? To 
what extent do these models take into account local features?” 
Source: Juan Carlos Monterrubio, Universidad Autónama del Estado de México,  
28th June, 2010 
 
Cultural issues were briefly mentioned while assessing possible explanations for 
the lack of tourism crisis planning (section 5.1.1).  Along with Latin culture, failure to 
accommodate academic knowledge, and corruption, another interesting cultural issue 
identified from the research is that of a deep-seated mistrust for the government and 
authorities among Mexican society in general, which, it is suggested, could have 
negative implications for tourism crisis management in Mexico. Tourism academic Juan 
Carlos Monterrubio explained during an interview that many Mexicans are extremely 
sceptical of political issues as a result of past political controversies, and this cynicism 
has been heightened by certain government actions during the influenza crisis, such as 
the 5 day shut-down and the release of scientifically unconfirmed information to the 
media.  Therefore, it is put forward that SECTUR would, in all likelihood, have great 
difficulty convincing a future domestic audience of the viability of tourism disaster 
management planning. 
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As Monterrubio explains:  
 
“If a model suggested to inform people, to educate people in crisis management, in the 
case of Mexico I am sure many people would say „I don‟t believe that - that is a political 
issue- because we have experienced many lies‟…Are these things considered in tourism 
crisis management models?” 
Source: Juan Carlos Monterrubio, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 28
th
 
June, 2010  
 
          Monterrubio is acknowledging how many Mexican tourism managers may 
ultimately scoff at the idea of instructed tourism crisis management, believing it to be 
just more government propaganda. There is no mention of this issue in contemporary 
tourism crisis models and frameworks, and surely this situation is not unique to Mexico.    
Whilst on the theme of scepticism and mistrust, it should not be overlooked how the 
research repeatedly cast doubts regarding the validity of the crisis.  
 
5.1.5   The ‘Mysterious' Crisis 
 The pessimism and uncertainty mentioned above is not just a consequence of Mexican 
history.  A great deal of suspicion is present among Mexican society towards all aspects 
of the AH1N1 Influenza crisis, brought about by its rapid disappearance from the media 
spotlight and the fact that it now appears to have been somewhat over-exaggerated. This 
attitude is demonstrated by the words of several interviewees below.   
 
“If you look at the data about the flu it was not that high…many people got the flu and 
nothing happened, they were sick for two weeks and that was it. One of my sisters got 
the disease, it was before April, maybe in March or something, so they didn‟t really 
know about the virus….she got better after one week.” 
Source: Adriana Uribe Pérez, Sub- Director of Statistical Operations, SECTUR, 9
th 
July, 2010  
 
“There are many doubts and unanswered questions about the true existence of the 
AH1N1 virus….a year later the WHO [World Health Organisation] authorities are being 
questioned about the role they played during the crisis and about the scientific 
committee appointees that were also in some multinationals‟ pharmaceuticals‟ payroll.” 
Source: Carlos Amaya Molinar, Universidad de Colíma, 6
th
 August, 2010  
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  “Many people believe there is more to this than meets the eye. So much is coming 
out…but it‟s easy to judge in hindsight now that we know it was not very virulent. It 
didn‟t increase the deaths in influenza statistics but it did create a severe impact in the 
service, in the tourist industry in Mexico.” 
Source: Adolfo Crespo, Vice President Customer Service and Corporate 
Communications, Mexicana Airlines, 14
th
 July, 2010   
 
          A favourite topic of conversation among Mexico‟s citizens is the plausibility of 
the AH1N1 influenza crisis; nevertheless, notwithstanding public opinion, there is no 
mistaking the fact that the unwelcome arrival of the AH1N1 influenza crisis did create 
an acute crisis for the Mexican tourism industry:  A major contributing factor to the 
severity of the crisis factor was the global media response. 
 
5.1.6   Media response  
  It was discussed in chapter two how „alarmist, sensationalist‟ media coverage of an 
event can severely worsen the situation and heighten negative tourist perception of a 
destination (see section 2.5.1).  Mason et al (2005) devote a paper to this topic, writing 
about the effects of media reporting of the SARS crisis on the tourism industry. Without 
wanting to investigate this issue in detail, special mention must be given to it as the 
research clearly demonstrates that media reports and images had a very negative effect 
on the crisis, which can be conveyed by the words of the interview respondents, and the 
headline and photograph (Mexico City airport) from The Times newspaper below. 
 
 “Global media response and many countries have been partners in this huge scam. 
Everyone did their part to create the fear.”   
Source: Kenneth Johnson, Owner and General Manager of EcoColors, Cancun, 13
th
 
January, 2011   
 
        “There is a tendency for media communications to over-react to the problems and 
this case was not the exception….maybe more so the communication within Mexico…”    
Source: Braulio Cárdenas, President of the National Chamber of the Restaurant and 
Food Industry, 3
rd
 December, 2010 
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Figure 5.1 „Fear spreads round the globe like a Mexican wave‟: Headline from The 
Times newspaper on Monday, 27
th
 April, 2009  
 
Source: www.guardian.co.uk       
 
5.1.7    Realities of small businesses  
  The final criticism regarding the „one size fits all‟ approach centres on the difficulties 
associated with small tourism businesses, both before and during a tourism crisis 
situation. As has been previously noted by Cioccio and Michael (2009), Hystad and 
Keller (2008), and de Sausmarez (2003), most small tourism businesses possess neither 
the time nor the resources to plan, or even seriously contemplate, potential future crises 
or disasters. As the majority of the world's tourism businesses can be classified as small 
or medium sized enterprises, it follows that tourism crisis management models are, in 
most cases, not reaching their intended audience and, even if they did, it is almost 
certain that the scarce resources available to the majority of these enterprises would not 
permit their implementation.  
Mexico was no exception. The research demonstrated that the majority of 
tourism small and medium sized enterprises did not have a crisis management plan for a 
health related crisis, and, when the crisis occurred, a large proportion were forced to 
close temporarily, or in some cases on a permanent basis.   
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 On a further note, the research identified that as many as 40% of small and 
medium businesses are unregistered in Mexico, and hence received none of the financial 
aid offered by the government. Interview respondent, Alejandro Rojas, Secretary of 
Tourism for Mexico City, explained the situation: 
 
“There was some government funding for enterprises…but I have to say that not all 
enterprises were helped or supported….there are certain companies that are not 
registered, particularly small companies, so how were they supposed to be helped by the 
government ? There were hotel promotions, but only 4 star, 5 star hotels…but what 
about all those small enterprises that are the majority of  tourism enterprises in this 
country?” 
Source: Alejandro Rojas, Secretary of Tourism for Mexico City, 20
th
 October, 2010 
  
Interview respondent, Kenneth Johnson, owner of Ecocolors tour business in Cancun, 
verified these comments:  
         “We didn‟t receive help from the government, only the promotional trusts…well     
actually the government did announce no payment of taxes - now how can we pay taxes 
if we did not have any income?” 
Source: Kenneth Johnson, owner of Ecocolors tour business, Cancun, 13
th
 January, 
2011    
 
5.2   Summary 
     The case study, therefore, appears to justify the criticism directed towards tourism 
crisis management models in that they tend to offer an inflexible approach hoping to 
suit all types of crises and all destinations and cultures when, in reality, this appears to 
not be possible. The case study provides an empirical example of how crises are often 
completely unpredictable, do not necessarily follow the suggested crisis „life-cycle‟, and 
require different responses according to the specific character of the crisis and 
individual destinations. It demonstrates how the uneven distribution of resources leads 
to diminished capabilities, how cultural issues change the complexion of the situation, 
how the media response can create huge negative repercussions for what in reality may 
be a fairly trivial problem, and the fact that small businesses, which comprise a major 
part of the tourism industry, are usually not able or inclined to take a pro-active 
approach and are often left without any form of assistance. 
As interview respondent, Fernando Betzano, from the National Confederation of 
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Mexican Travel Agents said:  
 
“I think in a way they [tourism crisis management models] suggest things work 
automatically; if I do „Z‟ then this happens…things do not work like that. I think they 
are quite simplistic in that they believe that things will automatically react in a certain 
way, in a certain direction….without taking into account that every crisis is unique … 
different…”   
Source: Fernando Betzano, National Confederation of Mexican Travel Agents, 5
th
 
November, 2010 
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Chapter 6 
 
Case study:  The elements of chaos theory in the AH1N1 Influenza crisis 
 
6.1    The elements of chaos theory 
 A tourism crisis and disaster management model was proposed (see Table 2.3), which 
was designed to provide an alternative to contemporary tourism crisis and management 
models and frameworks, and to overcome and eradicate some of the weaknesses 
mentioned above which were also evident in the AH1N1 Influenza crisis. 
The model is based on elements of chaos theory. It has been suggested that 
several of these elements can be identified throughout the various phases of a tourism 
crisis, which include phases which are labeled the „edge of chaos‟, the „butterfly effect‟, 
bifurcation, cosmology, self-organisation, strange attractors, creativity and the „lock-in‟ 
effect. The model proposes various managerial actions that can be implemented while 
the crisis is passing through the elemental phases.   
It is critical for the successful application of the model that the above elements 
could be identified during the AH1N1 influenza crisis. Hence, the following section will 
present the various elements of chaos theory as and when they appeared in the influenza 
crisis. 
 
6.1.2   ‘Edge of chaos’   
 In terms of chaos theory, systems are often regarded as being on the „edge of chaos‟ -a 
situation in which a „triggering‟ event can provoke a number of reactions, a „butterfly 
effect‟, which results in a crisis event. The Mexican tourism system could be described 
as being in a state of equilibrium in the months preceding April, 2009.  Although some 
sources suggest that the country was already suffering two crises, the world economic 
recession and the narcotics-related violence (Ritchie et al., 2010), visitor figures 
appeared relatively healthy which boded well for the coming months (UNWTO, 2009). 
 
6.1.3   ‘Butterfly effect’  
However, it appears that somewhere in the world, the metaphoric butterfly flapped its 
wings and the „storm‟ effectively landed in Mexico. The origin of Influenza AH1N1 
remains unclear at the time of writing; Monterrubio (2010) mentions a 10 year old 
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Texan boy as possibly being the first case; however there are conflicting reports and the 
research failed to unearth a satisfactory answer.  
Whether the origin of the outbreak was in the US, Mexico or elsewhere, what is 
important is that the resultant effect was a severe crisis for Mexican tourism. 
 
6.1.4   Bifurcation and cosmology   
  It is evident that the Mexican tourism system was severely affected by the sudden 
appearance of the AH1N1 Influenza crisis. In the words of interview respondent, José 
Alberto García (CPTM): 
 
 “Everybody was shocked and scared by what was happening and nobody knew what 
would happen next. Tourists did not want to come to Mexico and people here did not 
want to leave their houses.” 
Source: José Alberto García, CPTM employee, July 15
th
, 2010 
 
The emergency situation appears to correspond with the chaos theory elements 
of bifurcation and cosmology. Crisis events are described as points of system 
bifurcation, where the system is disrupted and cannot function as before. This was 
palpable as international tourism came to a halt and domestic tourism suffered a huge 
downturn. 
Cosmology episodes were evident in the nation‟s population as widespread 
confusion and fear spread rapidly due to the unknown potential of the virus. As 
interview respondent, José Raúl Sánchez (SECTUR) recalls: 
 
“For a time everybody was very scared. It was like the end of Mexico.” 
Source: José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, SECTUR, 11
th
 October, 2010 
  
 The confusion and fear abundant in Mexico at this time may have contributed 
towards several hastily made government actions, in particular the decision to impose a 
five-day nationwide „shut-down‟ and the release of scientifically unconfirmed 
information to the media, a huge mistake, according to Mexican academic, Juan Carlos 
Monterrubio: 
 
“The figures were increasing and increasing in the media every single minute...the 
government should have controlled the media...they were reporting figures without any 
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scientific confirmation. They did not have the scientific equipment to prove these figures 
existed until much later, and when this happened the figures were much smaller than 
originally reported to Mexico and the whole world.” 
Source: Juan Carlos Monterrubio, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 28
th
 
June, 2010 
 
6.1.5    Self-organisation and strange attractors 
  
i. Self-organisation   
 There are two significant aspects of chaos theory. One of these is the unpredictability, 
uncertainty, complexity and turmoil, which were all present during the opening stages of 
the AH1N1 Influenza crisis; another characteristic of chaos theory is the return to order 
which appears after bifurcation.  
As Sellnow et al. (2002: 274) point out: „self-organizing processes…can be 
expected to arise following bifurcation‟ in the form of „new communicative structures 
and relationships, understandings, and procedures‟.  Self-organising processes were 
evident in Mexico following the initial emergency stage. For example (as has been 
discussed), a suggested weakness of current tourism crisis management models is that 
they fail to recognise the realities surrounding small businesses. With at least 40% of 
tourism businesses in Mexico being unregistered, there was a highly significant number 
which did not receive any kind of help.  Many of these businesses were forced into 
closure and this resulted in lingering social effects in the form of unemployment and 
forced migration. However, critically, the majority of small and medium sized 
enterprises did survive the crisis and examples of innovation, creativity and self-
organisation were evident in the research, on an individual scale and by joint co-
ordination, thus supporting the claims of Sellnow et al. (2002) above, regarding the 
processes of self-organisation. 
When questioned about the challenges facing his business during the bifurcation 
stage of the crisis, interview respondent, Kenneth Johnson, owner of EcoColors in 
Cancun, replied: 
 
“It was a matter of looking at things in perspective and realising this month [May] was 
a loss but we could work on marketing, developing strategies, and improving our 
products and staff, so that when tourism started we could be ahead of competition in 
quality. We couldn‟t rely on government help so it was a matter of getting ourselves 
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organised. I think most companies had this outlook. It has certainly made us more 
competitive.” 
Source: Kenneth Johnson, owner of Ecocolors tour business in Cancun, 13
th
 January, 
2011 
 
A similar attitude was found when interview respondent, Walter Dagri, from 
Real Resorts Hotels, discussed the issue:  
“We did not fire employees. The company asked all executives with higher salaries to 
auto-reduce their incomes. In this way we could help the company‟s economy and save 
hundreds of employees. Everybody could keep his job. Some actions can be taken 
individually and some other can be taken together with Hotels Associations. You cannot 
sit around and wait for the Government‟s support.” 
Source: Walter Dagri, Sales Manager of Real Resorts Hotels, 11
th
 January, 2011 
 
ii.   Strange attractors  
 It appears that the „Vive México‟ campaign, with its focus on Mexican solidarity, 
served as an effective tool to encourage the concept of self-organisation. Sellnow et al. 
(2002: 289) refer to „region-wide common threat and shared hardship‟ as „strange 
attractors‟ which can strengthen relationships and lead to enhanced commitment to a 
cause, in this case the recovery of the Mexican tourism industry.  Although it is not 
suggested that those in the CPTM responsible for the „Vive México‟ campaign had 
chaos theory in mind during its conception, it serves to illustrate how tourism 
destination authorities can utilise the concept of self-organisation and motivate all levels 
of the industry to unite in a common cause by harnessing a „common vision, sense of 
meaning, strategy or value system that drives people to achieve a common goal.‟ (Zahra, 
2007: 855).  
Judging by visitor arrivals and hotel occupancy (the usual statistical criteria of 
success in the tourism industry), the Mexican tourism industry, in accordance with the 
chaos theory of self-organisation, appeared to demonstrate considerable resilience to the 
crisis, despite an obvious lack of preparation by the tourism authorities and by tourism 
stakeholders. In October 2009, just a few months after the height of the crisis, visitor 
numbers were actually slightly higher than the previous year (see Figure 4.1). It seems 
that the industry in general rose to the challenge presented by the crisis; nonetheless, it 
must be noted that there were significant casualties, perhaps the most prominent being 
the bankruptcy of Mexicana Airlines and the further social consequences of the crisis is 
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another matter entirely, perhaps worthy of further research. 
 
 
6.1.6   ‘Lock-in’ effect   
  The „lock-in‟ effect is said to explain repetitive behaviour in a tourism context. 
McKercher (1999: 429) mentions how chaos theory recognises that „certain innovations 
in the past can have a lasting effect despite changes in the conditions that originally 
made them necessary.‟   
  It has been suggested that the „Vive México‟ campaign inadvertently contributed 
towards the self-organisation of the tourism sector, and in a similar manner, the North 
American „Welcome Back‟ campaign perhaps indirectly produced an outcome which 
can be linked to the „lock- in´ effect associated with chaos theory. The campaign 
targeted customers who had already visited Mexico, including those individuals and 
families that frequent Cancun on a yearly basis. For such people, Mexico has a special 
„pull‟; they appear to have an affinity with the country, or at least a particular resort. In 
the words of a Canadian tourist interviewed in Cancun in January, 2011:  
 
  “I come here every year with my family, well nearly every year- we missed one year 
because of the swine flu scare, but now we are back and it‟s like nothing happened. It‟s 
great here, it has everything for us.” 
Source: Bruce Broughton, Canadian tourist interviewed in Cancun, 15
th
 January, 2011  
 
6.2   Summary 
It has been demonstrated that the chaos theory elements discussed in chapter two 
(section 2.5) were indeed present in the case study, thus indicating the usefulness of 
utilising chaos theory as a way of identifying various stages or phases of a tourism 
crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Case Study:  The chaos theory crisis and disaster management model and 
the AH1N1 influenza crisis 
 
7.1   The chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster management model  
 
Chapter two argued that tourism managers and decision makers would be better 
equipped to take reactive measures to the challenges presented by a tourism crisis or 
disaster if they were able to recognise chaos theory elements as they present themselves 
in a crisis.  It has been noted above how several elements of chaos theory were evident 
in the case study (chapter 6). 
The 'chaos theory' tourism crisis/disaster model revealed in the second chapter 
(table 2.3) suggests various managerial responses to correspond with each particular 
element. For example, a vital ingredient of the model is that managers strive to create a 
learning and knowledge sharing environment within their area of responsibility, thus 
creating an organisational climate which will be flexible, and ultimately robust, when 
facing a crisis situation. It suggests a suspension of marketing activities in the 
bifurcation stage, and an emphasis on clear and flexible communication; more reactive 
measures are offered as the crisis unfolds, until finally the managers and decision 
makers are left to reflect on the success and failures of their actions, presenting an 
opportunity to learn from mistakes and be better prepared next time (see Blackman and 
Ritchie, 2007).  
The following chapter will consider the second research question: 
 
Q2.  Does a model which views tourism crisis/disaster issues from a chaos 
theory perspective present a more attractive, viable alternative? 
 
Specifically the response of the Mexican tourism authorities to the AH1N1 
influenza crisis will be considered, and whether the actions taken by the authorities 
correspond with the recommendations of the chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster 
management model. 
 
97 
 
  
 It is important that the following issues are given particular attention: 
 
1. If the actions taken did correspond with a particular recommendation, then was this 
action ultimately successful? 
 
2. If no action was taken, would a particular situation have been improved by putting 
into effect a recommendation of the model?  
 
3. Did the tourism authorities take any measures not mentioned in the model, which 
would add to the viability the model? 
 
 
The following section begins by attempting to clarify whether the principal Mexican 
tourism organizations, SECTUR and the CPTM, could be considered to display an 
organisational environment conducive to innovation, flexibility, learning and change. 
 
7.1.1   Organisational environment  
 
Table 7.1 below is the first section from the chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster 
management model (table 2.3). It reveals the recommendations which are given for all 
tourism organizations, independent of factors such as size, location and resources. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1:  Recommended organisational environment 
 
 
 Create organisational 
environment that 
facilitates learning and 
‟embraces‟ change.  
 
Create environment that 
promotes innovation and 
flexibility.  
 
Promote adaptive 
management. 
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Due to the size and scope of this project, the research was not able to investigate in great 
detail the organisational structure of Mexican tourism organizations; nonetheless, the 
organisational structures of SECTUR and the CPTM and attitudes towards 
organisational learning were taken into account during interviews with past and current 
SECTUR and CPTM employees.  
          Mexican academic Carlos Amaya Molinar, who has previously worked in the 
CPTM, does not believe that SECTUR or the CPTM can be realistically described as 
'learning organisations':  
 
“I don‟t think that they are very flexible or innovative. I believe that they have a model 
of tourism operation and development that has been working and has been good for 
them, but maybe not for the whole country. The lack of flexibility and innovation has 
settled the Mexican tourism industry into stagnation; the model of tourism development 
doesn‟t change- sun and sea, mega resorts, golf courses and marinas.” 
Source: Carlos Amaya Molinar, Universidad de Colíma, 6
th
 August, 2010 
 
          It was noted during the research that the interviewees from SECTUR and CPTM 
occasionally gave contradictory answers, perhaps indicating poor communication and a 
lack of  knowledge transfer between organisations and, indeed, within the same 
organisation.  
 For example, at one stage, Adriana Uribe Pérez from SECTUR bemoaned the 
lack of finances:  
 
“We didn‟t have a contingency plan, especially for the health system point of view. We 
don‟t have that much money so we keep it in case of emergency.” 
Source: Adriana Uribe Pérez, Sub Director of Statistical Operations, SECTUR, 9
th
 July, 
2010 
 
José Raúl Sánchez, however, from the same organization, SECTUR, stated that:   
    
  “Institutions like SECTUR and CPTM have the experience, the human resources and 
the money to cope with crisis; don‟t forget that SECTUR is a branch of the federal 
government, it has the power and access to funds; the Mexican federal government is 
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not poor.” 
Source: José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, SECTUR, 11
th
 October, 2010 
 
          The research, therefore, appeared to suggest that the principal tourism 
organizations did not appear to demonstrate certain characteristics which are usually 
associated with learning organizations (see section 2.5.1). As a result, it is argued that 
the Mexican tourism authorities began the crisis at a disadvantage, as they did not 
seemingly exhibit an organisational environment which corresponds with that suggested 
in the model.  They were consequently unprepared for the sudden change brought about 
by the influenza crisis and this may have delayed or affected their response. Interview 
respondent, María Teresa Solís Trevo, who is an ex-employee of SECTUR and CPTM, 
was extremely critical of what she deems as a „slow‟ response: 
 
“Despite the knowledge on the SARS crisis impact, official communication and 
speeches stated that the Mexican travel industry would not be affected. There was 
complete inaction for over two weeks….it took over one month for the then Minister of 
Tourism, Rodolfo Elizondo, to travel to New York and have a press conference 
explaining the situation in Mexico. I couldn‟t avoid the contrast compared to the 1985 
earthquake crisis; in 1985 SECTUR„s Minister of Tourism was holding personal 
interviews in major media in US, Canada and Europe giving the best available 
exposition of the situation in Mexico City.” 
Source: María Teresa Solís Trejo, Director of Vantage Strategy Consulting (Mexico), 
26
th
 November, 2010 
 
        It does appear that the „delay‟ could have been avoided had SECTUR and the 
CPTM exhibited a more change embracing, adaptive style of management. Other „early 
mistakes‟ were made, such as the release of unscientifically confirmed information 
mentioned previously, which might have been avoided had the tourism authorities 
displayed a more cohesive and flexible response. 
 
 
The following sections will analyse the marketing and communication responses of the 
tourism authorities as the crisis progressed through the phases which have been 
associated with various elements of chaos theory. 
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7.1.2   ‘Edge of chaos’ phase 
Table 7.2 below is from the chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster management model, 
and displays the marketing and communication recommendations suggested for the 
„edge of chaos‟ phase. 
 
 
Table 7.2:   Recommendations for the „edge of chaos‟ phase 
 
Chaos theory element Marketing Communication 
 
Edge of chaos 
 
 
Be aware of the possibility of 
disaster and have a basic plan in 
place.   
Product diversification. 
Creation of strong brand image. 
Be aware of the possibility. 
Basic protocol (crisis 
management team) needs to 
be in place.  
Develop good relationship 
with media.  
 
 
 
 
The model suggests that in the „edge of chaos phase‟, tourism organisations should 
demonstrate awareness concerning the potential of a future disaster, and a basic plan 
should be in existence. If the organisation has adapted a „flexible, change-embracing‟ 
environment, (see sections 2.5.1 and 7.1.1) then such awareness should be inherent.  
On the marketing side, it is suggested that product diversification yields a 
stronger competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) as it prevents dependency on 
one product; likewise, the brandishing of a strong image has been seen to contribute to 
the 'lock-in' effect, while good media relations could help to mitigate negative reporting 
should a crisis situation arise. 
 
i. Marketing   
  
(a) Be aware of the possibility of disaster and have a basic plan in place.   
It has been established that during the „edge of chaos‟ phase, principal Mexican tourism 
organisations did not appear to exhibit the prerequisite recommendations of a learning 
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organisation which are considered central to the success of the model.  Also, while fully 
aware of the possibility of natural disasters occurring, the research showed no evidence 
of even a basic plan for an influenza epidemic, although a tourism crisis management 
team apparently was in existence under the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary of 
Tourism Operations. 
It is argued that by having a „basic health crisis plan‟ in place, as suggested by 
the model, then the Mexican government could possibly have avoided the controversial 
decisions made during the initial stages of the crisis, that is the release of unconfirmed 
information to the media, and the rather abrupt 5 day nationwide shutdown.  
 
(b) Product diversification 
Whether Mexico can be said to boast a diversity of tourism products proved difficult to 
ascertain. Graham Greene appeared to think so, even as far back as 1939 (see section 
4.2) and when challenged about the issue of product diversification, the SECTUR and 
CPTM interviewees were quick to highlight the special onus currently being given to 
alternative forms of tourism such as cultural tourism, business tourism, spa tourism, 
nature tourism and medical tourism through the Tourism Product Development 
Department and outlined in the 2007 tourism plan (see SECTUR, 2007).  However, this 
contradicts the viewpoint of Mexican tourism academic Carlos Amaya Molinar, who 
insists that the tourism authorities continue to concentrate solely on the beach „mega-
resort‟ (see section 4.3), ignoring other forms of diversification.  As it proved difficult to 
assess the past and current state of Mexican tourism (see section 4.3), questions 
regarding Mexico‟s tourism product diversification strategy likewise proved testing. 
Both topics have scope for further investigation.  
 
(c) Creation of strong brand image 
SECTUR insist that Mexico, as a tourism destination, is an extremely strong brand, 
proven by the fact that it is consistently in the top ten countries of international visitor 
arrivals worldwide.  It could be argued that the brand has recently suffered due to 
negative publicity regarding AH1N1 and security issues connected to the violence 
surrounding the drug cartels in the Northern states. Interview respondent, Walter Dagri, 
of Real Resorts hotels, comments upon this issue: 
 
“We have a strong brand, particularly in Cancun. People love it here. It is a beautiful 
place with beautiful hotels, not overly expensive, and people get treated like royalty 
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here. There has been negative reporting of Mexico, perhaps more so the drug violence 
than the swine flu, but the knowledgeable customer knows that the drug problems are 
thousands of miles away from here.” 
Source: Walter Dagri, Sales Manager, Real Resorts Hotels, 11
th
 January, 2011 
 
ii. Communication   
 
(a) Basic protocol (crisis management team) needs to be in place.  
 It was mentioned previously that SECTUR has a crisis management team which meets 
each year with the Mexican states to discuss various issues; however not even a basic 
plan appeared to have been in place for a tourism health crisis. 
 
(b) Develop good relationship with media.  
 The research suggests that there is a close working relationship among travel media and 
tourism destination public organisations, but a more distant and difficult relationship 
exists with economic and political media. From the point of view of the tourism 
authorities, economic and political media give a negative, inaccurate and 
disproportionate coverage of happenings and, from the point of view of the media, 
travel authorities attempted to minimise and underplay events so as not to compromise 
the performance of the tourism industry.  Certainly, Mexican tourism was greatly 
affected by negative reporting on a global scale, and it appears that it would be very 
difficult to prevent this from happening.  
Interview respondent, Braulio Cárdenas, from the National Chamber for the Restaurants 
and Food Industry, comments on media communication strategy: 
 
“There are strategies, that‟s why there are media professionals…but in general I 
personally tend to think that the media is a reflection of society, what people like…the 
media is forming people‟s fear of what people like and of what people are interested in. 
It‟s difficult because they have not only their own agenda… so from this point of view 
it‟s very hard. It can be done but it‟s hard…” 
Source: Braulio Cárdenas, National President of the National Chamber for the 
Restaurant and Food Industry, 3
rd
 December, 2010 
 
         Although not appearing to possess a basic tourism health crisis management plan, 
SECTUR and the CPTM did appear to exhibit the other recommendations put forward 
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in the tourism crisis model related to the 'edge of chaos' phase; however, it appears that 
issues such as product diversification, brand image and media relations are rather 
complex and difficult to define, perhaps offering alternative avenues for further 
investigation. 
 
7.1.3   Bifurcation / cosmology phase 
Table 7.3 shows the suggestions put forward in the chaos theory model for the 
bifurcation/cosmology phase of a tourism crisis.  
 
Table 7.3:    Recommendations for the bifurcation/cosmology phase 
 
Chaos theory element Marketing Communication 
Bifurcation Suspend or reduce 
marketing activities. 
Clear, flexible, open, truthful 
communication with 
stakeholders and the media. 
Cosmology Suspend or reduce 
marketing activities. 
Clear, flexible, open, truthful 
communication with 
stakeholders and the media. 
 
 
The chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster management model suggests that marketing 
activities should be either reduced or completely suspended during the bifurcation and 
cosmology phases, and that a strategy of clear, truthful communication with 
stakeholders and the media should be upheld at all times. 
 
 
i. Marketing  
 
(a) Suspend or reduce marketing activities 
 In accordance with Page et al. (2006), the model recommends that marketing activities 
should be temporarily suspended or at least reduced at this stage, and the research 
demonstrated that this was the case in Mexico, or at least to begin with.  All 
international marketing was immediately suspended and domestic marketing was 
reduced. Interview respondent, José Alberto García, from the CPTM confirms:  
 
 “It was not the time to show images of Mexico. We had to wait until people knew that 
the situation was improving.” 
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Source: José Alberto García, CPTM employee, 15
th
 July, 2010 
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the recommendation that all marketing activities be 
suspended, or at least reduced, throughout the whole of the bifurcation and cosmology 
phases, the „Vive México‟ campaign was put into effect very quickly. Given that the 
general consensus amongst the interviewees indicated that this campaign was perhaps 
the most impressive and effective measure put into place during the influenza crisis, 
perhaps this is an area in which the model could be improved.  
 
 
ii. Communication  
 
(a) Clear, flexible, open, truthful communication with stakeholders and the 
media 
The model, following Sellnow et al. (2002), proposes that communication should be 
truthful and accurate; unfortunately, the research clearly shows that many tourism 
stakeholders within Mexico believe that initial government statements to the media, 
later shown to be inaccurate, contributed towards the severity of the crisis and the level 
of anxiety, not just in Mexico but on an international scale. 
Monterrubio (2010: 13) is especially vociferous concerning this issue:  „…it 
seems that the way the global and national media reported alarmist information 
contributed significantly to a feeling of panic amongst potential and actual travellers to 
and inside Mexico. Additionally, the unconfirmed data reported by the federal 
government and the implemented measures based on such data enhanced panic among 
travellers.‟ 
          The research also revealed a substantial amount of anger within the tourism 
industry towards the government imposed five-day nationwide shutdown, which relates 
to the earlier discussion regarding a general attitude of mistrust towards the authorities 
in Mexico (see section 5.1.4). Interview respondent, Braulio Cárdenas described the 
feelings of restaurant owners and workers:  
 
“We were very angry! We believed that this method was an over-reaction by the 
government. The USA did not react the same way as ourselves. I believe that the 
intention was good, but there was not sufficient evidence of the severity of the 
problem…a lot had been manipulated and badly managed not solely by our government 
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but also the World Health Organisation.” 
Source: Braulio Cárdenas, National President of the National Chamber for the 
Restaurant and Food Industry, 3
rd
 December, 2010 
 
Similarly, interview respondent, Walter Dagri, from Real Resorts Hotels, criticised the 
government action:  
  “The government over-reacted and the tourism industry paid for that.” 
Source: Walter Dagri, Sales Manager, Real Resorts Hotels, 11
th
 January, 2011 
 
      It must be stressed that it was the Federal Government and the Health Ministry that 
took these actions, and not SECTUR or the CPTM. In defense of the criticism aimed 
towards them, the federal government cited the case of SARS in China.  Interview 
respondent, Alejandro Rojas, Tourism Secretary of Mexico City, explained the 
reasoning: 
 
  “The Mexican government and travel authorities had had the opportunity to observe 
the SARS crisis and the negative impacts that such a crisis had on tourism. One 
perception was that the Chinese government had tried to hide information from the 
public and had taken too long to take strict measures. The reaction of the Mexican 
government tried precisely to avoid a similar reaction.” 
Source: Alejandro Rojas, Secretary of Tourism, Mexico City, 20
th
 October, 2010  
  
          Despite the disapproval directed towards the Federal Government, the research 
demonstrated that certain effective communication strategies were put into place by the 
tourism authorities in the bifurcation phase of the Influenza crisis.  As proposed in the 
phase 1 emergency stage of the CPTM plan (see table 4.3), information was given 
through official channels coordinated by SECTUR and regular bulletins were given on 
an internet website. 
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7.1.4   Self-organisation / strange attractors phase 
 
Table 7.4 presents the recommendations for the self-organisation, strange attractors and 
„lock-in‟ effect phase of a tourism crisis.  
 
 
Table 7.4   Recommendations for self-organisation/ strange attractors/ „lock-in‟ phases 
 
  
Chaos theory 
element 
Marketing Communication 
Self-organisation 
Strange attractor 
Adaptation of marketing - 
product diversification (if not 
done previously), cost 
reductions, focus on domestic 
clientele. 
Alliances and joint marketing 
campaigns. 
Continuation of open 
communication with the media.  
Investigate government 
assistance and international 
aid. 
Lock-in effect  
 
Special offers for loyal 
customers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The phase of a tourism crisis which often displays the chaos theory elements labelled 
self-organisation, strange attractor, creativity, and „lock-in‟ effect,  calls for an 
adaptation of the marketing strategy. Recommendations include product diversification, 
if not done previously, a revision of pricing strategy, a focus on domestic customers, 
new customers or potential niche markets, and the forging or strengthening of existing 
or potential alliances.  
  It is advised that a policy of open, truthful communication with the media is 
adhered to, and, if warranted, it may also be an appropriate time to investigate 
government assistance and international aid.  
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i. Marketing   
 
(a) Adaptation of marketing, product diversification (if not done previously), cost 
reductions, focus on domestic clientele 
         As mentioned previously, the extent of product diversification to be found in 
Mexican tourism appears to be disputable. Despite the doubts and criticisms expressed 
by Carlos Amaya Molinar (see section 4.3), diversification was a major element of the  
2007 tourism plan, objective 8 of the plan being to sustain and diversify national and 
international tourism demand (SECTUR, 2006).   The „Vive México‟ campaign had 
already been put into effect during the bifurcation phase, with its domestic focus, tailor 
made destination campaigns (see table 4.3) and subsequent special offers such as 
reduced price vacations and 2 for 1 offers.  
 
(b) Alliances and joint marketing campaigns 
      SECTUR and the CPTM joined with Mexicana airlines to promote „Vive México‟ 
and other alliances were also undertaken with tour operators, hotels (noticeably the 
Grupo Posadas chain), universities, and so on. Interview respondent, José Alberto 
García (CPTM) comments upon these issues:  
 
 “We started a campaign called ‟Now, more than ever, Mexico Lives‟, which was 
accompanied by aggressive marketing strategies mostly on the part of airlines and hotel 
chains. Later we started the ‟Time to go‟ campaign in North America.” 
Source: José Alberto García, CPTM employee, 15
th
 July, 2010 
 
Interview respondent, Braulio Cárdenas, describes the marketing strategies put into 
effect by the restaurant sector:  
 
  “It depended a lot on the restaurant and the kind of market that they cater for. Some 
did 2 for 1 drink offers, free breakfasts….we also promoted Mexican cuisine as an 
important element of cuisine with SECTUR and the Economy Secretary.”  
Source: Braulio Cárdenas, National President of the National Chamber for the 
Restaurant and Food Industry, 3
rd
 December, 2010  
 
The North American promotional campaign was begun, assisted by various 
strategic alliances with other government ministries (health, finance, agriculture, 
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communication and transport, education, foreign affairs) consulates, embassies 
(particularly the Mexican embassy in Washington) and the foreign offices of the CPTM 
and Promexico  (a government agency designed to strengthen Mexico‟s economic 
position).  The CPTM intensified their public relations campaign, particularly in the US 
and Canada, with a number of press events and familiarization trips for journalists.  
 
(c) Focus on new customers or niche markets 
As part of the recovery process, SECTUR and the CPTM focused on new customers 
and niche markets, in particular those of Russia, Brazil, India and China, and various 
radical changes were introduced to immigration policy in order to minimise visa waiting 
times. Both the domestic 'Vive México' campaign and the international 'Welcome Back' 
campaign were designed to motivate new customers as well as those who already 
frequently travel within and to Mexico.    
 
ii. Communication  
 
(a) Continuation of open communication with media/ investigate government 
assistance and international aid   
 
 Several measures of government assistance were announced, which included- 
1. An act of government (the Tourism Act) which would enhance the Ministry of 
Tourism‟s power and influence. 
2. More resources given to individual states, with an emphasis on cultural and nature 
tourism. 
3. Diversification- special emphasis on medical tourism. 
4. New development - Largest tourism project in 25 years in Sinaloa. 
5. Restructuring of SECTUR, the CPTM and FONATUR. 
6. Website portal- Development of www.visitmexico.com  
 (SECTUR, 2009) 
 
    It appears that all of the marketing and communication recommendations put forward 
in the chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster management model for this phase of the crisis 
were introduced by the Mexican tourism authorities, including changes in the marketing 
strategy, a focus on alliances, and forms of government assistance.  
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7.2   Reflection 
The model recommends a period of reflection so that lessons can be learned so as to 
improve future marketing and communication processes and strategy. The government 
assistance mentioned above (announced in the recovery stage), with an emphasis on 
restructuring and diversification and development, demonstrates how reflection 
processes appear to have influenced the recovery strategy.  Interview respondent, José 
Raúl Sánchez (SECTUR) gives his thoughts concerning the lessons which should be 
learned from the crisis: 
 
“Hurricane Wilma gave us many experiences to learn from, and this influenza crisis has 
given us many, many more experiences. Communication between institutions was tested 
in this crisis. We must know who the main players are during a crisis, the main people 
who can give information 24 hours a day. This was not always available during the 
influenza crisis. Different segments of tourism – hotels, restaurants, small businesses, 
big businesses – must work in a more coordinated way through their chambers and 
organisations to react faster and to help each other.” 
Source: José Raúl Sánchez, Director of Technology, SECTUR, 11
th
 October, 2010 
 
7.3   The Mexican response and the model’s recommendations  
The following chapter will discuss the research conclusions in detail; before doing so, 
the three questions proposed earlier (section 7.1) will be considered: 
 The alternative tourism crisis and disaster management model was tested against the 
background of a real life tourism crisis, the 2009 Mexican AH1N1 influenza crisis.  
It was suggested that certain issues be given particular attention: 
 
1 .If the actions taken did correspond with a particular recommendation, then 
was this action ultimately successful? 
The CPTM quickly prepared a response (see table 4.3) which contained many features 
of the alternative chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster management model, such as a 
suspension of marketing activities and a focus on clear communication. From the 
bifurcation stage of the crisis onwards, the overall response of the authorities 
corresponded to the recommendations given in the model, and these responses appeared 
to be ultimately successful.  The only response which differed was the timing of the 
„Vive México‟ campaign (more on this below).  
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2. If no action was taken, would the situation have been improved by putting into 
effect a recommendation of the model? 
Recommendations surrounding organizational structure and culture and the availability 
of a basic health crisis plan were not evident in the principal Mexican tourism 
organizations of SECTUR and the CPTM, although a crisis management team was in 
existence in the CPTM. It is suggested that the lack of readiness may have contributed 
towards early mistakes, such as the release of unconfirmed data, and the nationwide 
shut-down. Doubts were also cast over the issues of product diversification and brand 
image. It is suggested that the situation would have been improved if the model‟s 
recommendations had been present from the onset.  
  
3. Did the tourism authorities take any measures not mentioned in the model, 
which would add to the viability of the model? 
The Mexican authorities chose to focus on domestic tourism during the bifurcation 
phase, rather than wait until the self-organisation phase, as suggested in the alternative 
chaos theory model. Due to the apparent success of the „Vive México‟ domestic 
campaign, it is conceded that the bifurcation phase may be a more suitable time to 
concentrate on domestic tourism, rather than waiting until the self-organisation phase.  
 
7.4   One year later… 
Before turning to the concluding chapter, it is interesting to briefly look at the situation 
a year after the events took place. Excerpts from a SECTUR report published on the 25
th
 
July, 2010, (translated from the original Spanish) perhaps serve to demonstrate the 
resilience of Mexico‟s tourism industry. 
 
 The number of international tourists visiting Mexico has grown 35%. SECTUR reports 
that the number of international tourists rose 35.2% in June compared to the same 
month last year.  During this period, 818, 278 tourists of different nationalities visited 
Mexico, against 605, 435 from June. 2009.  
 
 The United States, Canada, the UK, Spain and Italy are the principal visitors. 
Source: SECTUR (2010) 
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Chapter 8 
                                
Conclusion  
 
8.1   Introduction 
 This chapter considers what the research has achieved. The original aim of the research 
is briefly revisited and then the case-study and the research in Mexico are discussed. 
This is followed by conclusions to and final thoughts on the outcome of the research 
and the answers to the research questions.  
 
8.2   The aim of the research   
 Although others had considered crisis management models and processes more 
generally, Faulkner (2001) was the first to propose a crisis and disaster management 
framework specifically relevant to tourism. His lead was followed by others, such as 
Henderson (2003), Ritchie (2004), de Sausmarez (2004), Page et al. (2006), Carlsen and 
Hughes (2007), Hystad and Keller (2008) and Tew et al. (2008), all of whom recognised 
the need for more comprehensive theoretical and conceptual frameworks to assist in the 
management of tourism crises and disasters, and all who consequently produced models 
to meet this need (see Table 2.1).  
However, questions were raised regarding the effectiveness and viability of these 
models. As discussed in detail in the opening chapter (see section 2.4), certain 
weaknesses are evident and it is suggested that these apparent defects could diminish 
the models‟ usefulness when applied to a „real-life‟ tourism crisis or disaster. In 
particular, certain issues appear to have been over-looked, such as the sheer 
unpredictability of crises and disasters, the ways in which contrasting cultures react in 
different ways to similar situations, and the problems which beset small businesses both 
in pre-crisis times and during a crisis. The prescriptive, rigid models do not consider the 
uncertainty surrounding crisis and disaster situations, and the „one-size-fits all‟ approach 
does not appear to take into account differences in types of crises and disasters, and 
different levels of crisis preparedness in distinct locations. The identification of these 
weaknesses led to the formulation of the first research question which provides a direct 
challenge to contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management theory: do the 
weaknesses which appear to exist within the models affect their application to 
crisis/disaster situations?  
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Implicit in this first question is the notion that the time has come to explore other 
avenues which could provide an alternative and, perhaps, more effective direction for 
tourism managers in times of crisis. Various commentators (see sections 2.4 and 2.5) 
have suggested that chaos and complexity theory offer a possible alternative 
perspective, in that tourism destinations are envisaged as „systems‟ which are fragile, 
changing, dynamic and vulnerable to outside influences. Characteristics of chaos theory 
include a period of immense alteration in which the system suffers irreversible damage 
and then periods of self-organisation and creativity as the system reverts to a new 
„higher‟ order.   
This thesis, therefore, has sought to demonstrate not only the weaknesses of 
current tourism crisis management frameworks, but also how various elements of chaos 
theory often present themselves in a tourism crisis and, consequently, how specific 
marketing and communication strategies can be applied to manage the situation 
according to which chaos element is in evidence. This subsequently provided the 
framework for a proposed chaos theory tourism crisis and disaster management model 
(Table 2.3), leading to the second research question: does a model which views tourism 
disaster/crisis management issues from a chaos theory perspective present a more 
effective, viable alternative? 
In order to investigate the criticisms and challenges directed towards 
contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management models and frameworks, and to 
test the proposed chaos theory model, the AH1N1 influenza crisis and the subsequent 
tourism crisis suffered by Mexico in 2009 was selected as an appropriate case study. 
 
8.3    Mexico: getting to the truth    
Mexico was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the country was the 
scene of a recent high profile tourism crisis; secondly, the researcher has numerous ties 
to the country, providing him with the opportunity to gain access to relevant secondary 
data and, in particular, to suitable interviewees. All interviewees were selected 
according to the objectives of the research and from a variety of tourism backgrounds in 
an attempt to provide a complete and, as far as possible, unbiased account of the crisis 
and the country‟s response to it. While this was to a great extent accomplished, during 
the primary data collection it became evident that, on occasion, respondents appeared to 
contradict one another, as was apparent, for example with the two SECTUR employees 
interviewed  (see section 7.1.1).  This reflects the fact that, in a county such as Mexico, 
people are often unwilling to compromise their position by offering potentially 
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damaging information, and so employees from certain organisations may often avoid 
publicly criticising those organisations. Thus, on the one hand, SECTUR and CPTM 
representatives tended to talk positively of the success of Mexican tourism authorities 
and their response to the crisis; on the other hand, tourism academics, Carlos Amaya 
Molinar and Juan Carlos Monterrubio, and ex-employee of SECTUR and the CPTM, 
María Teresa Solís Trejo, tended to disagree and generally criticised the response.  
          This dialectical tension appears to add to the complexity of the research.  Are the 
SECTUR officials making rather pretentious claims on behalf of their organization or 
are the tourism academics being a little harsh with their criticism? For those who 
advocate quantitative research over qualitative research then this perhaps provides an 
example of how qualitative research can be condemned as being too general, unspecific 
and uncertain. However, in answer to such criticism, it has to be said that qualitative 
research is not meant to be an „exact‟ science. Differences in viewpoints are part and 
parcel of this research process and add to the richness and scope of the collected data 
and whether one wishes to identify with a certain point of view is a matter of personal 
opinion- one may prefer to „believe‟ the academics, or one may be more convinced by 
the those who work in SECTUR.   In short, it was decided that the most effective means 
of addressing the research questions was to elicit the opinions of the key players in 
Mexico – those  who were there when it happened and who, as a result of their 
positions, possess intimate knowledge of the AH1N1 crisis and responses to it.  
 
8.4   The research questions  
Q1: Do the weaknesses which appear to exist within [tourism crisis management] 
models affect their application to tourism crisis/disaster situations?  
 
From the analysis of the data gathered, the following table (Table 8.1 below) 
summarises the answer to this question, at least in the context of the AH1N1 influenza 
tourism crisis in Mexico. Overall, the suggested weaknesses and limitations of current 
tourism crisis management models (see section 2.4) were evident, and, as a 
consequence, it appears that this would limit their effectiveness and usefulness as a 
means of responding to the crisis. 
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Table 8.1: The Mexican AH1N1 crisis: evidence of weaknesses 
Unpredictability of tourism crises and disasters Although predicted within academic 
circles, a health crisis of this magnitude 
was not predicted in Mexico and therefore 
the AH1N1 influenza crisis can be 
regarded as an unprecedented, 
unpredictable crisis.  
 
Limitations of prescriptive models/ restrictions 
posed by a rigid plan 
 The crisis did not follow the „crisis life-
cycle‟ and its complexity and scope further 
added to the dilemma, thus making the 
'prescriptive' guidelines offered in 
contemporary models and frameworks  
almost unworkable.  
 
One-size-fits-all approach The limitations of a 'one- size fits all' 
approach were clearly evident as the 
nature of a health crisis called for a 
complete change of response and strategy 
from that used for previous natural 
disasters; the fact that it was played out at 
different locations, all with contrasting 
levels of competence and resources and at 
differing levels of severity, added to the 
managerial complexity of the crisis.  
 
Cultural context Research concerning the cultural context 
of the crisis added an interesting issue 
which could perhaps be used as a basis for 
future tourism crisis research. As had been 
previously noted, the „laid-back‟ Latin 
culture perhaps plays a part in the lack of 
pre-crisis preparedness, but an ominous 
development present in this case is a deep-
seated societal mistrust of the Mexican 
government, which could severely hamper 
crisis response. Decades of corruption and 
injustice has led to a situation in which 
many people are apathetic to government 
issues and are not willing to follow 
„advice‟ issued from the authorities. This 
has been arguably worsened by „poor‟ 
decision making (5 day shutdown and 
release of scientifically unconfirmed 
information); Mexican tourism academics 
fear the psychological impact of these 
actions could have major repercussions if a 
similar crisis were to be repeated, as the 
research suggested that many people 
would simply not believe what was being 
reported and would therefore fail to co-
operate.  
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It is suggested that these kinds of concerns 
are not unique to Mexico, and undoubtedly 
exists in many developing countries where 
tourism plays a huge part in the economy; 
it seems that tourism crisis management 
frameworks do not appear to take such 
issues into consideration. 
 
 
Realities of small businesses The reality is that at least 40% of Mexican 
tourism businesses are unregistered and 
therefore do not qualify to receive aid and 
are undoubtedly naïve and ignorant when 
it comes to tourism crisis management. 
This presents a significant problem which 
is not recognised in tourism crisis 
management models and frameworks, and 
is an issue which it is suggested should be 
given more prominence in tourism 
research. This situation undoubtedly exists 
in many other countries with practically 
half of tourism businesses being ignored 
by governments and decision makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2: Does a model which views tourism/crisis disaster management from a chaos theory 
perspective present a more effective, viable alternative? 
 
It was important to identify the various elements of chaos theory throughout the crisis 
and, as Table 8.2 below demonstrates, it appears that all of the elements mentioned 
previously (section 2.5 and chapter 6) could be identified.  
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Table 8.2:   Chaos theory elements present in the AH1N1 influenza crisis 
 
The edge of chaos  The edge of chaos is not a particularly 
difficult concept, and can be applied to any 
tourism destination at any time, not just to 
Mexico. According to official sources, the  
country‟s tourism industry appeared to be 
doing quite well, despite world recession 
and bad publicity regarding drug violence, 
until the „peace‟ was suddenly shattered by 
the arrival of the AH1N1 influenza virus. 
 
The butterfly effect 
 
While the origin of the AH1N1 virus 
remains rather unclear, there exists the 
strong possibility that it could have 
originated outside of Mexico, thus 
supporting the butterfly effect element of 
chaos theory, in which the source of a 
crisis or disaster often can be traced to 
another part of the world and often an 
unrelated issue. While the origin/cause of a 
crisis will not prevent it from happening, 
the butterfly effect helps to explain the 
„tenuous equilibrium‟ which exists in the 
pre-crisis stage, as incidents unconnected 
with the destination and indeed tourism 
can ultimately provoke a series of events 
which result in a tourism crisis/disaster. 
 
Bifurcation/ cosmology The Mexican tourism system was severely 
disrupted, creating an emergency situation. 
This corresponds with the chaos theory 
element of bifurcation, while panic among 
the Mexican population, and hasty 
decision making by the government can be 
linked with the element labeled 
cosmology. 
 
Self-organisation/ strange attractor/ creativity Self-organisation and creativity were 
evident as tourism businesses sought to 
survive the crisis by utilising novel, 
creative strategies, and it was suggested 
that self-organisation and solidarity were 
perhaps unwittingly encouraged by the 
„Vive México‟ campaign. Shared hardship 
can be likened to the strange attractor 
element, in which a common cause to 
promote the good of all can lead to 
commitment and the strengthening of 
relationships, ultimately accelerating the 
recovery process.  
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‘Lock-in’ effect A swift „recovery‟ and the return of the 
„loyal‟ tourist illustrates the „lock-in‟ 
effect, in which loyal customers return to a 
place with which they have a 
psychological bond, despite bad publicity 
and negative events. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5   The chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster management model: Does it present a 
more viable alternative? 
 It was not only important to seek evidence of chaos theory elements during particular 
stages of the disaster, but it was also necessary to assess whether the recommendations 
suggested in the chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster management model (Table 2.3) 
would have improved the response to any extent. This issue was addressed in detail in 
chapter 7.  
It appears that the recommendations delivered within the chaos tourism crisis model, in 
the form of appropriate marketing and communication strategies, could indeed be used 
to assist the recovery process. It has been evident that many of the recommendations of 
the chaos theory tourism model were inadvertently used as part of the Mexican tourism 
recovery strategy. For example, if one is to compare the chaos tourism crisis/disaster 
management model (Table 2.3) to the CPTM plan (Table 4.3), it can be seen that both 
contain marketing and communication measures which include: the suspension or 
reduction of marketing activities; a focus on domestic clientele; alliances and joint 
marketing campaigns; a focus on loyal customers and niche markets; product 
diversification; and, clear accurate communication.  
It became apparent that when the recommendations from the chaos tourism 
crisis/disaster management model were not being implemented, difficulties arose. This 
is most noticeable in the initial stages of the crisis.  For example, little evidence could 
be found linking even the most prominent Mexican tourism organisations with a 
„learning‟ type organisational culture, the lack of which proved very problematic in the 
initial stages, as confusion abounded and uncertainty was rife. It is suggested that, had 
the authorities been more prepared for change of any nature, as advocated, then the 
immediate response would have been improved. Along with this illustration of 
organizational  inflexibility,  the „edge of chaos‟ stage saw no evidence of even a basic 
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tourism health crisis plan, the subject of product diversification proved ambiguous, and 
the strong Mexican brand image was already under attack from „separate crises‟, in the 
form of the drug violence and the world economic crisis. 
 From the bifurcation stage onwards the response was more in line with the 
recommendations of the chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster management model, and it 
was at this stage that the crisis response arguably began to improve. It does appear that 
if the Mexican authorities had followed the chaos theory tourism crisis/disaster 
management plan from the beginning, then there would have been significant 
improvements to the response. 
 
8.6   Final thoughts 
Of course, the marketing and communication strategies put forward in the chaos tourism 
plan are by no means novel or innovative; they are suggested throughout the tourism 
crisis management literature. However, only here are they directly linked with chaos 
theory. As mentioned earlier, chaos theory has been linked with tourism crisis 
management for a number of years, but commentators have typically only hinted at its 
potential. That is, prior to this study, no empirical work had been undertaken to explore 
its application to „real world‟ tourism crisis management. It is, therefore, hoped that this 
research stimulates debate and encourages similar case studies.  
Currently, tourism crisis management theory extols the value of prediction and 
the anticipation of specific crises; conversely, this research has demonstrated that 
weaknesses exist in such a framework. Admittedly, chaos and complexity theory is a 
difficult concept and must be treated with caution; moreover, there may be more viable 
methods of addressing these weaknesses. In this thesis it has been presented as an 
alternative theoretical framework within which to address the important weaknesses 
which are evident in contemporary tourism crisis and disaster management models, but 
more research is needed to explore fully its possibilities in the context of tourism crises.  
Perhaps a combination of traditional and alterative theory would be an appropriate 
starting point, with attention being paid to the limitations and advantages of both 
approaches.  
However, one thing is clear. If the weaknesses highlighted in this research are 
not dealt with, then tourism destinations and their stakeholders will continue to suffer 
financial and personal loss as tourism crises and disasters continue to afflict random 
chaos on unsuspecting locations. From the evidence of this research, a tourism crisis 
management framework which considers the elements of chaos theory and 
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corresponding marketing and communication strategies appears to be a more valid 
response to tourism crises and disasters than existing models.  
120 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aderighi, M. and Cento, A. (2004) „European airlines conduct after September 11‟, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, 10, pp. 97-107 
 
Anderson, B.A. (2006) „Crisis management in the Australian tourism industry: 
preparedness, personnel and postscript‟, Tourism Management, 27, pp.1290-1297 
 
Arbel, A. and Bargur, J. (1980) „A planning model for crisis management in the tourism 
industry‟, European Journal of Operational Research, 5, 2, pp.77-85 
 
Armstrong, E.K. (2005) „Communicating with Visitors During and After a Natural 
Disaster – Examples from the 2003 Bushfires in the Australian Capital Territory‟, In: 
Managing risk and crisis for sustainable tourism: Research and innovation (Best 
Education Network Think Tank V, Kingston, Jamaica June 16-19) 
 
Avraham, E. and Ketter, E. (2008) „Media strategies for marketing places in crisis‟, 
Oxford: Butterworth- Heinemann 
 
Beeton, S. (2005) „The Case Study in Tourism Research: a Multi -Method Case Study 
Approach‟ (chapter 4 pp.37 -48) In. Ritchie, B.W., Burns, P. and Palmer, C. (Eds) 
(2005) Tourism Research Methods:  Integrating Theory with Practice, King‟s Lynn: 
Cabi Publishing  
 
Beirman, D. (2003) Restoring tourism destinations in crisis: A strategic marketing 
approach, Sydney: Allen & Unwin 
 
Berman, R. and Roel, G. (1993) „Encounter with death and destruction: the 1985 
Mexico City earthquake‟, Group Analysis, 26, pp. 89-91 
 
Blackman, D. and Ritchie, B.W. (2007) „Tourism Crisis Management and  
Organizational Learning : The Role of Reflection in Developing Effective  
DMO Crisis Strategies‟ , Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing , 23,  2,3,4, pp. 45-57 
 
121 
 
Blake, A. and Sinclair, M.T. (2003) „Tourism crisis management: US response to 
September 11‟, Annals of Tourism Research, 30, 4, pp. 813-832 
 
Brenner, L. (2005) „State-planned tourism destinations: The case of Huatulco, Mexico‟, 
Tourism Geographies, 7, 2, pp. 138-164   
 
Brenner, L. and Aguilar, A.G. (2002) „Luxury tourism and regional economic 
development in Mexico‟, The Professional Geographer, 54, 4, pp. 500-520 
 
Bryman, B. and Bell, E. (2007) Business Research Methods (2
nd
 Ed) Oxford University 
Press: Oxford 
 
Butler, R. (1980) „The concept of a tourist area cycle of evolution: implications  
for management of resources‟, Canadian Geographer, 24, pp.5-12 
 
Cammisa, J.V. (1993) „The Miami experience: natural and manmade disasters‟ In 
„Expanding responsibilities: a blueprint for the travel industry‟, 24th Annual Conference 
Proceedings of Travel and Tourism Research Association. (pp.294-295), Whistler, BC. 
 
Cappua, I. and Alexander, D.J. (2002) „Avian influenza and human health‟, Acta Tropica 
83, 1, pp.1-6 
 
Carlsen, J.C. and Hughes, M. (2007) „Tourism market recovery in the Maldives after the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 23, 2/3/4, pp. 
139-149 
 
Carlsen, J. C. and Liburd, J.C. (2007)  „Developing a Research Agenda for Tourism  
Crisis Management, Market Recovery and Communications‟, Journal of Travel and  
Tourism Marketing , 23  2,3,4,, pp.265 -276 
 
Carter, S. (1998) „Tourists and travelers‟ social construction of Africa and Asia as risky 
locations‟, Tourism Management, 19, pp.349-358 
 
Cassedy, K. (1991) „Crisis management planning in the travel and tourism industry: A 
study of three destinations and a crisis management planning manual‟, PATA: San 
122 
 
Francisco  
 
CEPAL (2010) Evaluacion preliminar del impacto en Mexico de la Influenza AH1N1 
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/4/38894/2010-011_Influenza-L958w.pdf 
[accessed 26th June, 2010] 
 
CESOP (2010) 2009, un ano de crisis para el Turismo   
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:YDKj2wf1dyIJ:www3.diputados.gob.mx/
camara/content/download/232819/632019/file/2009_a%25C3%25B1o_crisis_docto_82.
pdf+2009,+un+ano+de+crisis+para+el+turismo&hl=es-
419&gl=mx&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiPGH1_dhlfS9gbup5C9CsA_7Vcy1tDYhc0rfmu
bqwj9hn5eFcFRMP8QjW5OwrcJ9y3ROc0Lv_UR3t46LTpnWKN7IZINmSMILAwOc
09WL-
eXxDBGzukR4HBfmG_vfs92N9xJJqm&sig=AHIEtbTOGfdgG3_Jd9q9IVCkKqwea-
6ndQ  [accessed May 17
th
, 2011] 
 
Chien, G. C. L. and Law, R. (2003) „The impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome on hotels: a case study of Hong Kong‟, International Journal of Hospitality 
Management, 22, pp. 327-332 
 
Cioccio, L. and Michael, E. J. (2007) „Hazard or Disaster : Tourism Management for the 
Inevitable in Northeast Victoria‟ , Tourism Management , 28,  pp.1-11 
 
Clancy, M. (2001) „Mexican Tourism: Export growth and structural change since 1970‟, 
Latin American Research Review, 36, 1, pp. 128-150 
 
Collins, D.C. (1979) „Site and situation strategy in tourism planning - a Mexican case 
study‟, Annals of Tourism Research, VI, 3, pp. 251-356 
 
Cooper, M. (2005) „Japanese outbound tourism and the SARS and Iraqi crisis of 2003‟, 
Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, (Special Issue on Crisis), pp. 119-133  
 
Cooper, M. (2006) „Japanese tourism and the SARS epidemic of 2003‟, Journal of 
Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2-3, pp. 117-131 
 
123 
 
Coopey, J. (1996) „Crucial Gaps in the Learning Organization‟ (pp. 348-366) in  
Starkey, J., (Ed) (1996) How Organizations Learn , UK : Thomson Business Press 
 
Cossens, J. and Gin, S. (1994) „Tourism and AIDS: The perceived risk of HIV infection 
and destination choice‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 3, 4, pp. 1-20 
 
Cothran, D.A. and  Cothran, C.C. (1998) „Promise or Political Risk for Mexican 
Tourism‟ In Annals of Tourism Research, 25, 2, pp. 477-497 
 
Creswell, J.W. (1994) Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 
SAGE: Thousand Oaks, California  
 
D‟Amore, L.J. and Anuza, T.E. (1986) „International Terrorism: Implications and 
challenge for global tourism‟, Business Quarterly, (November) pp. 20-29 
 
Dann, G. and Phillips, J. (2000) „Qualitative Tourism Research in the late 20th Century 
and Beyond‟ , In  Faulkner, B., Moscardo, G. and Laws, E. (Eds)  Tourism in the 21st 
century: lessons from experience ,  London: Continuum 
 
Dann, G., Nash, D. and Pearce, P., (1988) „Methodology in Tourism Research‟, Annals 
of Tourism Research, 15, pp. 1-28 
 
Dombey, O. (2003) „The effect of SARS on the Chinese tourism industry‟, Journal of 
Vacation Marketing, 10, 1, pp. 4-10.  
 
de Sausmarez, N. (2003) „Malaysia‟s response to the Asian financial crisis: implications 
for tourism and sectoral crisis management‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 
15, 4, pp. 217-231 
 
de Sausmarez, N. (2004) „Crisis management for the tourism sector: preliminary 
considerations in policy development‟, Tourism and Hospitality Planning and 
Development, 1, 2, pp. 157-172 
 
de Sausmarez, N. (2007) „Crisis Management, Tourism and Sustainability: The Role of 
Indicators‟, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 15, 6, pp. 700-714 
124 
 
 
Drabek, T.E. (1995) „Disaster responses within the tourism industry‟, International 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 13, 1, pp. 7-23 
 
Dwyer, L., Forsyth, P. and Spurr, R. (2005) „Effects of SARS Crisis on the Economic 
Contribution of Tourism to Australia‟, In: Managing risk and crisis for sustainable 
tourism: Research and innovation (Best Education Network Think Tank V, Kingston, 
Jamaica June 16-19).  
 
Eugenio-Martin, J. L., Thea Sinclair, M. and Yeoman, I. (2005) „Quantifying the effects 
of tourism crises: an application to Scotland‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 
19, 2/3, pp. 21-34 
 
Evans, N. and  Elphick, S. (2005) „Models of Crisis Management: an Evaluation of their 
Value for Strategic Planning in the International Tourism Industry‟,  International 
Journal of Tourism Research, 7, pp. 135-150 
 
Fall, L. (2004) „The increasing role of public relations as a crisis management function: 
An empirical examination of communication restrategising efforts among destination 
organisation managers in the wake of 11th September, 2001‟, Journal of Vacation 
Marketing, 10, 3, pp. 238-252  
 
Fall, L. and Massey, J.E. (2006) „The significance of crisis communication in the 
aftermath of 9/11‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2-3, pp. 77-90  
 
Farazmand, A. (2009) „Hurricane Katrina, the crisis of leadership, and chaos 
management: time for trying the „surprise management theory in action‟, Public 
Organization Review, 9, 4, pp. 399-412   
 
Farrell, B.H. and Twining-Ward, L. (2003) „Reconceptualizing tourism‟, Annals of 
Tourism Research, 31, 2, pp. 274-295 
 
Faulkner, B. and Russell, R. (1997) „Chaos and complexity in tourism: in search of a 
new perspective‟, Pacific Tourism Review, 1, pp. 93-10 
 
125 
 
Faulkner, B. (2000) „The future ain‟t what it used to be: Coping with change, turbulence 
and disasters in tourism research and destination management‟, In Griffith University 
Professorial Lecture Series No. 6., Southport, Queensland, Australia 
 
Faulkner, B. (2001) „Towards a Framework for Tourism Disaster Management‟,  
Tourism Management , 22, pp. 135-147 
 
Faulkner, B. and Vikulov, S. (2001) , „Katherine, Washed Out One Day, Back on Track 
the Next : a Post Mortem of a Tourism Disaster‟,  Tourism Management, 22, pp. 331-
344 
 
Finn, M., Elliot-White, M. and Walton, M. (2000) Tourism and Leisure Research 
Methods: Data collection, analysis and interpretation, Pearson Education Limited: 
Malaysia  
 
Fink, S. (1986) Crisis Management, American Association of Management: New York  
 
Flick, U. (1998) An Introduction to Qualitative Research, Sage: GB  
 
Floyed, M. F., Gibson, H., Pennington-Gray, L. and Thapa, B. (2004) „The effect of risk 
perceptions on intentions to travel in the aftermath of September 11, 2001‟, Journal of 
Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15, 2/3, pp. 19-38.  
 
Fontana, A. and Frey, J.H. (1994) „Interviewing: The Art of Science‟ (chapter 22, 
pp.361-377) In. Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, Sage: USA  
 
Frisby, E. (2002) „Communicating in a crisis: the British Tourist Authority‟s responses 
to the foot-and-mouth outbreak and 11
th
 September, 2001‟, Journal of Vacation 
Marketing, 9, 1, pp. 89-100 
 
Gillen, D. and Lall, A. (2003) „International transmission of shocks in the airline 
industry‟, Journal of Air Transport Management, 9, 1, pp. 37-49.  
 
Glaesser, D. (2006) Crisis Management in the Tourism Industry, The Netherlands : 
126 
 
Elsevier Ltd  
 
Goodrich, J.N. (2002) „September 11, 2001, attack on America: a record of the 
immediate impacts and reactions in the USA travel and tourism industry‟, Tourism 
Management, 23, pp.573-580 
 
Gonzalez-Herrero, A. (1997) „Preventive marketing: Crisis reporting in the tourism 
sector‟, Estudios Autistics, 133, pp.5-28 
 
Gonzalez- Herrero, A. (1999) „Product commercialization and crisis planning in the 
tourist sector: Corporative image and consumer-centred marketing‟, Papers de Turisme, 
24, 6. 
 
Gonzalez-Herrero, A. and  Pratt, C.B. (1995) „How to manage a crisis before- or 
whenever- it hits‟, Public Relations Quarterly, Spring, pp.25-29 
 
Gonzalez-Herrero, A. and  Pratt, C.B. (1996) „An Integrated Symmetrical Model for 
Crisis-Communications Management‟, Journal of Public Relations Research, 8, pp.79-
105 
 
Gonzalez-Herrero, A. and Pratt, C.B. (1998) „Marketing crises in tourism: 
Communication strategies in the United States and Spain‟, Public Relations Review, 24, 
1, pp. 83-98 
 
Greco, J. (1994) „Miami manages a tourism crisis‟, Hemisphere, (September) pp.26-30 
 
Green, C. G., Bartholomew, P. and Murman, S. (2004) „New York Restaurant Industry. 
Strategic Responses to September 11, 2001‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 
15, 2/3, pp. 63-80.  
 
Greene, G. (1939) The Lawless Roads, Vintage Classics 
 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation, Sage: Newbury 
Park, CA  
 
127 
 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994) „Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research‟ 
(chapter 6, pp. 105-118) In. Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Sage: USA  
 
Gunderson, L. (1999) „Resilience, flexibility and adaptive management- antidotes for 
spurious certitude? ‟, Conservation Ecology, 3, 1:7 [online] URL: 
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art7/ 
 
Gurtner, Y. K. (2005) „Adversity and Resiliance: A case study of crisis management in a 
tourist-reliant destination‟, In: Tremblay, P. and Boyle, A. (Eds) Sharing Tourism 
Knowledge. Proceedings of the 2005 CAUTHE Conference, pp. 196-198 (Darwin: 
Charles Darwin University).  
 
Gurtner, Y. K. (2005) „Understanding tourism crisis: case study of Bali and Phuket‟, In: 
Managing risk and crisis for sustainable tourism: Research and innovation (Best 
Education Network Think Tank V, Kingston, Jamaica June 16-19).  
 
Hakim, C. (1982) Secondary Analysis in Social Research: A Guide to Data Sources and 
Methods with Examples, Allen & Unwin: London 
 
Hall, C. M. (2002) „Travel Safety, Terrorism and the Media. The significance of the 
issue-attention cycle‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 5, 5, pp. 458-466  
 
Heath, R. (1995) „The Kobe earthquake: Some realities of strategic management of 
crises and disasters‟, Disaster Prevention and Management, 4, 5, pp. 11-24 
 
Henderson, J.C. (2002) „Terrorism and tourism: managing the consequences of the Bali 
bombings‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15, 1, pp. 41-58 
 
Henderson, J. C. (2003a) „Case Study: Managing a health-related crisis: SARS in 
Singapore‟, Journal of Vacation Marketing, 10, 1, pp. 67-77 
 
Henderson, J. C. (2003b) „Communicating in a crisis: Flight SQ 006‟, Tourism 
Management, 24, 3, pp. 279-287 
 
128 
 
Henderson, J. C. and Ng, A. (2004) „Responding to crisis: Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) and hotels in Singapore‟, International Journal of Tourism Research, 
6, pp. 411-419 
 
Hitchcock, M. and Darma Putra, I. (2005) „The Bali bombings: Tourism crisis 
management and conflict avoidance‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 8, 1, pp. 62-76.  
 
Hoaglin, D.C., Light, R.J., McPeek, B., Mosteller, F. and Stoto, M.A. (1982) Data for 
decisions: Information strategies for policymakers, Abt Books: Cambridge, MA 
 
Hodder, I. (1994) „The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture‟ (chapter 24, 
pp. 377-393) In. Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, Sage: USA  
 
Hofstede, G.  (1983) „National cultures in four dimensions: A research based theory of 
cultural differences among  nations‟, International Studies of Management and 
Organization , 13, 1/2 , pp. 46-74 
 
Hollinshead, K. (2004) „A primer in ontological craft: the creative capture of people and 
places through qualitative research‟ (chapter 4, pp. 63-83) In. Phillimore, J. and 
Goodson, L. (Eds) (2004) Qualitative Research in Tourism - Ontologies, Epistemologies 
and Methodologies, Routledge:  Padstow, Cornwall  
 
Hopper, P. (2002) „Marketing London in a difficult climate‟, Journal of Vacation 
Marketing, 9, 1, pp. 81-88 
 
Hystad, P. and Keller, P.  (2006) „Disaster management: Kelowna tourism  
industry‟s preparedness, impact and response to a 2003 major forest fire‟,  
Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management, 13, 1, pp. 44-58 
 
Hystad, P.W. and Keller, P.C. ( 2008) „Towards a Destination Tourism Management  
Framework : Long-Term Lessons from a Forest Fire Disaster‟ , Tourism  
Management, 29, pp. 151-162 
 
Israeli, A. and Reichal, A. (2003) „Hospitality crisis management practices: the  
129 
 
Israeli case‟, International Journal of Hospitality Management, 22, 4, pp. 353-372 
 
Jennings, G. R. (2005) „Interviewing: a Focus on Qualitative Techniques‟ (chapter 9, pp. 
117) In. Ritchie, B.W., Burns, and Palmer, C.(Eds) ( 2005), Tourism Research Methods - 
Integrating theory with practice , CABI : King‟s Lynn  
 
Keown- McMullan, C. (1997) „Crisis: When does a molehill become a mountain?‟  
Disaster Prevention and Management, 6, 1, pp. 19-22 
 
Kim, S. S., Chun, H. and Lee, H. (2005) „The effects of SARS on the Korean hotel  
industry and measures to overcome the crisis: A case study of six Korean five-star  
hotels‟ , Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research , 10, 4, pp. 369-377  
 
King, B. (2000) „Institutions, research and development: tourism and the Asian financial 
crisis‟, International Journal of Tourism Research, 2, 2, pp. 133-136.  
 
Knights, D. and McCabe, D. (1997) „How would you measure something like that? : 
Quality in a retail bank‟, Journal of Management Studies, 34, 3, pp. 371-388  
 
Kolb, D. (1984) Experiential Learning, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall  
 
Kuo, H, I, Chen, C .C., Tseng, W.C ., Ju, L.F. and Huang, B.W. (2008) „ Assessing 
impacts of SARS and Avian Flu on international tourism demand in Asia‟,  Tourism 
Management , 29,  pp.917-928 
 
Lawton, G. and Page, S. (1997) „Evaluating travel agents‟ provision of health advice to 
travellers‟,  Tourism Management , 18, pp. 89-104 
 
Laws, E. and Prideaux, B. (2005) „Crisis management: a suggested typology‟, Journal 
of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2/3, pp. 1-8 
 
Lehrman, C.K. (1986) „When fact and fantasy collide: Crisis management in the 
tourism industry‟, Public Relations Journal, 42, 4, pp .25-28 
 
Lepp, A. and Gibson, H. (2003) „Tourist roles, perceived risk and international tourism‟, 
130 
 
Annals of Tourism Research, 30, 3, pp. 606-624 
 
Levy, D. (1994) „Chaos theory and strategy: theory, application and managerial 
implications‟, Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp. 167-178 
 
Lo, A., Chung, C. and Law, R. (2006) „The survival of hotels during disaster: A case 
study of Hong Kong in 2003‟ , Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research , 11, 1, pp. 65-
79 
 
Lovelock, B. (2004) „New Zealand Travel Agent Practice in the provision of advice for 
travel to risky destinations‟ , Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing , 15, 4, pp. 259-
280 
 
Mao, C.K., Cherng, G. and Lee, H. Y. (2009) „Post-SARS tourist arrival recovery 
patterns: An analysis based on catastrophe theory‟, (2009) Tourist Management (article 
in press)  
 
Mason, J. (2002) Qualitative Researching, Sage: Trowbridge, Wiltshire  
 
Mason, P., Grabowski, P. and Du, W. (2005) „Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 
tourism and the media‟, International Journal of Tourism Research, 7, pp. 11-21.  
 
Matthews, M.K., White, M.C. and Long, R, G.  (1999) „Why study the complexity 
sciences in the social sciences?‟, Human Relations, 25, pp. 439-461 
 
McLain, R.J. and Lee, R.G.  (1996) „Adaptive management: promises and pitfalls‟, 
Environmental Management, 20, 4, pp.437-448  
 
Mckercher, B.  (1999) „A chaos approach to tourism‟, Tourism Management, 20, pp. 
425-434 
 
McKercher, B. and Hui, E. L. L.  (2004) „Terrorism, economic uncertainty and 
outbound travel from Hong Kong‟, In:  Hall, C.M., Timothy, D.J and Duval, D.T (Eds) 
Safety and Security in Tourism. Relationships, Management and Marketing, pp. 99-116, 
Haworth Press: New York 
131 
 
 
Miller, G.A. and Ritchie, B.W.  (2003) „A farming crisis or a tourism disaster? An 
analysis of the Foot and Mouth disease in the UK‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 6, 2, pp. 
150-171 
 
Mistilis, N. and Sheldon, P.J.  (2005) „Knowledge management for tourism crises and 
disasters‟, In: Managing risk and crisis for sustainable tourism: Research and 
innovation (Best Education Network Think Tank V, Kingston, Jamaica June 16-19).  
 
Monterrubio, J.C.  (2010) „Short-term economic impacts of influenza A (H1N1) and 
government reaction on the Mexican tourism industry: an analysis of the media‟, 
International Journal of Tourism Policy, 3, 1, pp. 1-15 
 
Murphy, P.E. and Bayley, R. (1989) „Tourism and disaster planning‟ Geographical 
Review, 79, 1, pp. 36-46 
 
Okumus, F., Altinay, M. and Arasli, H. (2005) „The impact of Turkey‟s economic crisis 
of February 2001 on the tourism industry in Northern Cyprus‟, Tourism Management , 
26,  pp. 95-104  
 
Page, S., Yeoman, I., Munro, C., Connell, J. and Walker, L. (2006) „A case study of best 
practice- Visit Scotland‟s prepared response to an influenza pandemic‟ , Tourism 
Management , 27, pp.361-393 
 
Paraskevas, A. (2006) „Crisis management or crisis response system? A complexity 
science approach to organizational crises‟, Management Decision, 44, 7, pp. 892-907 
 
Peters, M. and Pikkemaat, B. (2005) „Crisis management in alpine winter sports resorts: 
the 1999 avalanche disaster in Tyrol‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2/3, 
pp. 9-20 
 
 
Pforr, C. (2006) „Tourism in post-crisis is tourism in pre-crisis: a review of the literature 
on crisis management in tourism‟, Curtin University of Technology School of 
Management Working Paper Series [online] URL: 
132 
 
http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=19723 
 
Pforr, C. and Hosie, P.J. (2007) „Crisis Management in Tourism : Preparing for  
Recovery‟,  Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing , 23, 2,3,4, pp. 249-264 
 
Phillimore, J. and Goodson, L. (2004) „Progress in qualitative research in tourism - 
Epistemology, ontology and methodology‟ (chapter 1, pp. 3-29) In. Phillimore, J. and 
Goodson, L. (Eds) (2004) Qualitative Research in Tourism - Ontologies, Epistemologies 
and Methodologies , Routledge:  Padstow, Cornwall  
 
Pizam, A. (2002) „Tourism and terrorism‟, International Journal of Hospitality 
Management, 21, 1, pp. 1-3.  
 
Pizam, A. and Mansfield, Y. (1996) Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues, 
John Wiley and Sons: Chichester  
 
Pizam, A. and Smith, G. (2000) „Tourism and terrorism: A quantitative analysis of major 
terrorist acts and their impact on tourism destinations‟, Tourism Economics, 6, 2, pp. 
123-138  
 
Pottorff, S.M. and Neal, D.M. (1994) „Marketing implications for post-disaster tourism 
destinations‟,  Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 3, 1, pp.115-122 
 
Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (1990) „The core competence of the corporation‟, 
Harvard Business Review, 68, 3, pp.79-91 
 
Prideaux, B. (1999) „The Asian financial crisis: Causes and implications for Australia‟s 
tourism industry‟,  Australian Journal of Hospitality Management, 6, 2, pp. 35-44 
 
Prideaux, B., Laws, E. and Faulkner, B. (2003) „Events in Indonesia: exploring the 
limits to formal tourism trends forecasting methods in complex crisis situations‟, 
Tourism Management, 24, pp.475-487 
 
Prideaux, B. (2003) „The need to use disaster planning frameworks to respond to major 
tourism disasters: analysis of Australia‟s response to tourism disasters in 2001‟, Journal 
133 
 
of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15, 4, pp. 281-298 
 
Riley, R.W. and Love, L.S. (2000) „The State of Qualitative Tourism Research‟, Annals 
of Tourism Research, 27, 1, pp. 164-187 
 
Ritchie, B.W., Dorrell, H., Miller, D. and Miller, G.A. (2003) „Crisis communication and 
recovery for the tourism industry: lessons from the 2001 Foot and Mouth disease 
outbreak in the United Kingdom‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15, 2/3, pp. 
199-216 
 
Ritchie, B.W. (2004) „Chaos, Crises and Disasters: A Strategic Approach to  
Crisis Management in the Tourism Industry‟ , Tourism Management,  25, pp. 669- 683 
 
Ritchie, B. (2008) , „Tourism Disaster Planning and Management : From Response 
 and Recovery to Reduction and Readiness‟ , Current Issues in Tourism , 11, 4, pp. 315-348 
 
Ritchie, B, W. (2009) Crisis and Disaster Management for Tourism. Great Britain:  
Channel View Publications 
 
Ritchie, J.R.B., Amaya Molinar, C.M. and Frechtling, D.C. (2010) „Impacts of the 
 world recession and economic crisis on tourism: North America‟ , Journal of Travel  
Research, 49, 1, pp. 5-15 
 
Robert, B. and Lajtha, C. (2002) „A new approach to crisis management‟, Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 10,4, pp.181-191 
 
Russell, R. and Faulkner, B. (2004) „Entrepreneurship, chaos and the tourism area  
lifecycle‟, Annals of Tourism Research , 31, 3, pp. 556-579 
 
Ryu, S. J. R. (2005) „Political Instability and its Effects on Tourism‟, In: Managing risk 
and crisis for sustainable tourism: Research and innovation (Best Education Network 
Think Tank V, Kingston, Jamaica June 16-19).  
 
Santana, G.  (2003) „Crisis Management and Tourism: Beyond the Rhetoric‟, Journal of 
Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15, 4, pp. 299-321 
134 
 
 
Schwandt, T.A. (1994) „Constructivist, Interpretist Approaches to Human Inquiry‟ 
(chapter 7, pp. 118-137) In. Denzin, N.K., and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Sage: USA  
 
Scott, N. and Laws, E. (2005) „Tourism crises and disasters: enhancing understanding of 
system effects‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2/3, pp.149-158 
 
Scott, R. (1988) „Managing a crisis in tourism: A case study of Fiji‟, Travel and Tourism 
Analyst, 6, pp. 57-71 
 
Scott, N., Laws, E. and Prideaux, B. (2007) „Tourism Crises and Marketing  
Recovery Strategies‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing , 23, 2,3,4, pp. 1-13 
 
SECTUR (2006) Programa Sectorial de Turismo 2007-2012   
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/PDF/PST2007-2012.pdf  [ accessed  17th May, 2011] 
 
SECTUR (2009) „Monitorea SECTUR destinos turisticos ante contingencia sanitaria‟  
SECTUR Sala de Prensa    
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_Boletin_044_Monitorea_Sectur_Destinos_Turist 
[accessed 29th June, 2010] 
 
SECTUR (2009) „Presenta El Presidente Felipe Calderon campana „Vive Mexico‟.  
SECTUR Sala de Prensa   
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_Boletin_060_Presenta_el_Presidente_Felipe_Cal 
[accessed 29th June, 2010] 
 
SECTUR (2009) „Inicia campana de promocion turistica „Welcome Back‟ en Norte  
America‟ SECTUR Sala de Prensa   
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_Boletin_067_Inicia_Campana_de_Promocion_Turis 
[accessed 29th June, 2010] 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
SECTUR (2009) „Retoma Turismo en Mexico senda de crecemiento‟ SECTUR Sala de  
Prensa 
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_Boletin_070_Retoma_Turismo_en_Mexico_Senda_d
e 
[accessed 30th June, 2010] 
 
SECTUR (2010) „Crece 35 por ciento el numero de turistas internacionales que visitan Mexico‟ 
SECTUR Sala de Prensa   
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/boletin_080_crece_35_por_ciento_el_numero_de_turis 
[accessed 15th October, 2010] 
 
SECTUR (2011) „? Como actuar ente una situation de emergencia ?‟   
http://www.sectur.gob.mx/wb/sectur/sect_8899_como_actuar_ente_un   
[accessed 14th September, 2010]  
 
Selbst, P. (1978), Management Handbook for Public Administrators. The Containment 
and Control of Organisational Crises, Van Nostrand: New York 
 
Sellnow, T.L., Seeger, M.W. and Ulmer, R.R. (2002) „Chaos theory, informational 
needs, and natural disasters‟, Journal of Applied Communication Research, 30, 4, pp. 
269-292 
 
Senge, P.M.,  Kleiner, A., Roberts,C., Ross, R.B. and Smith, B.S. (1994) The Fifth 
Discipline Field Book: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization, 
Nicholas Brealey Publishing: London  
 
Sharpley, R. (2005) „The tsunami and tourism: a comment‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 
8, 4, pp. 344-350 
 
Sharpley, R. and Craven, B. (2001) „The 2001 foot and mouth crisis- rural economy and 
tourism policy implications: a comment‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 4, 6, pp. 527-537 
 
Smith, D. (1990) „Beyond contingency planning: towards a model of crisis 
management‟, Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4, pp .263-275 
 
136 
 
Smith, D. and Sipika, C. (1993) „Back from the brink- post crisis management‟, Long 
Range Planning, 261, pp.28-38 
 
Sonmez, S., Backman, S. and Allen, L. (1994) Managing Tourism Crises: A Guidebook, 
Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism Management: Clemson University  
 
Sonmez, S.F. (1998) „Tourism, terrorism, and political instability‟, Annals of Tourism 
Research, 25, 2, pp. 416-456 
 
Srikatanyoo, N. and Campiranon, C. (2005) „Crisis management of the hotels in Phuket: 
A comparison of Thai and foreign hotel management style‟, ASAIHL-Thailand Journal, 
8, 2, pp. 165-176 
 
Stafford, G., Yu, L. and  Armoo, A. K. (2002) „Crisis management and recovery. How 
Washington, D.C. Hotels responded to terrorism‟, The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant 
Administration Quarterly, 43, 5, pp. 27-40.  
 
Stake, R. E. (1995) The Art of Case Study Research, Sage: USA  
 
Stake, R.E. (1994) „Case Studies‟ (chapter 14, pp. 236-247) In. Denzin, N.K., and 
Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative Research , Sage: USA  
 
Stewart, L. (1989) Does God play dice? The mathematics of chaos, Penguin Books: 
Middlesex, MA 
 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1994) „Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview‟ 
(chapter 17, pp. 262-273) In. Denzin, N.K., and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds) (1994) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Sage: USA  
 
 
„Swine Flu: the press reaction -How newspapers around the world covered the outbreak 
of swine flu‟ [online image] 2009. The Guardian    
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/gallery/2009/apr/28/swine-flu-press-
reaction#/?picture=346566333&index=15 [accessed 14th September, 2010] 
 
137 
 
Taylor, M.S. and Enz, C. A. (2002) „GMs‟, Responses to the Events of September 11, 
2001‟, Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly , February, pp. 7-20.  
 
Tew, P.J., Lu, Z., Tolomiczenko, G. and Gellatly, J. (2008) „SARS: Lessons in strategic 
planning for hoteliers and destination marketers‟,  International Journal of 
Contemporary Hospitality Management , 20, 3, pp. 332-346 
 
Thietart, R.A. and Forgues, B. (1995) „Chaos theory and organization‟, Organization 
Science, 6, 1, pp. 19-31 
 
Tse, A. C., So, S. and Sin, L. (2006) „Crisis management and recovery: How restaurants 
in Hong Kong responded to SARS‟,  International Journal of Hospitality Management, 
25,  pp. 3-11 
 
UNWTO (2009) World Tourism Barometer 7, 1, Jan. 
http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_1_en.pdf  [accessed 
September, 15
th
 2010] 
 
UNWTO (2009) World Tourism Barometer 7,2, June. 
http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_2_en.pdf  [accessed 
Septmber, 15
th
 2010] 
 
UNWTO (2010) Tourism Highlights   
http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/highlights/UNWTO_Highlights10_en_HR.pdf   
[accessed 17th May, 2011] 
 
Volo, S. (2007) „Communicating tourism crises through destination websites‟, Journal 
of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 23, 2, 3, 4, pp. 83-93 
 
Wang, Y.S. (2009) „The impact of crisis events and macroeconomic activity on Taiwan‟s 
international inbound tourism‟, Tourism Management, 30, pp. 75-82 
 
Wen, Z., Huimin, G. and Kavanaugh, R. R. (2005) „The impact of SARS on the 
consumer behaviour of Chinese domestic tourists‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 8,1, pp. 
22-38.  
138 
 
 
WEF (2009) The travel and tourism competitiveness report 
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/TTCR09/TTCR09_FullReport.pdf [accessed 24th 
October, 2010] 
 
Weick, K.E. (1993) „The collapse of sense making in organisations: the Mann Gulch 
disaster‟, Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, pp. 628-652 
 
Weiner, A.J. and Khan, H. (1972) „Crisis and arms control‟ In Hermann, C.F., 
International Crises: Insights from Behaviour Research (p.21), The Free Press: New 
York  
 
World Tourism Organization (2008) „Tourism 2020 vision‟ [online] Available from: 
http://www.unwto.org/statistics/index.htm [Accessed 16th June, 2010]  
 
Xu, J., and Grunewald, A. (2009) „What have we learned? A critical review of tourism 
disaster management‟, Journal of China Tourism Research, 5, 1, pp. 102-130 
 
Yin, R.K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Ed, Sage:  USA  
 
Young,W.B. and Montgomery, R.J. (1998) „Crisis management and its impact on 
destination marketing: A guide to convention and visitors bureaus‟,  Journal of 
Convention and Exhibition Management , 1, 1, pp. 3-18 
 
Yu, L. (2006) „A study of crisis management strategies of hotel managers in 
Washington, D.C. metro area‟, Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19, 2-3, pp. 
91-105.  
 
Zahra, A. and Ryan, C. (2007) „From chaos to cohesion- Complexity in tourism 
structures: an analysis of New Zealand‟s regional tourism organizations‟, Tourism 
Management, 28, pp. 854-862 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Zeng, B., Carter, R.W. and De Lacy, T. (2005) „Short-term perturbations and tourism 
effects: the case of SARS in China‟, Current Issues in Tourism, 8, 4, pp. 306-322 
 
 
 
140 
 
Appendix 1                                     Recent tourism crisis and disaster management publications 
 
 
Year 
 
Author (s) 
 
Title 
  
          Theme 
 
2001 
 Faulkner, W. Towards a framework for tourism 
disaster management 
Develops the tourism disaster management framework 
(TDMF) 
 Faulkner, W. and Vikulov,S. Katherine, washed out one day, back 
on track the next: a post-mortem of a 
tourism disaster 
Applies the TDMF to a case study in Australia 
 
2002 
 Frisby, E. Communicating in a crisis: the British 
tourist authority‟s responses to the 
foot-and-mouth outbreak and 9/11, 
2001 
A BTA press officer‟s review 
  Hopper, P. Marketing London in a difficult 
climate 
Short term marketing responses of the tourism industry and 
the government 
  Goodrich, J. September, 11
th
 2001 attack on 
America: a record of the immediate 
impacts and reactions in the USA 
travel and tourism industry 
Reaction of US travel and tourism industry to terrorist 
attacks 
 Henderson, J.C. Terrorism and tourism: managing the 
consequences of the Bali bombings 
Impacts and analysis of Bali bombings: applies Faulkner‟s 
framework 
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      Year         Author (s)                Title             Theme 
         
       2003 
Henderson, J.C. Managing a health-related crisis: 
SARS in Singapore 
Study of SARS outbreak in Singapore 
 Henderson, J.C. Communicating in a crisis: flight SQ 
006 
Reaction of Singapore Airlines to a plane crash 
 Miller, G..A and Ritchie, 
B.W  
A farming crisis or a tourism disaster? 
An analysis of the foot-and-mouth 
disease in the UK 
Application of Faulkner‟s model and case study of the 
Cheltenham festival 
 Ritchie, B.W et al. Crisis communication and recovery for 
the tourism industry: lessons from the 
2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak 
in the United Kingdom 
Analysis of crisis communication of British tourism 
authority and a district council 
 Blake, A. and Sinclair, M.T. Tourism crisis management: US 
response to 9/11 
Examines the effects of crisis using a computer model 
 Prideaux, B. et al. Events in Indonesia: exploring the 
limits to formal tourism trends 
forecasting methods in complex crisis 
situations 
Examination of forecasting methods using the case of 
Indonesia‟s political and economic crises of 1997 
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Year Author (s) Title                            Theme 
 Prideaux, B. The need to use disaster planning 
frameworks and respond to major 
tourism disasters: analysis of 
Australia‟s response to tourism 
disasters in 2001 
Application of TDMF to crises affecting Australia in 2001 
 Ritchie, B.W. Chaos, crises and disasters: a strategic 
approach to crisis management in the 
tourism industry 
Discusses a strategic and holistic approach to crisis 
management in the tourism industry 
 Santana, G. Crisis management and tourism: 
beyond the rhetoric 
Case study of effects of a known hazard on a beach resort in 
Brazil 
          
         2004 
Henderson, J.C. and Ng, A Responding to crisis: severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and 
hotels in Singapore 
Effects of SARS on Singapore‟s hotel sector and proposal of 
guidelines based on TDMF 
 de Sausmarez, N. Crisis management for the tourism 
sector: preliminary considerations in 
policy development 
Development of a sectoral crisis management plan and 
examination of Malaysia‟s government response to financial 
crisis of 1997 
    
         2005 
Scott, N. and Laws, E. Tourism crises and disasters: 
enhancing understanding of system 
effects 
Analysis of a systems perspective approach to tourism crisis 
management 
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        Year      Author (s) Title                        Theme 
 Laws, E. and Prideaux, B. Crisis management: a suggested 
typology 
A typology of tourism crisis terms 
 Eugenio-Martin, J.L et al. Quantifying the effects of tourism 
crises: an application to Scotland 
Provides a model which quantifies the response of different 
nationalities to different crises and applies to American, 
French and German tourism demand in Scotland 
 Mason, P et al. Severe acute respiratory syndrome and 
the media 
Focuses on media sensationalism during the SARS outbreak 
 Peters, M. and Pikeemaat, 
B. 
Crisis management in Alpine winter 
sports resorts- the 1999 avalanche 
disaster in Tyrol 
Investigates the disaster management process in Austria 
before and after an avalanche 
 Anderson, B.A. Crisis management in the Australian 
tourism industry: preparedness, 
personnel and postscript 
Explores the preparedness of organisations in relation to 
crises affecting the tourism industry 
 Zeng, B et al. Short-term perturbations and tourism 
effects: the case of SARS in China 
Effects on tourism of short-term crises and the effects of 
SARS in China 
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Year Author (s) Title                       Theme 
 Cioccio, L. and Michael, 
E.J. 
Hazard or disaster: tourism 
management for the inevitable in 
Northeast Victoria 
Analysis of how small businesses prepared for and 
recovered from the 2003 bushfires in Australia 
 Mistilis, N. and Sheldon, 
P.J. 
Knowledge management for tourism 
crises and disasters 
Development of a knowledge framework for tourism 
disaster management at the public sector level 
 Okumus, F. et al. The impact of Turkey‟s economic 
crisis of February 2001 on the tourism 
industry in Northern Cyprus 
A case study approach regarding the effects of Turkey‟s 
economic crisis on tourism in Cyprus 
 Evans, N. and Elphick, S. Models of crisis management: an 
evaluation of their value for strategic 
planning in the international tourism 
industry 
A case study of a UK based tour operator‟s response to 
September, 11
th
, 2001 and application of a crisis 
management model 
 Sharpley, R. The tsunami and tourism: a comment Comment on the Indian ocean tsunami of 2004 
 
     2006 
Hystad, P and Keller, P. Disaster management: Kelowna 
tourism industry‟s preparedness, 
impact and response to a major 2003 
forest fire 
A case study investigating the relationship between a forest 
fire and the local tourism industry 
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Year Author (s) Title               Theme 
 Page, S. et al. A case study of best practice- Visit 
Scotland‟s prepared response to an 
influenza pandemic 
A scenario planning exercise for a global flu pandemic 
 Pforr, C. Tourism in post-crisis is tourism in pre-
crisis: a review of the literature on 
crisis management in tourism 
Exploring current academic discourse 
 Paraskevas, A. Crisis management or crisis response 
system? A complexity science to 
organizational crises 
Complexity theory approach to a hotel chain food poisoning 
crisis 
 
    2007 
Pforr, C. and Hosie, P.J Crisis management for tourism:      
preparing for recovery 
Suggestions made regarding the importance of human 
resources in tourism crisis management 
 Scott, N. et al. 
 
 
Tourism crises and marketing recovery 
strategies 
Examines how to rebuild the market for a tourism service or 
destination following a significant catastrophe 
 Volo, S. Communicating tourism crises through 
destination websites 
Addresses the issue of crisis communication using a 
destination‟s website 
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Year Author (s) Title                              Theme 
 Blackman, D. and Ritchie, 
B.W. 
Tourism crisis management and 
organizational learning: the role of 
reflection in developing effective 
DMO crisis strategies 
Discusses the application of critical evaluative inquiry and 
managed reflection following a crisis 
 Carlsen. J.C. and Hughes, 
M. 
  
Tourism market recovery in the 
Maldives after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami 
Case study of market response and recovery in the Maldives 
 Kuo et al. Assessing the impacts of SARS and 
Avian flu on international tourism 
demand to Asia 
Assesses the impact of two infectious diseases on tourism 
demand to Asia by use of statistical analysis 
 Carlsen, J.C. and Liburd, J. Developing a research agenda for 
tourism crisis management, market 
recovery and communications 
Discussion on the need to develop a research agenda for the 
field 
 de Sausmarez, N. Crisis management, tourism and 
sustainability: the role of indicators 
Evaluates the role of indicators, using empirical data 
gathered in Malaysia 
 
    2008 
Ritchie, B.W. Tourism disaster planning and 
management: from response and 
recovery to reduction and readiness 
Suggests a „post-disciplinary‟ approach to research to 
facilitate more effective planning 
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Year Author (s) Title                               Theme 
 Hystad, P.W. and Keller, P.C Towards a destination tourism disaster 
management framework: long-term 
lessons from a forest fire disaster 
Follow up to previous case study (see above) which offers a 
framework concerning stakeholder preparedness 
 Tew, P.J. et al.  SARS: lessons in strategic planning for 
hoteliers and destination marketers 
Reviews impact of SARS epidemic and offers guidance to 
hoteliers and marketers in the Niagara region 
 
    2009 
Wang, Y. The impact of crisis events and 
macroeconomic activity on Taiwan‟s 
international inbound tourism 
Examines the impact of four disasters on Taiwan‟s inbound 
tourism 
 Mao, C. et al. Post-SARS tourist arrival recovery 
patterns: an analysis based on 
catastrophe theory 
Examines post SARS inbound arrivals from Japan, Hong 
Kong and the USA to Taiwan using the cusp catastrophe 
model 
 
   2010 
Monterrubio, J.C. 
 
 
Short-term economic impacts of 
influenza A (H1N1) and government 
reaction on the Mexican tourism 
industry: an analysis of the media 
Examines economic impacts and government reaction to the 
AH1N1 Influenza crisis in Mexico 
 Ritchie, J.R.B. et al.  Impacts of the world recession and 
economic crisis on tourism: North 
America 
Examines the impact of the 2009/2010 economic climate on 
North American tourism 
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Appendix 2  
 
Applications of Faulkner‟s framework  
 
  
 Author (s) and topic    Application 
 
  Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) 
  Katherine Flood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) attempt to apply Faulkner‟s original framework by examining the 1998 Australia Day flood at 
Katherine, Australia.  The focus of Faulkner and Vikulov‟s study is to observe the impact of the disaster and the response of the 
tourism sector; this is achieved by utilising a qualitative, inducted approach by means of loosely structured interviews using a 
„disaster incident response evaluation‟ grid, which provides a framework for the respondents to recollect events. The objective 
of the interviews is to evaluate ; (i) the unfolding of events, (ii) the responses of individuals and organisations and the reasons 
for these responses, (iii) if actions taken were pre-planned, (iv)  if in hindsight, individuals would have reacted differently and, 
(v)  how a more effective reaction from other parties could have been gained. The grid format corresponds with the disaster 
phases identified in Faulkner‟s (2001) disaster management framework. A workshop phase is devised in order to check the data 
for contradictions and cross-check against secondary data from the media and official reports and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the various responses. The workshop also seeks to identify ways in which the disaster has led to changes in the approach to 
tourism management. 
 
The conclusions of the research, according to Faulkner and Vikulov (2001,p. 343),  highlight the necessity of the “development 
and on-going review of destination disaster management plans to become a routine component of the …agenda” and further   
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Author (s) and topic  Application  
  
convinces the authors of the need for advance planning. The importance of a coordinated approach is emphasised; however, the 
authors suggest that the regional tourism association should concentrate on the ‟tourism-specific disaster management strategy‟, 
including recovery stage marketing strategies which reinforce the positive changes brought about by the disaster and counter-act 
the negative changes, and the emergency services attention should focus their attention on more specific disaster management, 
such as visitor and employee safety.  
 
Faulkner and Vikulov  produce a revised version of the disaster management framework, which is particularly appropriate for 
destinations affected by flooding ;  it encourages the employment of further case study research concerning a range of disasters 
to test the applicability of the revised framework in a different situation. 
       
     Henderson (2002) 
      Bali bombings 
 
Henderson investigates the nightclub bombings in Bali of 2002 and applies the framework. The disaster began at the emergency 
stage, and soon progressed to the intermediate and long-term recovery, although at the time of writing  resolution is regarded as 
being “a distant prospect.” (2002, p. 54). Henderson recommends advance planning, as disasters which begin at the emergency 
stage allow no time for preparation, and also  advises ongoing risk assessment and contingency planning.   
 
      
    Prideaux (2003) 
    Australia 2001 
 
 
Prideaux investigates crises affecting the Australian tourism industry in 2001 and applies them to the framework. In comparing 
the actual responses (in this case from the government) to the suggested response mechanisms of Faulkner‟s framework, it 
becomes evident that the crisis lacked a pre-event stage and there was no defined prodromal stage, thus leading to a delayed                                                                     
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Author (s) and topic Application 
  
response. Prideaux concludes by suggesting that with some slight modifications, Faulkner‟s framework could indeed be used in 
larger and multiple crises and in a wide range of situations, and that without such measures the tourism industry will continue to 
suffer unnecessary disruptions. 
 
    Miller and Ritchie (2004) 
    Foot and Mouth  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A further application of the framework is made by Miller and Ritchie (2003) in response to the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak in 
the UK. A lack of preparedness is noted in the pre-event stage, while the extended length of the prodromal stage serves to create 
divisions between the tourism industry and the farming industry, in stark contrast to Faulkner‟s advocated „united‟ and 
„coordinated‟ approach. Problems emerge with the similarly lengthy emergency stage, which leads to intense media scrutiny, 
along with political influences affecting government policy. The intermediate stage is characterised by divisions regarding 
marketing strategy, the recovery stage is basically a continuation of the intermediate stage, while the resolution stage, with its 
potential for single or double loop learning (Kolb, 1984), brings about governmental changes with the creation of a new 
government ministry and crisis management unit (evidence of government misunderstanding and neglect of the tourism 
industry, according to the authors), but, unfortunately, reflection serves to highlight the deep divisions that occurred during the 
crisis.  
 
In contrast to Prideaux‟s positive comments regarding Faulkner„s framework, Miller and Ritchie (2003) offer some criticism by 
suggesting that the framework is limited,  as all crises and disasters differ in size and scope.  They note that there are obvious 
differences between the Katherine flood and the Foot and Mouth crisis;  the disaster stages in the Foot and Mouth case are not as 
identifiable as in the Katherine flood situation and the disaster was played out in much larger geographical área and in a much 
larger time scale (the problem of an indefinite crisis duration is also noted by Beirman (2003) in relation to Israel) and conclude   
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Author (s) and topic   Application 
  
that while the framework is useful for analysis, it would not be of much use to managers attempting to navigate their way 
through such a crisis. The lack of discernible crisis phases provokes difficulties; it is unclear whether the crisis is in the 
emergency or intermediate phase and distinct regions appear to enter phases at different moments, thus leading to confusion as 
to what is the appropriate strategic response and which plans to use. 
 
 Henderson and Ng (2004) 
 SARS in Singapore 
 
Henderson and Ng  apply the framework to a case study which investigates how hotels in Singapore react to the SARS crisis. 
They note that the crisis begins almost immediately at the emergency stage. “The sudden onset of the crisis and its nature cut 
short any pre-event or prodromal stages, with no chance of evasion and very little time to prepare” (2004, p.414), and  argue that 
this is evidence of the crisis not corresponding with crisis management theory.  
 
The authors advocate a set of guidelines for hoteliers in case of future similar occurrences, firmly recommending pre-event 
planning due to the evident lack of preparedness of Singaporean hoteliers. 
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 Appendix 3   
 An explanation of chaos theory  
       
                             Chaos theory                                         Elements  
  „The study of nonlinear dynamic systems‟ (Levy, 1994: 167) 
    In 1963 meteorologist Edward Lorenz, in the process of simulating 
weather patterns, discovered that even very small changes to initial 
conditions resulted in very different outcomes. This ultimately led to the 
conclusion that minute differences to the initial conditions of any 
dynamic, non-linear system (not just the weather) can result in drastic 
changes. This led to the term „ butterfly effect‟ as it was considered that 
even something as trivial as the flapping of a butterfly‟s wings had the 
potential to evoke dramatic atmospheric conditions thousands of miles 
away.  
   However, it was also noted that despite the disruption and change, the 
situation would revert to what Faulkner and Russell (2004:557) call „a 
new order‟, often an improvement on the previous position. A number of 
elements exist within chaos theory which eventually lead to the „new 
order‟ 
   „Chaos theory, then, points simultaneously to the inherent disorder, 
randomness, complexity, and unpredictability; and to the inherent order, 
pattern, and general predictability in an effort to understand the operation 
of large, complex systems.‟ (Sellnow et al., 2002: 273) 
 
 ‘Edge-of-chaos’: „An “edge-of-chaos” state exists where a system has 
reached a point of tenuous equilibrium.‟ (Faulkner and Russell, 2004: 558) 
 
 Bifurcation: „…the flashpoints of change where a systems direction, 
character, and/or structure are fundamentally disrupted.‟ (Sellnow et al., 
2002: 271) 
 
 Cosmology: „…all existing forms of sensemaking fail to account for 
experiences‟ (Sellnow et al., 2002: 271) 
 
 Self-organisation: „…this new order appears to arise from inner 
guidelines and principles rather than by being imposed by external forces.‟ 
(Sellnow et al., 2002: 272) 
 
 Strange attractors: „Strange attractors may take the form of general and 
fundamental social assumptions, values, first principles, conflicting 
tensions and needs, or oppositional paradoxes to which a social system 
naturally and continually returns.‟ (Sellnow et al., 2002: 273) 
 
‘Lock-in-effect’: „…a strong network of mutually reinforcing 
relationships that…endure long after the initiating conditions have been 
superseded‟. (Faulkner, 2000: 10) 
 
